On January 16, Pakistan’s military leadership, led by Army Chief Gen. Asim Munir, held a meeting with all of the major political parties in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s provincial capital, Peshawar. While the meeting’s political undertones – most notably a meeting with the senior leadership of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) with regards to the future of jailed former Prime Minister Imran Khan – attracted the most media attention, security dominated the Peshawar discussion.
The Diplomat has learned that the political leadership has been informed of a forthcoming increase in the intensity of military operations in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, especially in the merged districts of the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). In recent months, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), also known as the Pakistani Taliban, have been increasing their presence in the former FATA, their old haven.
Sources have informed The Diplomat that the high-level security meeting in Peshawar also featured a critique of the army’s past policies. “The army chief acknowledged that TTP terrorists should not have been released [in 2021], and admitted that the ‘Good Taliban Bad Taliban’ policy has caused Pakistan a lot of harm,” a provincial opposition party member told The Diplomat.
The meeting also saw the airing of many criticisms of the PTI, which rules Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, with opposition parties blaming the party’s policy vis-à-vis the Taliban as a major reason behind the resurgence of the TTP in former FATA. The PTI’s interests were also questioned when the military leadership shared the details of what they are dubbing “targeted security operations” in areas that – as opposition parties were quick to point out – contain significant on-ground support for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s ruling party. The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa governor, Faisal Karim Kundi, reportedly said that the PTI government, led by Chief Minister Ali Amin Gandapur, isn’t allocating sufficient resources for the operations because they don’t want the Taliban eliminated. Kundi, who as governor is appointed by the central government, accused the provincial government of misappropriating funds allocated for counterterrorism efforts.
While Munir made a point not to acknowledge references to the PTI and Imran Khan, he agreed that the move to release TTP fighters – which occurred during Khan’s tenure as prime minister – resulted in the group’s resurgence. The army chief reiterated that the military will no longer tolerate any Taliban presence in Pakistan, even using the word “khawarij” – signifying outside the fold of Islam – for the Taliban, a term now regularly touted in mainstream media. Pakistan’s military has also taken to referring to the TTP as “khawarij” in its press releases.
Munir further reiterated in the meeting that the presence of TTP hideouts in Afghanistan will not be tolerated. “Last month’s operation conveyed the message that we will not tolerate safe havens for these khawarij elements to launch attacks against Pakistan,” a military official told The Diplomat, referring to Pakistan military’s airstrikes in Afghanistan’s eastern Paktika province on December 24. Afghanistan retaliated with its own cross-border strike at the end of last year.
The security meeting in Peshawar, designed to share the military’s upcoming counterterrorism efforts in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, has come against the backdrop of an increasing dire surge in terrorism. Last year witnessed the highest number of militant attacks in Pakistan for a decade, with the majority of them being carried out by the TTP and its affiliates. Since the Afghan Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in 2021, the TTP has increased its presence in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, with locals bearing the brunt of both the jihadist violence and the security operations.
“The lawlessness has increased, and the people are scared to go out of their homes after sunset,” said Abdullah Bettani, a political activist based in Tank, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. “Even though the security operations are more targeted, there is still significant damage for the locals. Many, including women and children, are dying in the crossfire.”
Bettani added, “And unlike the past, even fewer people have the resources, or even the willingness, to relocate. The economic situation has significantly worsened, and there is a lack of trust with regards to the state.”
While anti-army sentiment has grown across Pakistan, not least because of the support enjoyed by the PTI and Imran Khan, locals in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have long been resentful of the state’s policies. The financial crisis and rising unemployment have further helped the TTP’s recruitment in these areas. While a United Nations monitoring report estimates that around 6,500 fighters are a part of the group, locals suggest those now affiliated with the TTP could number up to 20,000.
In addition to the surge in manpower, the TTP received a share in the $7 billion worth of arms and equipment left behind the by the United States when it withdrew from Afghanistan in 2021. Now the TTP is using its increased power to trigger the region’s faultlines, and is deploying resources to create a parallel governance system in many parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The TTP currently has office-bearers in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, similar to the Afghan Taliban regime, including locally designated governors and intelligence officials.
“The Pakistani Taliban’s relocation to the merged districts, including Swat, has created unrest amongst the local people and tribes – old enmities have been revived, land issues exacerbated, and tussles for area control has started,” a tribal rights activist from former FATA, Mona Naseer, told The Diplomat. “The Taliban are heavily armed and therefore the parties in litigation prefer them to be on their side. They get land, power, and resettlement. [This is] one of the reasons for the recent killings, abductions, extortions, and skirmishes amongst different tribes,” she added.
A prominent example of the TTP’s emergence aggravating clashes is currently visible in Kurram, a merged district, which has practically been cordoned off from the rest of the province since November. Over 100 villages have remained under siege with tribal and clashes erupting since the reemergence of the TTP. “The killings are about the relocation of the TTP in Talo Kunj village and Badshah Kot village,” said Naseer, referring to the violence in Kurram, where the TTP has historically formed its strongholds alongside the Haqqani Network.
The Haqqani Network, a key strategic asset of the Pakistan army in the lead up to the takeover of Kabul, is now the direct link between the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, and an intermediary in the Pakistani state’s negotiations with the TTP and other resurgent affiliates such as the Hafiz Gul Bahadur group. With the Pakistani Taliban’s growing clout, especially in the bordering areas, the Haqqani Network’s visible presence in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has increased. After the killing of senior Haqqani Network leader, and the Taliban regime’s Minister of Refugee and Repatriation, Khalil Rahman Haqqani in an Islamic State-orchestrated bomb blast last month, Islamic commemorative ceremonies were held for him in many parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, including Peshawar.
While Pakistan’s military leadership is depicting a stronger stance against the Kabul regime, locals say that Haqqani Network leaders continue to be given the same security protocols in Pakistan that they have enjoyed for decades, suggesting that support from sections of the army continues to be provided.
In a statement shared with The Diplomat, TTP leader Umar Mukarram Khosarani said that the Pakistani Taliban have the same goals as the Haqqani Network. “We will continue the mission of the martyr [Khalil Haqqani] who not only played a pivotal role to establish the Islamic Emirate [in Afghanistan] but also strived for the same for Muslims around the world. It is time for Muslims to unite and take the mission forward with steadfastness.”
Former TTP spokesman Ehsanullah Ehsan said that in order to make forays into Pakistan, the outfit is reshaping its strategy. “Where the Tehreek-e-Taliban’s focus has remained on the army, it will expand to other institutions as well. The Tehreek-e-Taliban has decided that if the government targets the homes and families of the Taliban then they would do the same,” said Ehsan. He added that “the ultimate goal of the Pakistani Taliban is to establish Islamic rule in Pakistan – we want 100 percent Islam, and even if someone offers us 99 percent we will not agree.”
Despite the army’s bid to excommunicate the Pakistani Taliban in the official narrative, the TTP’s upholding of Islamic rhetoric underlines that the group enjoys Islamist legitimacy – more so than the state. Furthermore, the TTP’s vocal ambitions to make further inroads into Pakistan, beyond the tribal areas along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, suggests that the military’s duplicity with regards to the Taliban is still in play, despite the army leadership’s vows.
“The military’s seeming stance against the Taliban is merely cosmetic. The TTP is practically running a shadow government,” said Mohsin Dawar, a former member of the National Assembly from North Waziristan and chairman of the National Democratic Movement. “The more power the TTP enjoys, the more robust its parallel justice system has become, the more it is in charge of the matters in the region. Today, the TTP is more equipped, more strategic, and more organized, similar to how the Afghan Taliban operated from Pakistan,” he added.
As the TTP increases its influence in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, in addition to a surge in its attacks, the group’s adoption of the Afghan Taliban’s governance template appears to point to goals not too different from those achieved by the regime in Kabul. “It is evident that the Pakistan Taliban are ready to have certain areas formally handed over to them,” said Dawar. “They envision their own emirate.”
