The Baloch Liberation Army’s (BLA) self-sacrificing Majeed Brigade carried out a Fidayee (suicide attack) in Noshki, Balochistan on March 16. A suicide bomber in a VBIED (vehicle-borne improvised explosive device) targeted a Pakistan Army convoy consisting of eight buses on the RCD Highway, according to a BLA statement. The explosion completely destroyed one military bus, after which the Fateh Squad, the BLA’s elite unit, launched a coordinated ground assault.
According to the BLA, the Fateh Squad systematically eliminated all military personnel in another bus. The BLA claims to have killed a total of 90 Pakistani soldiers in the attack.
Pakistan’s military released far smaller casualty counts, saying that five people – “three security forces personnel and two innocent civilians” – were killed. The press wing of Pakistan’s military, Inter-Services Public Relations, also said that the military had killed three of the attackers.
The Noshki bus attack marks another escalation in the insurgency in Balochistan, Pakistan’s southwestern province. The BLA is no longer relying on sporadic guerrilla attacks; its operations now involve highly coordinated battlefield tactics and the integration of suicide attacks with conventional guerrilla warfare. The Fateh Squad’s role in this attack highlights the BLA’s ability to conduct well-planned follow-up assaults, ensuring maximum damage after a suicide attack.
The attack in Noshki also followed just days after the high-profile hijacking of the Jaffar Express, in which at least 21 passengers were killed (according to Pakistan’s military; the BLA claimed to have killed over 200 security forces). The two major attacks in less than a week sends a clear message that Pakistan’s military control over Balochistan is slipping.
The BLA’s Majeed Brigade and Fateh Squad
The Majeed Brigade is the elite suicide attack unit of the BLA, responsible for executing some of the most high-profile attacks against Pakistani military targets and foreign interests in Balochistan. This unit first emerged on December 30, 2011, when it carried out a VBIED attack on Shafiq Mengal, a Pakistani military-backed warlord accused of running state backed militias, locally known as “death squads.” The attack was claimed by the BLA, who identified the suicide attacker as Darvesh Baloch. This marked the first known instance of an organized suicide attack by the Baloch insurgency, introducing a tactic that would later evolve into full-scale military operations.
Since then, the Majeed Brigade has expanded its operations, conducting increasingly sophisticated attacks. In April 2022, a woman named Shari Baloch carried out a suicide bombing in Karachi targeting Chinese nationals, killing three Chinese teachers and their Pakistani driver. It was the first instance of the BLA using a female suicide bomber.
In November 2024 Rafiq Bezanjo struck the Quetta Railway Station, executing a suicide bombing that killed at least 26 people and injured 60. This attack was meticulously planned with intelligence provided by BLA’s intelligence wing Zirab (Zephyr Intelligence Research and Analysis Bureau) to target a train carrying Pakistani soldiers, ensuring minimal civilian casualties and maximum military impact.
More recently, on March 11, the Majeed Brigade, in conjunction with BLA’s elite units, including the Fateh Squad and Special Tactical Operations Squad (STOS), carried out another major operation: the hijacking of the Jaffar Express. The attack further demonstrated the insurgents’ ability to strike at Pakistan’s critical infrastructure and security forces.
The Fateh Squad, unlike the Majeed Brigade, is not a suicide unit but an elite special operations force within the BLA, known for its high-intensity urban warfare, complex assaults, and follow-up operations. This unit specializes in direct combat, storming military bases, convoys, and security posts after an initial explosion or ambush. In the March 16 Noshki bus attack, while the Majeed Brigade’s VBIED strike crippled the military convoy, the Fateh Squad followed up with an attack on surviving personnel, significantly increasing the total number of casualties.
This dual-phase attack strategy demonstrates the BLA’s evolving insurgent warfare. It is moving away from conventional hit-and-run tactics toward large-scale battlefield engagements, further eroding Pakistan’s ability to maintain control over Balochistan.
A War Pakistan Cannot Win
The events of the past week prove that the Pakistani state is facing an insurgency that it neither understands nor can defeat through brute force. Instead of learning from its past failures, Islamabad has doubled down on the same repressive tactics, refusing to engage in meaningful dialogue with peaceful Baloch advocacy groups, much less with the BLA.
Pakistan has treated the Baloch resistance as a purely law-and-order problem rather than a legitimate political struggle. Yet decades of military operations, from the early 2000s to the present, have not weakened the insurgency; they have strengthened it. Every crackdown, every extrajudicial killing, and every enforced disappearance has fueled a new generation of fighters.
The Majeed Brigade’s increasing use of suicide attacks, combined with Fateh Squad’s direct ground offensives, shows that the BLA is no longer just an insurgent group engaging in sporadic violence – it is executing coordinated military operations. The ability to pair self-sacrificing missions with follow-up guerrilla strikes is a tactical shift that Pakistan’s security forces seem unprepared for. The Pakistani state may dismiss these attacks as isolated incidents, but the rapid succession of large-scale operations suggests a sustained and organized resistance.
Pakistan’s government continues to insist that the BLA is a foreign-backed terrorist outfit. After the Jaffar Express hijacking, ISPR Director General Lt Gen Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry told reporters, “We must understand that in this terrorist incident in Balochistan, and others before, the main sponsor is your eastern neighbor (India).” Later in the same press conference, he said that the attackers had links to Afghanistan, and were speaking to Afghan “handlers” through the Jaffar Express incident.
However, the scale and consistency of Baloch discontent suggests that this is an indigenous movement. If some Baloch people are taking up arms with the BLA, tens of thousands more are joining in peaceful protests to demand their rights.
Pakistan’s refusal to recognize Baloch grievances has led to one inevitable outcome – more war.
The Path Forward: A Political Solution or Perpetual War?
Pakistan has a choice to make. It can continue its failing military campaign, ensuring that more of its soldiers die in attacks like the ones targeting the Jaffar Express and the bus convoy in Noshki. Or it can acknowledge the reality that Balochistan is not just a rebellious province but a region demanding self-determination, one that will not be silenced through force.
If Pakistan is serious about peace, it must abandon its narrative of external conspiracies and engage in political negotiations with Baloch activists. This means addressing core grievances – resource exploitation, enforced disappearances, and military occupation – rather than dismissing all criticism of its policies as foreign interference.
However, history suggests that Pakistan will not change course willingly. The state remains trapped in its military-centric mindset, convinced that brute force can extinguish a movement rooted in decades of injustice. But the Baloch resistance is not going away. Decades of experience around the world – not least the U.S. war in neighboring Afghanistan – have proven that military-first approaches to ending insurgency rarely succeed. If Pakistan refuses to learn from its mistakes, it will only face more devastating blows in the future.
The state must decide: engage in meaningful dialogue or continue to bleed. The choice is clear, but whether Islamabad will make the right one remains to be seen.
