Associate Membership: What might work across the Atlantic is unlikely to work across the Channel

Fabian Zuleeg argues that even if Canada becoming an Associate Member of the EU is successful, which depends on it becoming an ambitious, clearly defined and well-managed structure, it is not a future model for the future UK-EU relationship. 

The very ambition that could make Associate Membership meaningful for Canada makes it difficult for Britain. A successful EU–Canada partnership could instead provide the kernel for a broader alliance of like-minded countries.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has proposed that Canada should become the EU’s first “Associate Member”. If there is to be a first, presumably there can be a second, so why not the United Kingdom?

Geopolitically, the case is compelling. The UK is a large European democracy, one of the continent’s most important military powers and a crucial supporter of Ukraine. Economically, the EU and UK remain deeply interdependent. They face the same threat from Russia, similar challenges from China, instability in the European neighbourhood and growing uncertainty about the future direction of the United States.

Indeed, the geopolitical logic is in some respects even stronger than for Canada.

Yet the reaction in Britain has been telling. Associate Membership is simultaneously dismissed by some as an empty label and viewed by others as potentially offering Canada the kind of bespoke relationship the UK could not secure after Brexit. Both cannot be true. But the reaction illustrates how difficult the politics would be.

The rapidly changing geopolitical environment already requires the EU and UK to move beyond managing Brexit towards systematically defining and acting on shared strategic priorities. But that does not necessarily make Associate Membership the right vehicle.

The terminology is difficult, even for the EU and Canada, let alone the UK. Inside the EU, governments question what membership means if a non-European country can become an Associate Member without being part of the Union or its established enlargement process. The term membership invokes notions of shared sovereignty and decision-making under the EU treaties but this is not on offer. For Canada, it could imply a relationship with the EU that goes further politically and institutionally than many Canadians envisage.

Regardless of the label, the immediate priority must be to ensure that Associate Membership represents a genuinely meaningful form of integration. It needs ambitious content, clearly defined rights and obligations and credible governance.

It should encompass economic security, defence and defence production, trade, technology, energy, critical minerals, finance and democratic resilience. It must also specify where cooperation means coordination and where it entails common rules, institutions or sovereignty-sharing. Without this, Canada’s Associate Membership risks becoming another impressive European announcement that delivers little in practice.

However, the starting point for the UK is very different. Canada is seeking to diversify trade away from the United States and towards Europe. There are also substantial complementarities, including energy, critical minerals and other resources. The British position is fundamentally different. The EU is already the UK’s most important economic partner. The challenge is not diversification but reintegration after deliberate disintegration. That makes defensive economic interests and distributional conflicts much more likely to predominate.

Most importantly, the UK was a full member for 47 years. It did not merely cooperate with EU decision-making. It participated in it. Any meaningful Associate Membership would inevitably involve accepting common rules, constraints and institutions without regaining an equivalent vote over their creation.

The EU has its own sensitivities. It remains wary of British cherry-picking and “cakeism”. Both sides need greater flexibility, but differentiated integration also has to protect the integrity of the EU.

The Withdrawal Agreement and Trade and Cooperation Agreement add another layer of complexity, as do the slow, incremental steps towards closer cooperation since Brexit. EU–UK relations already have a dense legal and political architecture that cannot simply be replaced by a new label.

What might work across the Atlantic is therefore unlikely to work across the Channel. Even if Associate Membership proves successful, it should not simply be replicated for Britain.

Yet the geopolitical logic behind EU–Canada integration applies in spades to the UK. The problem is the institutional vehicle, not the strategic imperative.

A successful EU–Canada Associate Membership should provide the kernel for a broader Economic Security Alliance (ESA) of like-minded countries.

Such an Alliance would provide a mechanism through which liberal democracies can collectively manage economic interdependence in an era of coercion and systemic rivalry. The EU, UK and Canada could form its core, alongside other like-minded partners such as Norway, Japan, Australia and South Korea.

Its purpose would go far beyond free trade. Members could coordinate investment screening and export controls, secure critical supply chains and infrastructure, cooperate on critical technologies and data, integrate aspects of defence procurement and finance, and develop collective responses to economic coercion. They should also work together to uphold and, wherever possible, defend the global rule of law and multilateral system on which open economies and liberal democracies continue to depend.

This would not mean cooperation without obligations. Deeper integration must entail common rules, governance and reciprocal commitments. But these would be negotiated collectively among participating countries rather than constructed as a lesser version of EU membership.

The UK would not be returning as a second-class member of an organisation it chose to leave. It would be joining the EU, Canada and other like-minded countries in building a new structure designed for a new geopolitical era.

For the EU, this would avoid muddying the waters for Ukraine, Moldova, the Western Balkans and others seeking actual EU membership. Associate Membership should not become a convenient substitute for enlargement where full membership has been promised.

Associate Membership therefore needs to succeed on its own terms. It must become an ambitious, substantive new relationship between Canada and the EU, not another label in search of content. It makes sense to strengthen bilateral political cooperation, quickly, whatever label is applied.

But what might work across the Atlantic is unlikely to work across the Channel.

Its significance for Britain could instead be to demonstrate what deeper integration among like-minded democracies can achieve, providing the kernel for an Economic Security Alliance in which the EU, UK, Canada and others participate as partners to convert convergence in strategic interests into collective power.

By Fabian Zuleeg, Chief Executive and Chief Economist at the European Policy Centre.