Callum Murphy and Alex Brookes: The Chagos deal is collapsing in plain sight because it was rushed, opaque and unsound

Callum Murphy is Director of Campaigns and Alex Brookes Director of External Affairs & Engagement at Conservative Friends of Overseas Territories (CFOT)

So, for the second time, President Trump has publicly warned Keir Starmer against pressing ahead with Labour’s reckless Chagos deal.

This was not an off-the-cuff remark or a misunderstanding. It was a deliberate intervention, later confirmed by the President’s own press secretary, making clear that he does not believe this is a good deal for Britain, the United States, or allied security.

That matters.

Because while Labour ministers cling desperately to selective briefings suggesting the United States Department of State is “content”, the President of the United States is saying something very different. And when it comes to Diego Garcia, it is presidential authority – not diplomatic mood music – that ultimately determines whether American confidence exists.

This widening gap between the White House and Downing Street exposes the central weakness of Labour’s entire approach. Starmer is attempting to force through a permanent surrender of British sovereign territory, on a brittle lease-back arrangement, without secure American buy-in. That is not statecraft. It is strategic negligence.

Some in Westminster will try to dismiss Trump’s remarks as theatre – part of a broader pattern of disruption, or a “Greenland-style” negotiating ploy. That analysis does not stand up.

Unlike past rhetorical gambits, this intervention was specific, repeated, and focused on a concrete vulnerability: the risk that the lease underpinning Diego Garcia could fail. That concern goes to the heart of the deal. If sovereignty is surrendered and the lease later collapses – through political pressure, legal challenge, or a change of government in Mauritius – Britain and its allies would have no guaranteed right to operate from one of the most strategically important military bases in the world.

That is precisely why successive UK governments, of all political colours, have maintained sovereignty over the British Indian Ocean Territory. Labour’s decision to abandon that principle is not compelled by law. It is a political choice – and a reckless one.

The Prime Minister now finds himself exposed. Labour’s strategy relied on rushing the deal, obscuring its true cost, and presenting American acquiescence as a fait accompli. Trump’s intervention has blown that apart.

The Government may say it will “pause for thought”, but the reality is closer to panic. Without American confidence, this deal cannot proceed. And with time running out in the parliamentary calendar, Labour is rapidly losing its ability to bounce this through the Commons before scrutiny catches up.

This is not just embarrassing. It is destabilising. Allies do not appreciate being presented with irreversible faits accomplis on matters of shared security. By surrendering sovereignty first and attempting to tidy up the US position later, Labour has inverted the basic logic of alliance management.

Even leaving aside the diplomatic chaos, the substance of the deal remains indefensible. Conservatives have already exposed, through Freedom of Information requests, that the real cost of this agreement is close to £35 billion – nearly ten times higher than the figure initially floated by Labour. That is £35 billion to give up British territory, dissolve the British Indian Ocean Territory, and fund what amounts to a long-term subsidy to the Mauritian state.

At a time when British families are being squeezed at home, Labour is preparing to send billions of pounds abroad – money that will account for over four per cent of the Mauritian government’s entire budget. British taxpayers will, in effect, be subsidising tax cuts overseas while facing tax rises at home.

No serious government would describe that as value for money.

Diego Garcia is not an abstract diplomatic token. It is a linchpin of Western defence architecture in the Indo-Pacific. Mauritius, meanwhile, has openly deepened cooperation with China, announced closer links with Russia, and welcomed Iranian diplomatic support for its sovereignty claims.

Labour’s deal creates a structural vulnerability at the heart of this arrangement. A lease is only as strong as the political will behind it. Surrender sovereignty, and Britain gives up its ultimate safeguard.

That is why the 1966 UK-US treaty matters. It states unambiguously that the territory “shall remain under United Kingdom sovereignty”. That treaty has not been amended. Ministers admit discussions are merely “ongoing”. Proceeding regardless risks placing the UK in breach of its international obligations – and Parliament has yet to properly scrutinise any proposed amendment under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act.

Overlaying this diplomatic drift is the unanswered questions of the process – specifically the role of Jonathan Powell in the negotiations. Freedom of Information material acquired by CFOT shows FCDO officials circulating Chagos-related briefings to Powell in August 2024, before his formal appointment as negotiator on 6 September 2024 (the date which the Government informed Parliament he officially commenced the role), including press reports and read outs from meetings between the Prime Ministers of the UK and Mauritius. Powell was also briefed by FCDO officials during August 2024. This timeline alone raises obvious concerns about authority, vetting, clearance, and accountability.

Now with the Bill being delayed after President Trump’s renewed attack, those questions become even more acute. If the negotiations were conducted in a grey zone of informal engagement before formal appointment, and the resulting deal is now being paused under external pressure, the issue is not just transparency – it is whether the correct procedures were followed and whether potential breaches of national security were committed.

The Freedom of Information requests raise fundamental questions: what vetting was undertaken prior to Powell’s appointment and by whom in the FCDO or Cabinet Office; what conflict of interest assessment was made regarding his work through Inter-Mediate, particularly given his activities in China, a state actor in favour of the surrender in the same month as his formal appointment in September; why he appeared to have access to classified government materials before being formally appointed; why the FCDO continued to use unsecure communications to pass him classified information despite acknowledging the need to arrange secure channels; in what capacity he met the Mauritian Prime Minister on the 30 August 2024 prior to formal appointment (having received briefing from FCDO officials in Port Louis in advance of the meeting); what level of security clearance he held during August 2024 and the materials he was authorised to see; why Parliament was told he was appointed on the 6 September if he was operating in the role earlier; and what conditions were placed on managing his dual roles, given he only left Inter-Mediate upon becoming National Security Advisor in November 2024.

The Government has told Parliament that Powell was appointed on 6 September 2024. Yet the document trail now points to involvement weeks earlier – receiving classified correspondence and actively negotiating at most senior level in Mauritius (the PM of Mauritius no less) while still being employed by Inter-Mediate. This appears to be a case of freelancing on a sensitive foreign policy file by an individual who, at the time, still had interests and international contracts with third parties and foreign actors.

This material would significantly deepen concerns about process, transparency, and national security safeguards around the negotiation itself. An arrangement that must be paused after international backlash, delayed in Parliament, and defended amid unanswered questions about the negotiator’s status is not a settled strategic settlement – it is a live political liability.

It is also now becoming clear that the government may have misled Parliament.  The involvement of Powell and officials in FCDO needs to be investigated at the highest levels and as matter of urgency. But it would appear to be another case of the Prime Minister appointing a former Blairite apparatchik with little or no due diligence or vetting. The Prime Minister’s judgement is therefore once again brought into question.

The Chagos Surrender Bill compounds these failures. It grants sweeping Henry VIII powers, avoids meaningful scrutiny of £35 billion of public spending, and contains no robust mechanism to guarantee the long-term security of Diego Garcia.

It also fails the Chagossian people.

Labour signed this deal without proper consultation and blocked a proposed referendum that would have given Chagossians a direct voice in their future. Even the United Nations has raised concerns about how this process has been forced through.

Trump’s intervention has crystallised what Conservatives have argued from the start: this deal is unstable, ill-judged, and unsustainable. It undermines British sovereignty, weakens national security, and damages our most important alliance.

The longer the Government pauses, the clearer the conclusion becomes, this is a negotiation conducted in opacity, defended in haste, and now reconsidered under pressure from allies, Parliament, and its own unresolved paper trail.