This week, Vietnam upgraded its relations with Indonesia and Singapore to Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships (CSPs) during Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) chief To Lam’s visits to the two countries. These upgrades followed the same action that the Southeast Asian nation undertook with New Zealand on February 26. This brought the number of CSPs that Vietnam has signed to 12, as these three nations joined China, Russia, India, South Korea, the United States, Japan, Australia, France, and Malaysia at the top tier of Vietnam’s diplomatic hierarchy. To be sure, Indonesia and Singapore are unlikely to be the last nations to establish CSPs with Vietnam. The question is how many more CSPs and strategic partnerships (SPs) Vietnam intends to sign, and with whom?
SPs and CSPs are the second and highest of the four levels of diplomacy between Vietnam and another country. The other two lower in ranking are regular and comprehensive partnerships (CP). Vietnam has never offered a definition of any of these terms, nor has it generally offered explanations for its decision to sign a SP or CSP with any particular country. However, Hanoi has worked out a roadmap to construct a network of SPs and CSPs based on its foreign policy of multilateralization and diversification that it has consistently implemented since 1986.
The ultimate goal of Vietnam’s foreign policy is fivefold: gaining partners’ recognition of the CPV as the country’s only political party; promoting economic development through trade and investment cooperation; strengthening national security through law enforcement cooperation; enhancing soft power through education, science and technology cooperation and cultural exchange; and, defending territorial integrity and sovereignty through bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation.
This roadmap prioritizes SPs and CSPs with traditional friendly countries, neighboring countries in the region, major European countries, and other important partners. In his keynote speech delivered at the 2013 Shangri-La Dialogue, former prime minister Nguyen Tan Dung said that Vietnam’s priority was to establish SPs with all five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council.
Vietnam conceives SPs and CSPs as frameworks through which, first, high attention is drawn to each other’s strategic interests. Second, it envisions them as a means of developing strategic trust through strategic dialogues and cooperation, particularly focusing on politics, defense and security, economics and intelligence information sharing. Third, it aims to develop a long-lasting and stable relationship with the partner. Fourth, the SP implicitly recognizes the legitimacy of the ruling CPV. Fifth, disputes and conflicts can be addressed peacefully based on strategic trust.
Among the 12 nations with which Vietnam now has CSPs, three are in East Asia, one is in South Asia, three are in Southeast Asia, two are in Oceania, one is in Europe, and one is in North America. Vietnam is also reportedly discussing the establishment of a CSP with Thailand.
In addition to its 12 CSPs, Vietnam also has nine SPs, with Thailand, the Philippines, Italy, Spain, Germany, the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Brazil. It also has signed comprehensive partnerships (CP) agreements with 14 countries: Brunei, Myanmar, Mongolia, Denmark, the Netherlands, Ukraine, Hungary, Switzerland, Canada, Chile, Venezuela, Argentina, South Africa, and the United Arab Emirates.
Among the other Southeast Asian nations, Laos and Cambodia occupy a special status in Vietnam’s foreign policy. From a geopolitical perspective, Vietnam’s “special relationships” with these two neighbors are of utmost importance to its security. Vietnam and the Philippines are currently SPs and have not yet indicated their intention to upgrade their relations to CSPs. However, given that the Philippines is one of the five founding members of ASEAN, the region’s largest rice importer (followed by Indonesia and Malaysia), and a South China Sea claimant with shared respect for international maritime law, the two countries will surely consider an upgrade to CSP in the near future.
Notably, while Denmark and the Netherlands are CPs of Vietnam, they enjoy strategic partnerships in specific areas. The former is a green SP, and the latter is SP in climate change and sustainable agriculture. Technically, Vietnam can upgrade its relations with its CP and SP partners to CSPs anytime it wishes. However, Vietnam will do so only with those that are critical for it to achieve its core foreign policy goals.
As yet, Vietnam has no SP or CP in Africa. However, the partnership for cooperation and development signed with South Africa in 2004 is generally viewed as a CP given the scope of cooperation that it covers. Vietnam and South Africa have expressed aspirations to elevate the partnership to a higher level, either an SP or a CSP. The upgrade is worth considering for Vietnam given the role of South Africa in the continent as well as its key membership in BRICS.
In the Middle East, the United Arab Emirates is the only country from the region to establish a CP with Vietnam. The two countries might upgrade their relations to SP or CSP in the near future because of the economic benefits that Vietnam might enjoy from an elevated relationship.
What surprises many observers is the level of diplomacy between Vietnam and Israel. The two countries celebrated the 30th anniversary of diplomatic ties and concluded a free trade deal, the first that Vietnam has done so with a Middle Eastern country, in 2023. Vietnam has also purchased a large amount of weapons and defense technologies from Israel amidst reduced supplies from Russia. However, Israel is neither a comprehensive nor strategic partner of Vietnam. An upgraded relationship with Israel will further buttress strategic trust that serves both the economic and defense objectives of Vietnam’s foreign policy.
Vietnam is expanding its network of SP and CSP in following an established roadmap that serves the goals of its foreign policy. The answer to the question of how many CSPs and with whom Vietnam want to sign depends on how the SP and CSP serve Hanoi’s, and its partners’, foreign policy goals.
