Traditionally, Indonesia has adhered to a “bebas dan aktif” – “free and active” – foreign policy, whereby Jakarta keeps a careful balance in its foreign relations with rival great powers. However, the new Indonesian president, Prabowo Subianto, aims to implement a more active foreign policy compared to his predecessor, President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo. Does this signal a sea change in Indonesia’s approach?
Assessing Prabowo’s first foreign policy actions, early signals say no. His approach is best described as “more active” but still “free” – or non-aligned – in line with Indonesia’s longstanding commitment to a hedging foreign policy. However, there are a few longer-term issues to watch regarding China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) that could herald obstacles to Indonesia’s regional security if they become trends over the course of Prabowo’s tenure.
Prabowo So Far
Since taking office in October 2024, Prabowo has worked to make his mark on domestic policy, including by carving out more space for the Indonesian military to involve itself in politics. In particular, the new president has turned to the military to fill key domestic policy roles, just as it did during the Suharto years. This includes the army’s implementation of Prabowo’s signature free meals policy. At the same time, this has been balanced out by Prabowo’s large tent coalition incorporating most political parties, the largest in decades with 48 ministers and 58 vice-ministers. Prabowo has also moved to slash the government budget by 8.5 percent and transfer much of the money to a new sovereign wealth fund under his control. Appointing his longtime ally, Sugiono, as foreign minister signals how foreign policymaking is similarly more concentrated in his office than under Jokowi.
Prabowo quickly put his stamp on the world stage with a slew of early international trips and engagements. His administration sent a strong signal by traveling to Beijing for Prabowo’s first international trip as president. President Xi Jinping and Prabowo inked $10 billion in bilateral deals, but a concerning joint statement grabbed the most headlines. It called for the joint development of resources in the South China Sea within Indonesia and China’s overlapping maritime claims, seemingly affording recognition to Chinese claims. By implicitly recognizing China’s illegal nine-dash line in the South China Sea, Jakarta would be seriously breaking with the other ASEAN claimant states. However, the Foreign Ministry rapidly issued a clarification denying any formal recognition of Beijing’s maritime claims.
Yet, this outreach to Beijing does not mean a decisive shift away from the United States. Immediately following the trip to Beijing, Prabowo traveled to Washington to meet with then-U.S. President Joe Biden, while also placing a personal phone call to President Donald Trump to congratulate him on his election victory. Despite the initial Beijing trip, Indonesia-U.S. ties are proceeding as normal. Under the new Trump administration, Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s eighth official call after assuming his duties was with Sugiono, ahead of several key U.S. allies.
Following China and the United States, the Prabowo administration kept up his rapid pace of visits. The new president traveled to Peru for the APEC Summit, Brazil for the G-20 Summit, the United Kingdom, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt – all during November and December. In January and February, Prabowo found himself in Malaysia twice and India, while also welcoming Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Secretary of the Russian Federation Security Council (and longtime Putin ally) Sergei Shoigu to Indonesia. Indicating some interest in leading the Global South, Jakarta also formally decided to join BRICS.
These moves make it clear that the Prabowo administration has not departed substantially from Jokowi. The pace of outreach is certainly faster, but Indonesia remains committed to “hedging,” which describes foreign policy behavior designed to avoid dependence on any one outside actor while keeping positive ties to as many powers as possible.
Traveling to Beijing and Washington back-to-back signals that Prabowo does not aim to adopt either a pro-China or pro-U.S. agenda but rather to forge deals with both. Hs outreach to countries throughout both the Global South and with rising middle powers like India, Japan, Turkiye, and the UAE positions Indonesia as a leader among the developing countries, thus harkening back to Indonesia’s days as a leader in the Cold War Non-Aligned Movement. Indonesia’s approach under Prabowo has not fundamentally changed.
Trends in Indonesian Foreign Policy
Yet, there are longer term concerns to watch. For one, the South China Sea debacle sends a worrisome signal about Indonesia’s capacity to start punching in its own weight class in an increasingly cutthroat world of great power competition. The China-Indonesia joint statement was most likely the result of a genuine (but single-minded) desire to ensure stable bilateral relations with China and net new Chinese investments that could contribute to an early economic win for Prabowo that collided with inexperience and human error. Given the public backtracking by the Foreign Ministry, the debacle may simply have been a mistake by the new administration, especially as the president has concentrated decision-making in his office away from the traditional bureaucracy.
Second, and perhaps in a more intentional shift, Sugiono skipped an ASEAN Foreign Ministers meeting held in Thailand in December. The meeting focused on addressing the ongoing crisis in Myanmar, one of the most doggedly intractable problems facing the regional grouping. Indeed, due to its consensus and non-interference norms, ASEAN remains deadlocked on controversial issues like Myanmar and the South China Sea, particularly with China’s ability to pressure its closest partners to hamstring collective responses to Beijing’s aggression. It is possible that Prabowo may be attempting to reshuffle Indonesia’s foreign relations priorities, with ASEAN falling lower down the list than before.
This would be a real shift if it continues throughout Prabowo’s term. Historically, Indonesia has served as the de facto leader of ASEAN by virtue of its size and strength. Indeed, Indonesia pushed hard to advance the project in its early days. ASEAN first formed in 1967 as a counter to Chinese expansionism, with then-Indonesian President Suharto leading the charge in strengthening the capacities of regional states to resist outside influence. If Prabowo sees less utility in attempting to reform the grouping to better tackle the twin challenges of the South China Sea and Myanmar’s civil war, that may say a lot about the long-term (poor) health of the regional grouping.
Indonesia’s Longer Term Foreign Policy in a Tense Neighborhood
In sum, “free and active” remains the watch phrase describing Indonesian foreign policy. Prabowo has crisscrossed the world in his first months as Indonesia’s leader, aiming to put Jakarta’s partnerships on solid footing even as he reorganizes much of Indonesia’s approach to domestic policy. If it continues in the coming years, the only significant genuine change would be the apparent downgrading of ASEAN in Indonesian calculations.
Prabowo may see extraregional partners as the key to ensuring Indonesian security and prosperity, but a weak ASEAN might prove detrimental to Jakarta’s long-term interests. Fundamentally, ASEAN’s raison d’etre is to ensure Southeast Asia can stand together in the face of larger powers. Without it, even Indonesia, although massive compared to its Southeast Asian neighbors, would likely find itself in trouble in a one-to-one matchup against China. However, fixing ASEAN would require Jakarta to take steps that would either anger its immediate neighbors, such as pushing for punishment of Myanmar’s junta, or draw Beijing’s wrath, if Jakarta decides to openly back up the Philippines and Vietnam against China in the South China Sea. Right now, it is clear that Indonesia does not see rocking the boat as in its immediate, primarily economic, interest.
From a U.S. perspective, there might be opportunity with Prabowo at the helm in Jakarta, especially as he seeks to boost Indonesia’s economic performance. Indonesia is the world’s largest producer of nickel, but its industry remains dominated by Chinese firms. It is also a large, emerging market and the de facto leader of the most critical region for China-U.S. competition. Greater U.S. market access, arms sales, coordination on maritime security, and private sector investment could reduce Indonesia’s reliance upon China for economic engagement, which is the primary driving force behind Jakarta’s need to cooperate with Beijing despite the security threat.
Given Prabowo’s clear interest and investment in raising Indonesia’s profile on the world stage, Washington has a rare opportunity to further deepen Indonesia-U.S. ties and set the United States up for long-term success in Southeast Asia. Better relations with Indonesia can help make the U.S. stronger and more prosperous.
