On December 25, 2024, Chinese state media Xinhua reported that the country had officially approved the construction of what will be the world largest hydro-dam with annual capacity of 60 gigawatts (GW), or 300 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity. The planned site is on the lower reaches of the Yarlung Tsangpo River in the Tibet Autonomous Region, in the foothills of the Himalayas.
With recent estimates suggest that the new hydropower dam’s cost to potentially exceed 1 trillion yuan ($137 billion), the planned hydropower dam is expected to surpass the country’s famous Three Gorges Dam as the largest – and most expensive – in the world. The Three Gorges dam cost 254.2 billion yuan and generates 88.2 billion kilowatt-hours annually.
The Power Construction Corporation of China (PowerChina), in partnership with the Tibet Autonomous Region government, is expected to oversee the project. When the proposal was unveiled in late 2020, Yan Zhiyong, chairman of PowerChina, hailed it as an “historic opportunity for the Chinese hydropower industry.”
Chinese officials and media have declared that the day will be a “people-centric project aimed at enriching the people and promoting Tibet’s development.” The hydropower dam’s construction is expected to boost rapid growth in local industries (such as logistics) and also create local employment opportunities.
In India, however, the prospect of a major dam in Tibet has raised both environmental and geopolitical concerns. The Yarlung Tsangpo River flows into India, where it becomes the Brahmaputra, and then on to Bangladesh, where its known as the Jamuna.
The Chinese Foreign Ministry has denied that the new dam will have any potential negative impact on downstream countries. In a press conference in December last year, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning reaffirmed China’s “responsible attitude” to transboundary rivers, claiming the planned dam would not harm downstream regions. She also highlighted China’s commitment to dialogue and cooperation with neighboring countries on disaster prevention.
Despite these assurances, India remains cautious and is moving forward with its own plans to ensure water security. In late 2020, India announced plans to build a 10-12 GW hydroelectric dam in Arunachal Pradesh as a countermeasure to China’s proposed “super dam.”
Amid the competing narratives, what do we actually know about the proposed dam, and China’s reasons for approving the project?
Details of the New Hydropower Dam
This ambitious project reflects China’s broader push to enhance its infrastructure capabilities and capitalize on the vast hydropower potential of the Yarlung Tsangpo. The new dam will take advantage of a section where the river drops 2,000 meters in around 50 kilometers. The hydropower project will be constructed near the river’s “Great Bend” in Medog County, Nyingchi (Linzhi) Prefecture. Medog is the final county before the Line of Actual Control (LAC) between China and India. This site, sandwiched between mountains, offers ideal conditions for hydropower generation, potentially creating nearly 70 million kilowatts of technically exploitable energy.
It’s believed that China’s government has been quietly researching this enormous hydropower project for a number of years, if not decades. However, the Chinese central authorities did not make it public until November 2020. That month, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China included the hydropower project in the country’s national 14th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development and the 2035 Long-Term Goals.
Two key factors may explain China’s cautious approach to this project. First, the project site’s extreme remoteness, which until recently lacked road access and power supply, made launching such a large-scale initiative unfeasible. Second, Beijing may have previously lacked the readiness or capacity to manage potential conflicts with downstream countries, particularly India. Now, however, China appears better positioned to address concerns of its neighbors, enabling the project to advance.
India has strongly opposed the proposal, largely because Tibet supplies about one-third of its water. From New Delhi’s perspective, altering downstream flows could disrupt the Yarlung Tsangpo-Brahmaputra’s rhythm, affecting groundwater and surface water levels. This could jeopardize water access for agriculture, drinking, and other essential needs. Additionally, the dam’s impact on water quality raises concerns. These changes could have far-reaching consequences for downstream communities, including agro-pastoralists, farmers, and others reliant on the river for drinking, fishing, and livelihoods
The hydropower project could affect water flow into the bordering Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. However, it is unlikely, at least in theory, to significantly impact the region where the Brahmaputra flows. Research indicates that while 50 percent of the Brahmaputra River basin lies within China, it accounts for only a small minority of the total basin discharge. The United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization estimates that waters from China contribute 30 percent of the Brahmaputra River’s flow, while other sources suggest the figure could be as low as 7 percent. These varying figures illustrate differing views on China’s role in the river’s flow, and thus the dam’s impact. Given that the Indian portion of the basin experiences some of the highest rainfall in the world, the downstream impact may be less significant than anticipated.
Indeed, the Chinese side offers a highly positive view of the project, suggesting minimal environmental impact. It has portrayed the hydropower dam as a “run-of-the-river” project, meaning the water will be diverted to generate electricity and then allowed to re-enter the Yarlung Tsangpo. China has also pledged to maintain dialogue through existing channels and increase cooperation on disaster prevention.
The timing of the official approval of the project is noteworthy, particularly in the context of China-India relations. After a five-year hiatus, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi met in 2024 on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia, signalling a potential thaw in their relationship. However, a major challenge remains the absence of strong bilateral mechanisms for managing transboundary river governance, an issue that has become increasingly critical given the growing securitization of water. This challenge is closely tied to the broader political and military dynamics between the two countries.
Many details about the dam are still unclear at this point. Critical information, such as the number of residents that will potentially be displaced and the project’s environmental impacts, remain undisclosed. The region’s fragility, including its susceptibility to natural disasters like landslides, earthquakes, and floods, has also been little discussed by Chinese sources, raising concerns about the dam’s safety and stability.
Understanding China’s Expanding Hydropower Ambitions
Beijing’s interest in the new hydropower project reflects its domestic energy transition priorities. China’s growing focus on hydropower development in Tibet is driven by the region’s immense renewable energy potential, which aligns with the country’s ambitious domestic energy goals and green low-carbon circular development.
At present, the country’s hydropower resources have the potential to create over 676 million kilowatts of energy, the largest in the world. Of this amount, Tibet accounts for around 30 percent. Despite this vast potential, much of Tibet’s resources remain undeveloped, with the installed capacity representing only 1 percent of the region’s technically exploitable potential.
The autonomous region’s hydropower resources are mainly concentrated along the Yarlung Tsangpo, Nu, Lancang, and Jinsha rivers. Among them, the Yarlung Tsangpo, which flows through Tibet before crossing into India and Bangladesh, is central to Tibet’s vast energy potential. Given its capacity to generate nearly 80 million kilowatts, due in part to the river’s steep gradient and high flow rate, it is vital in in China’s efforts to meet its clean energy demands.
This strategy is central to Xi’s commitment for China to reach peak carbon emissions by 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. These goals have positioned carbon emission reductions and the transition to clean energy as key priorities in the country’s 14th Five-Year Plan and 2035 Long-Term Goals.
As part of this, China aims to reduce carbon dioxide emissions intensity by 18 percent and energy intensity (emissions per unit of GDP) by 13.5 percent by 2025. With these ambitious climate targets, the government has placed a strong emphasis on expanding renewable energy sources, and hydropower is expected to play a crucial role. Hydropower, particularly in Tibet, is viewed as an essential resource to meet China’s growing clean energy needs.
Recent energy shortages have taught China to go slowly on changing its energy mix, however. During the winter of 2020, provinces including Hunan, Jiangxi, Inner Mongolia, and Zhejiang encountered significant power supply constraints. Energy shortages recurred in September and October 2021, affecting 18 out of China’s 30 provinces, with shortfalls ranging from 1 percent to 16 percent. Consequently, a number of provincial governments decided to approve and build large amounts of new coal capacity to address these power shortages.
In other words, in China the expansion of renewable energy is being encouraged alongside construction of hundreds of new coal-fired power plants to protect against power blackouts. This dual strategy ensures a stable energy supply while simultaneously advancing the transition toward a greener energy mix. While coal still provides 55.3 percent of China’s total energy consumption, the government is increasingly focusing on renewable sources like hydroelectricity to reduce reliance on fossil fuels and meet its emissions targets.
As China shifts away from coal, Tibet is poised to play a pivotal role in the nation’s clean energy future. The region’s vast hydroelectric potential is a central element of the country’s energy strategy, as outlined in the Tibet Autonomous Regional Government’s 14th Five-Year Plan and 2035 Vision. Harnessing Tibet’s hydropower resources is expected to be a key driver in achieving China’s low-carbon energy goals, further solidifying Tibet’s importance in China’s broader renewable energy agenda.
Local Interests Driving Hydropower Development in Tibet
Locals have been forced to bear significant environmental, socioeconomic, and cultural losses from the construction of major hydropower projects in China. As a result, such hydro-engineering projects are often portrayed in state media as a sacrifice for the national interest in which local authorities align with central government priorities. The strong backing of the Tibet Autonomous Regional government and hydropower companies is evident in this project. Both entities have consistently promoted hydropower development as a solution to regional economic disparities and a driver of growth in one of China’s most underdeveloped regions.
This push aligns with Tibet’s broader three-step plan for advancing its electricity and hydropower sectors, as outlined by Ding Yexian, the former vice chairman of Tibet. The plan’s stages include alleviating power shortages before 2012, resolving electricity access issues between 2013 and 2015, and promoting rapid hydropower development from 2016 to 2020, with the long-term goal of transforming hydropower into a strategic industry for “outward transmission” of electricity. The ultimate objective is to establish hydropower as a key economic pillar for Tibet, delivering substantial economic benefits to the region.
More recently, key plans, including the Tibetan Autonomous Regional Government’s 13th Five-Year Plan and 14th Five-Year Plan, called for developing hydropower projects on region’s major rivers (including the Yarlung Tsangpo) as part of broader efforts to achieve energy generation and build clean energy bases for local and national consumption.
Local leaders have signed cooperation agreements with major state-owned power companies like China Huaneng Group, PowerChina, and the China Three Gorges Corporation to accelerate hydropower development.
There is potential for the new hydropower project to export hydroelectricity to other provinces, such as to provinces in central China that have faced power shortages in recent years. It is estimated to bring in 20 billion yuan ($2.744 billion), further attracting investment and boosting the region’s economy. Through these efforts, the local government hopes to use hydropower to address regional economic disparities and drive long-term growth in Tibet.
While the dam offers substantial energy potential, it also poses significant environmental and geopolitical risks, particularly for neighboring countries like India. To fully realize its benefits while mitigating potential conflicts, robust international dialogue will be crucial in addressing the project’s complex challenges.
