Can the system deliver on the government’s proposed reforms?

Following on from their recent blog looking at Labour’s proposals to reform the asylum appeals system, Ali Ahmadi, Catherine Barnard and Fiona Costello explore whether it is possible to deliver these reforms.

In November 2025, the government published its policy paper on asylum reforms, ‘Restoring Order and Control’, describing it as the ‘largest overhaul of asylum policy in modern times’. At its core is a proposed move to temporary refugee status, initially granted for 30 months, reviewable every 2.5 years, and revocable if protection needs cease (for example the home state is now deemed safe). It also proposes that indefinite leave to remain (ILR) will not be granted until a refugee has at least 20 years of continuous residence (refugees must currently wait five years to apply). The government says this will make the system fairer, cheaper, and more sustainable. But will it? Can an already strained system handle the administrative burden, or will it exacerbate delays, costs, and uncertainty?

Under the existing rules, refugees are given five years limited leave to remain (LLR) during which time they can work and access public funds without having to prove an ongoing fear of persecution (the test for refugee status). At the five-year mark, they can apply for ILR (i.e. settlement) which is a permanent permission to live and work in the UK. Applying for ILR is largely procedural and getting ILR is, according to the Home Secretary, ‘near automatic’. It involves checks on continued residence and criminality but does not require a full re-assessment of protection needs. Recent data shows that around 94% of people granted refugee permission (refugee status, humanitarian protection, etc.) have obtained some form of ILR after 10 years.

The proposed shift to 30-month reviews fundamentally changes this model. Refugees would need to demonstrate, at regular intervals, that they are still in need of protection, while the Home Office would be required to re-evaluate conditions in countries of origin and reconsider individual circumstances repeatedly over many years. One conservative estimate suggests that around 1.9 million reviews would be needed in the first decade of the policy. Such a workload represents a substantial expansion in responsibilities for the Home Office, which would need far more staff, deeper country-expertise capacity, more interview and processing infrastructure, and stronger case-management systems to avoid a new cycle of delay and error.

The system is already under strain. The National Audit Office (NAO) investigated a sample of 5,000 asylum claims lodged almost three years ago and found that 56% (2,812) still did not have a final outcome. Asylum backlogs stand at over 71,000 cases relating to almost 91,000 people.

The burden would fall not just on the Home Office. Legal aid providers, advice organisations, local authorities, refugee charities, and integration services would all face significantly increased demand. Many are already over-stretched. Some parts of the country, including the East of England, have only a handful of asylum legal aid providers, and waiting lists for free advice can be months long. Data from October 2023 shows that 63% of people in England and Wales do not have access to asylum and immigration legal aid providers in their local area. Regular reviews will compound these challenges. If the process becomes rushed or formulaic, individuals may seek judicial review on grounds of procedural fairness, adding to the case load of already burdened courts.

The quality of initial Home Office decisions is already in question: nearly half of all asylum appeals succeed, indicating a high rate of initial decision errors. The Home Office itself reported that only 52% of asylum decisions met its own quality standards in 2023/24. Therefore, without adequate safeguards, any ongoing routine review system may generate more litigation, not less, and increase, rather than reduce, uncertainty.

A system of routine reviews also carries a significant risk of administrative bottlenecks. Recent experience shows that when the Home Office accelerated the clearing of asylum backlogs, it created a knock-on delay in the appeal courts. For instance, the asylum appeals caseload stood at 51,000 cases in May 2025. This was an increase of 88% from March 2024, and largely due to the Home Office attempting to clear asylum backlogs. Conducting regular reviews for all refugees, alongside existing initial claims and appeals, could create a permanent state of triage unless the government commits to sustained, large-scale investment.

For refugees, the lack of stable status would affect employment prospects, housing access, and long-term planning. Employers and landlords may be hesitant to engage with people whose status is periodically uncertain The UNHCR, in their observations on the UK’s proposals, notes that short-term stay arrangements subject to regular review and lengthy pathways to settlement and naturalisation create ‘prolonged uncertainty and despair, undermining integration and social cohesion’. It also notes that In 2023, the Australian government abolished its own temporary protection visas for refugees, because it made ‘no sense – economically or socially’ to keep people in limbo.

Further, if refugee protection is withdrawn after, say, 15 years, families who have built lives in the UK could be uprooted, raising human rights concerns. They might also face reintegration challenges and economic hardship in their ‘safe’ homelands.

Refugees will have the option to switch to a ‘work and study’ route that offers faster settlement. This favours the employable, leaving trauma-affected or unskilled refugees in perpetual precarity. It is also likely to lead to a two-tier system where only ‘deserving’ contributors gain security.

The new policy will also apply to post-2021 grants of refugee status. This retrospectivity raises rule-of law concerns. Individuals who planned lives based on a five-year promise of ILR now face protracted limbo, potentially breaching legitimate expectations under administrative law. It also risks weakening trust in decision-making, both among refugees and wider civic institutions.

In conclusion, the proposals promise ‘order’ to the asylum system, but their practical deliverability remains uncertain. Reviewing every refugee’s status every 30 months (so eight times in 20 years) demands considerable resources, high-quality decision-making, and a robust network of support services to ensure fairness and legality. Without these, the system risks creating constant administrative churn, expanding backlogs, heavier burdens on public services, and deep insecurity for refugees. If the government goes ahead, it will need not only new legislation but also a credible operational plan, significant investment in the system and guarantees that the process will not compromise fairness or efficiency.

By Catherine Barnard, Senior Fellow, UK in a Changing Europe & Professor of EU Law and Employment Law, University of Cambridge, Fiona Costello, Assistant Professor, University of Birmingham and Ali Ahmadi, Research Associate, University of Cambridge and PhD student at Anglia Ruskin University.