In international politics, influence is rarely achieved through military might alone. Nations that successfully shape global narratives and public opinion do so by wielding culture as an instrument of diplomacy. For India, a country with one of the world’s most diverse cultural ecosystems, this tool has been underutilized, limiting its strategic outreach. Cultural diplomacy is not just an artistic or academic exercise; it is a means to strengthen geopolitical ties, create economic opportunities, and counteract foreign narratives that challenge India’s global standing.
If we look back at history with the right lens – not as a nostalgic exercise but as a study in strategy – we find instances where India’s cultural outreach has given it clear advantages. The spread of Buddhism, facilitated by state-backed emissaries under Emperor Ashoka, ensured that Indian philosophical thought influenced Central Asia and East Asia for centuries. The Chola dynasty, through its naval expeditions, not only extended its influence across Southeast Asia but also fostered deep linguistic, artistic, and religious connections with modern-day Indonesia, Thailand, and Cambodia.
More recently, in the 20th century, India’s independence movement, led by figures like Rabindranath Tagore and Mahatma Gandhi, gained global traction partly because their cultural and intellectual outreach resonated internationally. India was not just a post-colonial state emerging from British rule – it was a voice in global movements against imperialism, deeply influencing Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America.
Despite these historical advantages, contemporary Indian foreign policy has not integrated cultural diplomacy in a systematic way. While India’s economic and strategic partnerships have grown, its cultural outreach remains fragmented, underfunded, and inconsistent. In contrast, China has aggressively invested in shaping its global image through Confucius Institutes, state-sponsored media, and cultural exchanges embedded in its development aid programs. This gap in India’s approach needs urgent attention from the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), especially as global divisions deepen and competition over narratives becomes fiercer.
One of the fundamental weaknesses in India’s cultural diplomacy is institutional fragmentation. The Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR), the primary body responsible for cultural engagement, lacks the funding and strategic autonomy necessary to expand India’s influence effectively. While the MEA oversees the ICCR, its initiatives are often seen as secondary to economic or security concerns, rather than an integral part of India’s foreign policy strategy.
For instance, India’s presence in Africa has largely relied on economic investments and developmental assistance, yet there has been little cultural engagement to complement these efforts. Compare this to China, which pairs every major infrastructure project under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) with Chinese language training, media collaborations, and Confucius Institutes. China understands that economic influence alone does not create lasting ties; cultural engagement fosters long-term ideological and diplomatic alignment.
India’s relationship with South Asia also suffers from a lack of cultural diplomacy. Nepal and Bangladesh, two nations with deep linguistic and historical ties to India, have increasingly engaged with China, not just because of economic reasons but due to Beijing’s deliberate efforts to shape cultural narratives. China funds Nepali and Bangladeshi media outlets, sponsors university programs, and promotes Mandarin education, ensuring that its influence is normalized among younger generations. India, despite its vast cultural connections, has not built equivalent institutions that reinforce these linkages.
A major example of missed potential is the neglect of Bollywood and India’s entertainment industry as a foreign policy tool. Indian cinema has a devoted following around the world – in Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia – but the government has not leveraged this cultural capital into structured diplomatic initiatives. South Korea’s success with Hallyu (the Korean Wave) was not accidental; it was backed by state-sponsored funding, international media deals, and global promotions. India, despite having a stronger entertainment industry than South Korea, has failed to create policies that strategically use film, music, and digital media to enhance its soft power abroad.
Like South Korea, China’s success in cultural diplomacy is not due to an inherent advantage but a result of meticulous, well-funded strategy. Through the Confucius Institutes, China has created a global network of cultural and language education, ensuring that Mandarin becomes the second language of choice in many developing countries. By 2023, China had over 500 Confucius Institutes in 162 countries with more than 9 million students enrolled, while India’s ICCR has just 37 cultural centers worldwide. This sheer scale means that young professionals, academics, and policymakers in Africa and Latin America are more likely to engage with Chinese language and thought than with Indian intellectual traditions.
Another key aspect of China’s approach is global media dominance. State-run news agencies like CGTN, Xinhua, and China Daily produce content in multiple languages, shaping narratives about China across different regions. India’s international media presence, in contrast, remains weak. Doordarshan International launched in 1995 (rebranded as DD India) with the mandate to “become a truly Global Public Broadcaster Channel with unique high-quality content and services,” yet it has limited global reach. Private media houses that could project India’s image internationally do not receive structured government support to expand into foreign markets.
China also integrates cultural diplomacy into its development aid programs. African students receive thousands of Chinese government scholarships, and many return to their home countries with a strong affinity for China. Many of these young people eventually come to occupy influential positions in politics and business. India, while offering scholarships under the ICCR, does so in a far less organized and strategic manner.
To address these challenges, the MEA must take a proactive role in restructuring cultural diplomacy as an integral part of India’s foreign policy. A few immediate steps could make a significant impact. First, India must invest in expanding the ICCR’s reach and funding. Instead of focusing on scattered cultural initiatives, the ICCR should be integrated into India’s diplomatic missions, ensuring that Indian embassies serve as hubs for cultural engagement, not just visa-issuing offices.
Second, Bollywood and the Indian entertainment industry must be systematically promoted abroad. India should establish film festivals, digital partnerships, and co-production agreements in key foreign markets, ensuring that Indian cinema reaches wider global audiences. Collaborations with Netflix, Amazon Prime, and regional film industries could cement India’s influence in places where Bollywood already has a following.
Third, India must counteract China’s media influence by strengthening its international broadcasting capabilities. Expanding DD India, investing in multilingual news platforms, and supporting private Indian media to operate internationally could help shift narratives in India’s favor.
Fourth, India should create structured cultural exchange programs that tie into its economic and diplomatic efforts. For instance, every major infrastructure project that India funds – whether in Africa or Southeast Asia – should include an Indian language institute, a cultural center, or an academic collaboration.
Fifth, India must prioritize cultural engagement within South Asia. This means promoting joint educational initiatives with Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, reviving literary and historical collaborations, and actively fostering people-to-people connections through scholarships and student exchanges.
In a world where global narratives are contested as fiercely as military and economic power, cultural diplomacy is not a luxury – it is a strategic necessity. China has demonstrated that influence is built not just through trade and infrastructure but through education, media, and cultural outreach. If India does not actively shape its global image, others will do it for them – and not always in a way that serves India’s interests.
For the MEA, the challenge is clear: cultural diplomacy must be elevated from an afterthought to a central pillar of India’s foreign policy. The tools are already in place – India’s intellectual traditions, cultural influence, linguistic diversity and a vast diaspora (approximately 35.4 million in number) are unmatched. What is needed now is the political will and institutional commitment to use them effectively. India does not need to reclaim a lost past; it needs to build a future where its cultural influence is as powerful as its economic and strategic ambitions.
