if Welsh rugby truly belongs to its clubs, players and supporters, then those entrusted with running it have a responsibility to be open and transparent about the evidence behind decisions
Welsh rugby team.(Image: Getty Images)
After over two decades of writing for the Western Mail, I don’t normally do two consecutive columns on the same subject, but the last few days have been momentous for the game we love – Welsh rugby.
Over the past week, the crisis over its future has intensified, with former internationals, regional representatives, supporters and prominent business figures questioning both the WRU’s three-region strategy and the board’s ability to implement it.
Calls have been made for board members to stand down, and, as this column emphasised last week, for the financial evidence underpinning the decision to be released.
The WRU responded by condemning “personal attacks” on its board and, whilst any genuine abuse is clearly unacceptable, none was evident in the public statements made by prominent critics such as Hayley Parsons and Jonathan Davies, or by those of us asking the WRU to release its evidence.
More importantly, though, the union insisted there is “no realistic prospect” of generating enough money to fund four competitive professional teams beyond 2028 and said criticism must be accompanied by credible alternatives. That is a reasonable standard until one considers that the detailed financial and sporting information needed to test this conclusion remains largely within the WRU itself, as I emphasised in my last article.
Yet despite these constraints, detailed alternatives are emerging that deserve serious examination. One I have recently read is “Built to Win: A Business and Sporting Turnaround Plan for Welsh Rugby”, a framework developed by a Welsh entrepreneur with extensive experience in business turnaround, financial restructuring, and commercial dealmaking.
Interestingly, its central thesis is that Welsh rugby’s fundamental problem may not be the number of professional teams but an operating model in which governance, ownership, central costs, regional funding, player development and commercial activity have become fragmented and poorly aligned.
The real challenge it poses to the WRU is therefore not simply to retain four teams, but to reform the operating system and then retest whether three or four regions represent the best sustainable structure. That distinction matters as moving from four teams to three may provide additional funding for each surviving licence, but it does not automatically reduce central bureaucracy, improve coaching, repair the player pathway or eliminate duplicated functions.
One of the main proposals in Built to Win is to separate the community and professional games through a Welsh rugby amateur foundation that would protect club democracy and govern grassroots rugby, while a professionally appointed Wales rugby board would oversee the stadium, elite teams, commercial rights and high-performance system.
It also proposes centralising shared services such as finance, procurement, technology, data, sponsorship and customer management, while retaining regional responsibility for rugby delivery, identity and community engagement. It also proposes independent financial oversight, transparent procurement, published performance indicators, stronger player and coach pathways and an integrated commercial strategy.
At this stage, it is not a finished business case, and nobody should pretend otherwise as its financial projections are illustrative, its sporting proposals require expert validation and some of its structural recommendations could be difficult to deliver.
Nevertheless, it is already a credible alternative framework that challenges the WRU’s assertion that no realistic route exists to sustaining four competitive professional teams beyond 2028. Whilst it does not prove that four teams are financially viable, it shows the question should be tested independently rather than treated as settled.
So what should happen now? There is no reason why an independent adviser should not be given controlled access to the WRU’s departmental costs and headcount, cash flow, debt commitments, regional funding flows, stadium economics and major commercial and lending agreements. Comparable information would also be required from all four regions, including their income, operating costs, debts, shareholder loans, property obligations and restructuring liabilities.
The existing four-region structure could then serve as the financial and performance baseline against which three alternatives are tested: the WRU’s proposed three-region model and the reformed Built to Win operating model with either three or four teams. Each should be assessed using identical assumptions under base, downside and severe-downside conditions and the independent adviser could then publish the methodology, common assumptions, comparative results and conclusions without disclosing sensitive material.
Such an appraisal should also consider how the Welsh Government and local authorities could support facilities, community participation and shared infrastructure where these contribute to public health, youth engagement, social cohesion and regional economic development, although this should not mean using public money to underwrite professional teams’ recurring losses.
The same should apply to any other credible model as Built to Win is not the only alternative being developed. Indeed, another Welsh entrepreneur spoke to the Western Mail earlier this week about a separate strategy more explicitly focused on retaining four professional teams alongside reform of WRU expenditure, governance and the player pathway.
The existence of both these alternative strategies (and there may be others) reinforces the central point that the choice is no longer simply between the WRU’s three-region proposal and preserving the present, unsuccessful structure.
What is not acceptable is for the WRU to determine which financial information is released, maintain control over the assumptions underpinning its preferred conclusion and then dismiss alternatives because those outside the organisation cannot produce a fully costed business case without access to the same underlying evidence.
That is not a fair test of credibility but a closed shop in which only the WRU can meet the standard it has established. If the WRU is correct and four professional teams cannot be sustained under any credible reformed structure, then an open appraisal of the alternative strategies would strengthen its case and give difficult decisions greater legitimacy. If it is unwilling to subject its conclusion to that test, people will reasonably ask whether the evidence is as definitive as its public statements suggest.
The central question is no longer whether the existing four-region model is working, but whether its failure stems primarily from the number of teams or from the system surrounding them. Those responsible for our national game should welcome an independent comparison of every credible option to ensure that Welsh rugby secures the best possible long-term outcome, rather than simply the one that appears most convenient today.
Most importantly, if Welsh rugby truly belongs to its clubs, players and supporters, then those entrusted with running it have a responsibility to be open and transparent about the evidence behind decisions that will shape everyone’s game for generations.
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