Vietnam continues to expand and develop its outposts in the Spratly Islands at a rapid pace after a “record year of island building in 2024,” a U.S. think tank said last week.
In a briefing published on March 21, the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) stated that Hanoi has continued its work in the disputed islands, beginning dredging operations in new areas “even as some features approach completion.”
AMTI’s previous briefing, published last June, documented a sharp increase in the pace of Vietnam’s dredging and reclamation activities in the Spratlys, whose dozens of features are claimed (and in many cases occupied) by China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Brunei.
AMTI, which is run by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., said that in the first half of 2024, Vietnam had created 692 acres of new land, “almost as much new land as it had in the previous two years combined.”
Since then, Vietnam’s dredging operations have continued at this “breakneck pace,” AMTI said in last week’s briefing, creating 641 new acres of land. This brought Vietnam’s current total dredging and landfill in disputed areas to the South China Sea to approximately 3,319 acres, nearly three-quarters of the 4,650 acres reclaimed by China. In terms of artificial land, Vietnam has now created 2,236 acres in the Spratly Islands, around 63 percent of China’s 3,500 acres.
This landfill included 143 new acres at Barque Canada Reef, 118 acres at Discovery Great Reef, 125 acres at Ladd Reef, and 121 acres on South Reef. While features such as Namyit Island and Sand Cay “now appear more or less complete in terms of landfill,” new dredging has begun at the northern end of Cornwallis South Reef.
Perhaps the most notable development has been the expansion of Vietnam’s military and maritime facilities in the Spratlys. For example, AMTI noted that “eight of ten recently expanded features are receiving newly dredged harbors,” suggesting that “enhanced maritime logistics are a core component of Hanoi’s expansion goals.” According to AMTI, Vietnam now has harbors on 12 of the 25 features under its control, up from just four prior to 2021.
“This significant increase in port facilities will allow Vietnamese military and law enforcement to operate in greater number and for longer periods of time before returning to shore – the same logistical advantage that China has used to maintain year-round patrols in the Spratlys,” the AMTI briefing stated.
One of the curious elements of the story is the fact that China has said relatively little about the significant works that Vietnam has carried out at its outposts in the Spratly Islands. Throughout this period, it has responded with considerable force to minor actions by the Philippines, including attempts to resupply forces stationed on its own claimed features in the South China Sea. This can be put down to the closer political, ideological, and historical affinities between the Chinese and Vietnamese communist parties, and Vietnam’s success in reassuring the Chinese government that it is not taking part in Washington’s attempts to contain Chinese power. It may also suggest that Beijing is reluctant to pick fights with two South China Sea claimant states simultaneously.
In any event, AMTI noted that with the completion of landfill operations at several of Vietnam’s Spratly Island outposts, “the next phase of Vietnam’s Spratly expansion is likely to include more significant construction of facilities on the islands.” This could include the significant expansion of Vietnam’s air capabilities. Late last year, it completed a 2,400-meter runway at Barque Canada Reef, and AMTI noted that Ladd Reef, Pearson Reef, and Tennent Reef have each been expanded to a size capable of hosting airstrips. (In addition, Vietnam has a smaller runway on Spratly Island.)
In a break from recent precedent, the Chinese government publicly protested in February, the completion of the airstrip on Barque Canada Reef. A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson said that Beijing “always opposes relevant countries conducting construction activities on illegally occupied islands and reefs.” AMTI concluded its briefing by arguing that “more public reactions from Beijing may prove inevitable” as Vietnam continues to fill in newly created artificial islands. Whether this extends to the sorts of kinetic response that China has deployed against the Philippines remains to be seen.
