54 years after Operation Searchlight and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s historic declaration of the independence of Bangladesh, the country stands at a critical juncture yet again. As in 1971, decisions in Dhaka could alter regional dynamics, especially vis-à-vis India and Pakistan, with whom Bangladesh’s destiny has been closely intertwined.
There is growing bonhomie between Bangladesh’s Muhammad Yunus-led interim government and Pakistan — a development that has not gone unnoticed in New Delhi, whose relationship with Dhaka faces uncertainties. A much anticipated meeting between Yunus and India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi on the sidelines of the upcoming BIMSTEC Summit in Thailand is unlikely to happen. Meanwhile, Bangladesh’s relations with Pakistan as well as China are deepening.
Evolving Foreign Policy: Liberation to the July Uprising
While Bangladesh’s relations with Pakistan have warmed since the fall of the Sheikh Hasina government on August 5 last year, ties between the two countries were by and large fraught for decades. Dhaka’s foreign policy stemmed from a troubled and contested history, a lack of ideological consensus, and a sharply divided polity, among other geoeconomic and regional considerations.
The division of Pakistan in 1971, within 24 years of its birth, which led to the creation of an independent Bangladesh, left a deep imprint on Pakistan’s psyche. Pakistan and Bangladesh thus began their bilateral journey on a hostile note; it took Pakistan close to three years to recognize the new state. The animosity persisted for decades, especially during Awami League (AL) rule, with the issue of Pakistani war crimes being a major irritant in bilateral relations.
Many in Bangladesh view liberation from Pakistan as a bedrock of their national identity, while some never reconciled to the split. Its foreign policy has grappled with varying notions of nationalism, with the AL, the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) and the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) having starkly different visions and conflicting foreign policy approaches. While the AL had close historical ties with India — Sheikh Hasina not only built close political, economic, and strategic relations with Delhi but was also sympathetic to India’s concerns over Pakistan — the BNP under Ziaur Rahman sought to diversify relations, especially with China, and fostered better ties with Pakistan. The JI, which collaborated with Pakistan during the liberation war and opposed the liberation of Bangladesh, was perceived as being staunchly anti-India and as Pakistan’s proxy. Hasina banned the JI and convicted and hanged its leaders for atrocities and war crimes committed in 1971.
While Bangladesh’s relationship with Pakistan was largely distant, ties with India were close, especially over the past 15 years of AL rule. A strong bilateral relationship saw India standing by Hasina despite the authoritarian slide in her governance. Hasina’s resignation last year set in motion dramatic changes in Bangladesh’s domestic politics. An interim government under Muhammad Yunus that took charge on August 8 lifted the ban on the JI, and the BNP and JI are actively mobilizing ahead of elections. There have been dramatic changes on the foreign policy front as well.
Bangladesh and Pakistan: Growing Friendship
Since Yunus took charge in Bangladesh, there have been significant developments in Dhaka’s relations with Islamabad across the diplomatic, military, economic, and cultural domains. The political leadership has met on multiple occasions. Chief Adviser Yunus and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif met on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly summit in New York in September 2024 and again in Cairo three months later. They pledged to settle the issues of 1971 and open a “new page” to enhance cooperation. They also spoke of reviving the SAARC. Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar described Bangladesh as a “long lost brother” and is expected to visit Dhaka soon, marking the first such high-level visit since 2012. Pakistan’s High Commissioner to Dhaka Syed Ahmed Maroof has been active, attending events and holding consultations.
Pakistani and Bangladeshi military officials have also met to step up defense cooperation. Top army and navy officers, including the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) chief, have exchanged visits. Armies that went to war against each other are now describing their relationship as one between “two brotherly nations” united in resisting “external influences.” The Pakistan Army may also train its Bangladeshi counterpart, while the Bangladesh navy recently participated in a multinational naval exercise in Karachi. Bangladesh could also buy JF-17 “Thunder” fighter jets from Pakistan.
Besides, economic relations have picked up with the two sides resuming direct trade and establishing a direct sea link. Bangladesh’s National Board of Revenue has scrapped the requirement for mandatory physical inspection of imports from Pakistan. There are plans for direct flights between the two countries. Dhaka is also easing visa restrictions for Pakistani nationals.
Cultural interaction has grown as well. Students who led the July Uprising organized a concert featuring Pakistani musicians in December 2024. Jinnah’s birth and death anniversaries were celebrated at the Press Club in Dhaka with Urdu songs and poetry. Dhaka University, an epicenter of the liberation movement as well as the July Uprising, has reversed its 2015 decision to shut its doors to Pakistani students.
Bangladesh and India: Emerging Uncertainties
The change in regime in Dhaka has resulted in major developments in Bangladesh’s relations with India. Diplomatic spats have erupted, as have tensions along the economy and India-Bangladesh border.
An important issue of contention between Delhi and Dhaka is India’s reluctance to extradite Hasina to face trial for alleged atrocities in Bangladesh, despite the Yunus regime’s repeated requests on the matter. Meanwhile, India called out the interim regime for failing to act robustly to prevent attacks on the Hindu minority, and Dhaka was upset when Hindu right-wing mobs targeted its consulate in Agartala. Both sides issued official statements calling on the other to prevent violence. There have been other discouraging signals from Dhaka as well. It stayed away from an Indian event celebrating the 150th anniversary of the India Meteorological Department, and a program on judges training. A significant low emerged when Mahfuz Alam, an adviser in the interim government, shared a social media post blaming India for “ghettoizing” Bangladesh. He also shared a controversial map showing Indian territories as part of Bangladesh. A former Bangladeshi army officer called for a change in Bangladesh’s national anthem, which he argued was “imposed by India.”
Additionally, there have been tensions along the border. Bangladesh has objected and obstructed India’s building of a border fence. Farmers from both countries have clashed. In 2024, India’s Border Security Force seized contraband items worth millions of rupees, the highest in ten years.
Economic ties have frayed as well. Dhaka has placed an Adani Group power project under review, and Indian exports to Bangladesh have fallen. Bangladesh has also withdrawn participation as a transit point in an Internet broadband project.
However, there have been some positive developments too. India’s Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri visited Dhaka and Foreign Minister Jaishankar met his Bangladeshi counterpart in Oman. The two governments have also continued official talks on the border and river water sharing agreements. Besides, their navies recently participated in a joint naval exercise. Additionally, India has not reduced its allocation of assistance for Bangladesh in this year’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) budget.
Implications for India
New Delhi has significant economic, political, and strategic stakes in Bangladesh and the future course of Bangladesh-Pakistan relations. The recent developments in Dhaka’s ties with Pakistan have deepened New Delhi’s geopolitical concerns. While India has not directly commented on the relationship between the two sovereign nations, its MEA spokesperson said it is keeping a close watch on activities in the neighborhood, especially those related to its national security. India would take the necessary steps as per the circumstances, he said. However, Indian Army Chief General Dwivedi was more forthright. He described the “relationship” between the “epicentre of terrorism,” i.e., Pakistan and a “neighbouring country,” i.e., Bangladesh, as a “major concern” for India.
India shares a long, porous border with Bangladesh. The latter adjoins West Bengal and four states in the conflict-ridden Northeast. Should Pakistan’s presence in Bangladesh increase, Delhi fears that ISI agents would provide support to insurgents there. India has, therefore, ramped up security in its areas bordering Bangladesh, particularly at the Siliguri corridor. In addition to concerns over the smuggling of weapons and drugs into India, Delhi is apprehensive over the spread of ideas and radicalism. Bangladesh’s growing ties with Pakistan, the increasing influence of JI and radical groups like the Hefazat-e-Islam and Ansarullah Bangla Team, along with attacks on minorities and Sufi shrines, have alarmed New Delhi.
At a time when India’s pre-eminence in South Asia is being challenged by China and in the context of warming ties between Bangladesh and China — Yunus recently visited Beijing where he signed nine agreements — India is worried over Dhaka’s growing proximity with Islamabad and Beijing. Delhi’s deteriorating relations with Bangladesh could also impact the country’s eastward push, envisioned in its Act East Policy and initiatives such as BIMSTEC.
Public sentiment in favor of Pakistan has grown in Bangladesh. Less than 10 percent of Bangladesh’s population is above the age of 60 years, which means that most Bangladeshis do not remember a life in “East Pakistan” but have experienced living in India’s “shadow.” This Indian dominance, perceived or real, has ignited strong views. A public survey in Bangladesh in October 2024 revealed that 59 percent of respondents “liked” Pakistan and 53.6 percent shared the same feeling for India. However, the disparity was starker regarding whom they disliked. 28.5 percent and 41. 3 percent of Bangladeshis “disliked” Pakistan and India, respectively.
Conclusion
That Modi is yet to meet Yunus is of concern. The upcoming BIMSTEC meeting provided the two leaders with an opportunity for a face-to-face meeting. New Delhi has turned away from that opportunity.
While recent developments in Bangladesh’s foreign policy suggest a transformation, it might be an oversimplification to interpret Dhaka’s relationships with New Delhi and Islamabad as a zero-sum game. If Bangladesh decides to deepen ties with Pakistan, it is unlikely to be at the expense of India as its economy and geography closely tie Bangladesh more to India than Pakistan. What we are seeing is an attempt by Dhaka to diversify its partnerships. Pakistan, meanwhile, wants to counterbalance India.
The current regime in Bangladesh is an interim and provisional one, and elections are expected within a year. The conduct of elections and its outcome will significantly impact not only the future course of Bangladesh’s domestic politics but also, regional geo-politics. A polity that has remained deeply divided between two parties — the AL and BNP — is seeing the emergence of new forces like the student-led Jatiya Nagorik Party. The role of the army is another important factor.
India is closely watching developments unfold in Bangladesh. While it must desist from being seen to be taking sides in Bangladeshi politics, it cannot remain idle. It must boost engagement with all sections in Bangladesh to ensure that the bilateral relationship between Dhaka and Delhi, built over decades of work, is not undone. Yunus’ recent description of the bilateral relationship as historically, politically and economically inseparable and attribution of differences between the two countries to “propaganda” provides hope.
