It’s difficult to exaggerate just how much global politics have changed in the past few weeks. NATO is on its last breath. The U.S.-guarded international order is a mild bout of flu away from expiring. Europeans feel that U.S. President Donald Trump has just signed away Eastern Europe to the Russians again. As people in these parts say, in reflection of the Munich Agreement and the Yalta Conference, decisions are now being made “about us without us.” Whether all of this is a grand bluff waits to be seen. But a father who threatens to walk out on his kids will never enjoy the same degree of trust again.
Amid all the opprobrium and head-scratching, much of the European media and commentariat have been completely ignorant about why Washington apparently thinks it needs to abandon Europe: to focus on the Indo-Pacific. Events of recent weeks will be claimed as big victories by the likes of Elbridge Colby, now undersecretary for policy at the Pentagon, who has been lobbying for years for America to get out of Europe and jump further into Asian security. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth told Europeans that “stark strategic realities prevent the United States of America from being primarily focused on the security of Europe” and that Washington was now focusing on China, which has “the capability and intent to threaten our homeland and core national interests in the Indo-Pacific.”
Perhaps it’s only at the edges, but one detects a little glee from some folks in Asia. Sorry, Europe, but now it’s our time to bask in America’s protective glow. Some schadenfreude is also probably at hand; many Southeast Asians, in particular, have favorable views of Vladimir Putin and Russia and weren’t too happy at being told by the Biden administration and Europeans that they were unethical for not caring more about events in Eastern Europe. I heard that at the recent Honolulu Defense Forum, a South Korean delegate suggested that “cutting a deal with Russia will allow America to focus on deterring the might of China.”
There are reasons to be skeptical. Capitulation in Ukraine isn’t going to hold back Putin’s imperial motives, so this won’t be the end of violence in Europe. America only really gets out of Europe when it quits NATO, which it hasn’t yet. So, just as President Barack Obama kept a toe in the Middle East while his “pivot of Asia” was an excuse to get out of that region, America will continue being dragged back into European security problems. There’s also the case that, should a transatlantic president replace Trump, all this might be reversed. Asian allies would be best not to bet on this new “pivot” being durable.
More importantly, can anyone confidently deny the following statement? Trump is prepared to ditch America’s European allies during a continental crisis, but he wouldn’t do the same with America’s Asian allies. It’s getting rather tiresome to constantly see people clutching at “transactional” as a comforting adjective for Trump’s foreign policy. In reality, Trump is a pathological pacifist who, for all his faux nationalism, cannot comprehend the love of one’s homeland and why anyone would risk their lives to defend it. So he cannot understand why anyone would go to war to defend themselves against an invader or to fight for their liberty.
Like pacifists before him, particularly the 1930s variant, this has developed into an unhealthy fascination with imperialists and tyrants. For Trump, patriotism, love of one’s culture or traditions, comradeship, and desire for liberty are mere distractions from the purpose of life: making money. In a telling anecdote, John Kelly, his former White House chief of staff, recalled standing with Trump next to the grave of Kelly’s son, who was killed in Afghanistan. Trump apparently turned to him and said: “I don’t get it. What was in it for them?”
Because he doesn’t “get it,” he assumes everyone else must be motivated by the same base motives as his. Politicians lead their people into wars for profits or personal power. Soldiers must be “suckers” (his description of Americans who died in the Second World War) for thinking that they are actually fighting for something bigger. Since it’s all a scam, just sign a peace deal (however unfair it is) and get on with making money!
Had Trump said that America was getting out of town and it now was up to the Europeans to negotiate with Vladimir Putin, had he said that Ukrainians could keep on fighting but they’d have to now pay America for weapons – that would have been a bitter pill but at least a digestible one. But what’s this? Trump is insisting that Europeans are now responsible for their own security while America (without European participation) is directly in charge of peace talks (surrender talks, more accurately) with Putin, which will create even more instability in Eastern Europe.
Moreover, Trump wants to get Ukraine off the table so that he can repair relations with Moscow. Marco Rubio, the secretary of state, told his Russian counterpart of “the incredible opportunities that exist to partner with the Russians” if they could simply dispose of the Ukraine war. What opportunities? Washington has pissed off most of Europe (U.S. exports to the European Union were worth $370 billion in 2023) in order to repair relations with Russia (U.S. exports to Russia were worth $6.4 billion before the Ukraine war started).
Say I’m wrong, that Trump is really transactional and American protection can simply be bought. But you’re essentially buying something without a price tag. It’s uncharted waters, and who knows how much America’s protection will cost? Would Washington stick to its treaty alliance if the Philippines bought a handful of U.S. aircraft and advanced weaponry each year? Would Manila need to spend $500 million a year, $1 billion a year, or $5 billion a year on U.S. defense equipment? Is it $1 billion this year but $2 billion next year? Would it mean Manila signing over its nickel and copper reserves to the United States? Is Taipei going to have to hand over its semiconductor monopoly to Washington? (Trump has apparently said he wants Taiwan’s TSMC to take a controlling stake in Intel’s chip factories.) What is Vietnam going to have to do?
Not only is there no price tag, there’s no guarantee of delivery. Manila could spend $10 billion and sign away its natural resources, yet only when the rockets start flying will Washington say whether it will stick to its side of the bargain and defend the Philippines. Moreover, something that is almost entirely overlooked is that as the relationship becomes more transactional, the junior partner often becomes less important. Imagine Taiwan does agree to trim its monopoly on advanced semiconductors and give a larger share to the United States, such as by moving some of its operations to America. By doing this, does it become more or less important to America to protect Taiwan? The reason Taiwan matters so much right now is that it is home to a semiconductor industry that Washington cannot allow Beijing to get its hands on. But move a considerable part of that industry to the United States, and there’s less reason for Washington to fight for Taiwan.
At the fundamental level, transactional diplomacy must be based on some sort of trust: you will get what you pay for. But do you have more or less trust in him after watching Trump abandon America’s oldest allies? Moreover, if, as Trump has insinuated, Ukraine was stupid in trying to defend itself against a more powerful invader, wouldn’t Taiwanese and Filipinos be even more stupid in trying to defend themselves against China, which boasts a far more powerful military than Russia? It’s also a more prosperous invader than Russia.
Manila and Taipei will be expected to pay a lot more to Trump’s America to protect themselves from a country (China) that can offer Trump so much more than they can. The Philippines could spend $100 billion more on U.S. imports and defense equipment, but Beijing can always outbid it. (Notice that Trump has imposed more tariffs on China and is wooing Xi Jinping to strike a big trade deal.) Wouldn’t a transactional leader readily accept a deal with China and then look the other way while it colonizes the South China Sea and invades Taiwan?
I’ve taken quite a few words to get to here, but does knowing any of this actually help a Southeast Asian government? After all, what alternatives are there?
