At the recent Raisina Dialogue in New Delhi, Philippines’ Armed Forces Chief General Romeo S. Brawner revealed ongoing discussions to expand the membership of the “Squad” grouping of nations. “Together with Japan and our partners we are trying to expand the squad to include India and probably South Korea,” Brawner said.
A minilateral grouping comprising Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and the United States, the Squad was formed in May 2024 to push back against China’s growing maritime power and increasing assertiveness in Asia. It emerged out of a meeting of the defense chiefs of the four countries on the sidelines of the Shangri-La security dialogue in Singapore in 2023.
“We have a commonality with India because we have a common enemy. And I’m not afraid to say that China is our common enemy. So, it’s important that we collaborate together, maybe exchange intelligence,” Brawner said.
The announcement comes amid China’s increasing military muscle-flexing in the South China Sea, where it has overlapping maritime claims with the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei.
The Philippines’ push to include New Delhi in the Squad is not surprising as India has increasingly emerged as an important factor in the strategic calculations of South China Sea littoral states, stemming from India’s growing involvement in the maritime disputes that plague the sea.
Previously, India preferred a cautious approach to the disputes. For example, it adopted a neutral stance on the 2016 arbitral tribunal award on the South China Sea, which ruled in the Philippines’ favor against China. However, India has increasingly signaled warming relations with China’s rival claimant states. Recently, India’s Minister of External Affairs, S. Jaishankar, was explicit in expressing support for the Philippines’ maritime rights in the South China Sea. He “firmly reiterate[d] India’s support to the Philippines for upholding its national sovereignty.”
India’s support for Southeast Asian claimant states goes beyond rhetoric. In May 2023, for the first time, India sent warships to the South China Sea as part of its maiden maritime exercise with the navies of the ASEAN countries. Again in 2024, Indian Navy ships participated in an operational deployment to the South China Sea, which included port calls at Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Brunei.
Importantly, India has increased defense exports to Southeast Asian countries, particularly the Philippines and Indonesia, and is supporting their naval modernization efforts.
To be sure, New Delhi is still careful not to cross what the Chinese would consider “red lines.” Even as India’ss policy continues to be driven by its long-stated commitment to the principles of freedom of navigation, peaceful resolution of disputes, and respect for international laws, its actions in the South China Sea remain short of direct involvement.
This comes from a pragmatic assessment of the Indian Navy’s limited assertive force projection around disputed areas of the South China Sea, where Beijing is evidently the much stronger military power. India’s position of non-involvement in the maritime disputes is also consistent with its long-standing position of opposition to external interference in the resolution of the Kashmir dispute. Additionally, for the Indian Navy, whose primary area of interest is the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea is of secondary importance.
At the same time, there are strong reasons why India should play a bigger role in the South China Sea.
First, New Delhi has high economic and diplomatic stakes in the region. Not only does 55 percent of India’s trade pass through the South China Sea and Malacca Straits but also, India is participating in the joint development of energy resources in the region. Unfettered Chinese control of the waters poses a threat to India’s economic vitality and national security; that makes such a scenario unacceptable to New Delhi.
Second, increasing Chinese coercion, despite major maritime powers such as the U.S., Japan, and EU countries increasing their naval deployments in the South China Sea, underscores the need for collective action. This is acknowledged by Southeast Asian countries themselves, which are turning toward powerful extraregional actors to prevent a China-driven East Asian security order. As a country that is trying to position itself as a responsible growing power, New Delhi cannot afford to sit by idly, especially with Southeast Asian countries seriously doubting New Delhi’s capability and political will for global leadership.
According to ‘The State of South East Asia-2024’ published by the Singapore-based ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, only 14.2 percent of respondents in a survey were confident that India would “do the right thing” and contribute to global stability, while 30.5 percent had “little confidence” it would do so. Consequently, India will need to be, in the words of former Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale, more “responsive to ASEAN expectations.” To be taken more seriously by Southeast Asian countries, India will need to be more proactive in engaging them.
Besides, the assumption that China would respect Indian redlines in the Himalayas and the Indian Ocean if New Delhi did not interfere in the South China Sea disputes was disproved by China’s aggression on Indian soldiers at Galwan in Ladakh in June 2020.
So, will India consider joining the Squad?
When the idea of the Squad grouping was first floated, New Delhi’s strategic circles were not so receptive to it. There were apprehensions that it would replace the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or Quad, of which India is a part. But such apprehensions have since dissipated.
Much will depend on how this grouping, currently in its infancy, evolves.
It is worth noting that India’s initial hesitation in joining the Quad was due to the grouping’s overtly military nature in its early years. New Delhi’s subsequent warming to the Quad was because of its expanded scope and, in the words of Jaishankar, “good agenda” when it was revived With no formal institutional structure in place, the Squad’s activities have been limited to periodically publicized military exercises, the most recent of which was held in February 2025.
Given its focus on military cooperation, intelligence-sharing and joint exercises, the Squad is likely to appeal less to New Delhi, reducing the chances of the latter joining the grouping in its current form. However, if the scope and agenda of the grouping are restructured to focus on soft security issues, such as maritime safety, New Delhi might be more receptive.
