Republicans in the US House of Representatives are moving to add prediction market restrictions to a stalled congressional stock trading ban, as lawmakers scrutinize whether members of Congress should be allowed to wager on elections or public policy.

House Administration Committee Chair Bryan Steil plans to attach prediction market provisions to H.R. 7008, the House’s stalled stock trading ban bill, before it reaches the floor, Bloomberg Government reported Thursday.

Steil said he expects House leaders to schedule a vote on the measure, which would combine stock trading limits with new restrictions on lawmakers’ use of prediction markets.

The push comes amid growing scrutiny of prediction markets and renewed efforts to tighten rules on lawmakers’ financial trading.

No full ban on lawmakers’ prediction market use in Steil proposal

Steil’s proposal does not seek to ban prediction markets outright for members of Congress, but would restrict certain types of contracts lawmakers could trade. He said bets tied to sports or entertainment outcomes, such as the Super Bowl, would remain allowed, while contracts tied to elections or public policy would be limited.

Steil said the House still lacks clear rules for how members should engage with prediction markets.

“I don’t think this is a critique of the underlying product one way or the other,” Steil said.

Related: Polymarket users cry foul after Strategy sale market resolves to ‘no’

Politico says influencers promoted Polymarket after payments

According to a Friday report by Politico, influencers promoted Polymarket after receiving payments linked to the company’s chief marketing officer.

PayPal transaction records reviewed by Politico show at least $350,000 in payments routed through a personal account tied to CMO Matthew Modabber, alongside a broader flow of more than $2.5 million to hundreds of recipients over 14 months.

At least 20 creators later posted about Polymarket on X, often without disclosing financial ties, including figures such as Brian Krassenstein and Riley Gaines.

Cointelegraph reached out to Polymarket for comment on the promotions but had not received a response by publication.

Source: Brian Krassenstein

Polymarket attracted attention in 2024 after users successfully bet on Donald Trump’s election victory, reinforcing claims that prediction markets can reflect political outcomes in real time.

Prediction markets have also faced regulatory pushback in multiple jurisdictions over election-related contracts, gambling concerns and alleged insider-style trading.

Magazine: Should users be allowed to bet on war and death in prediction markets?

• Hayes exited ZEC after an Orchard privacy bug raised supply doubts.
• He also liquidated HYPE and NEAR while rotating his portfolio.
• The Zcash flaw was patched, but future exploitation cannot be ruled out.

Arthur Hayes, co-founder of BitMEX, has fully exited his positions in Zcash (ZEC), Hyperliquid (HYPE), and NEAR Protocol (NEAR).

The decision comes at a time when the crypto market is still digesting the implications of a flaw found in the Orchard shielded pool, a core component of Zcash’s privacy system.

The move has drawn attention across the digital asset space, not only because of Hayes’ profile as a macro investor, but also due to the nature of the vulnerability, which raised questions about the integrity of ZEC’s supply mechanics inside its shielded environment.

Orchard vulnerability triggers uncertainty in Zcash

The trigger for the sell-off was a vulnerability discovered in the Orchard shielded pool, which is designed to enable private transactions on the Zcash network using zero-knowledge proofs.

The issue raised concerns that, under certain conditions, it may have been theoretically possible to create counterfeit ZEC within the shielded system without immediate detection.

While Zcash developers moved quickly to deploy an emergency patch, the core concern was not just the existence of the bug itself, but the inability to verify whether it had ever been exploited before it was fixed.

Because shielded transactions are designed to be private, there is no straightforward way to retroactively audit all activity in a way that could definitively rule out past abuse.

Market reaction was immediate and sharp.

ZEC experienced a heavy sell-off, with its price falling by over 45% during the height of the reaction.

Liquidity thinned quickly as traders rushed to reduce exposure to an asset suddenly carrying uncertainty around its supply integrity.

The incident reignited a long-running debate around privacy-focused blockchain systems.

While zero-knowledge proofs are widely regarded as one of the strongest cryptographic tools available for privacy, they also introduce complexity that can make historical verification of state changes significantly more difficult compared to transparent blockchains.

Arthur Hayes exits ZEC, HYPE, and NEAR positions

Against this backdrop, Arthur Hayes confirmed that he had fully liquidated his ZEC holdings.

Hayes also closed positions in HYPE and NEAR, signaling a broader portfolio adjustment rather than a single-asset reaction.

Hayes described the situation in blunt terms, stating that what he previously referred to as his “Holy Trinity” thesis no longer held.

The key issue for Hayes was not confirmed exploitation. Instead, it was the presence of unresolved uncertainty.

Even with a patch in place, the inability to definitively prove whether counterfeit issuance had occurred prior to the fix created a level of risk he was no longer willing to carry in a privacy asset.

The Holy Trinity is dead. Sadly due to the Orchard Pool exploit, I had to dump our entire $ZEC bag.
– While I think it’s extremely unlikely of any minting, it cannot be formally cryptographically proved impossible
– The privacy from AI, govt, big tech narrative demands perfection…

— Arthur Hayes (@CryptoHayes) June 5, 2026

Alongside the ZEC exit, Hayes also liquidated positions in HYPE and NEAR.

While no direct technical link was identified between those assets and the Zcash vulnerability, the simultaneous sell-off suggests a broader repositioning of capital rather than an isolated reaction.

Key Highlights

• Jensen Huang, CEO of NVIDIA, has validated Samsung, SK Hynix, and Micron as certified suppliers of HBM4 memory for the upcoming Vera Rubin AI accelerator system.
• The Vera Rubin platform has commenced full-scale production and is scheduled for commercial delivery in the third quarter of 2026, offering a tenfold increase in agent throughput versus Grace Blackwell.
• Industry analysts project SK Hynix will capture between 60% and 70% of the HBM4 supply volume for Vera Rubin, while Samsung secures 25–30%, leaving Micron with the balance.
• Micron shares fell 7.7% on June 5 despite the certification announcement, weighed down by tech sector pressure following robust employment data and Broadcom’s quarterly results.
• The certification disclosure came during Huang’s visit to South Korea, where he conducted strategic discussions with executives from SK, Samsung, LG, Hyundai, and Naver regarding supply chains and AI collaboration.

On June 5, 2026, NVIDIA’s CEO Jensen Huang publicly validated that the three leading memory chip manufacturers—Samsung, SK Hynix, and Micron—have successfully completed the qualification process to provide HBM4 high-bandwidth memory for the company’s Vera Rubin artificial intelligence accelerator system.

NVIDIA Corporation, NVDA

NVDA shares reached $218.66, posting a 1.82% gain for the session, while Micron (MU) experienced a 7.74% decline.

Upon his arrival in Seoul, Huang addressed the media, stating: “All three vendors have been qualified. All three vendors are in production, and they’re all racing to support Vera Rubin.”

Vera Rubin represents the next evolution beyond NVIDIA’s Grace Blackwell GPU platform. The system transitioned to full production status after Huang’s presentation at GTC Taipei on June 1, 2026, and the company reports it achieves a tenfold improvement in agent throughput relative to Grace Blackwell.

“Agentic AI is a new kind of workload,” Huang explained. “One prompt can launch a thousand-step journey of reasoning, retrieval, tool use and response generation. Vera Rubin was built for this moment.”

Shipments of the innovative platform are projected to commence during Q3 2026. Every Vera Rubin server configuration combines NVIDIA’s Vera central processors with Rubin graphics processing units and terabytes of HBM4 memory technology.

This announcement represents Huang’s first public validation that all three memory providers have successfully met certification requirements for the new system, putting to rest months of industry conjecture about the supply chain.

Projected Distribution of HBM4 Supply Volume

Although NVIDIA has not released official volume distribution figures, industry supply-chain experts predict SK Hynix will command approximately 60–70% of the HBM4 memory supply for Vera Rubin. Samsung is anticipated to capture around 25–30% of the allocation, while Micron will fulfill the remaining portion.

SK Hynix initiated the qualification pipeline ahead of its competitors. Samsung launched HBM4 volume production in February 2026. On June 2, Huang publicly encouraged SK Hynix to accelerate its production capacity, emphasizing that worldwide semiconductor availability continues to face constraints.

NVIDIA is simultaneously establishing a fresh research and development facility in South Korea and is currently hiring personnel for the operation.

Micron Stock Declines Despite Qualification Approval

The favorable supply chain development failed to support Micron shares. MU declined 7.74% on June 5, pressured by widespread technology sector weakness that followed a hotter-than-anticipated U.S. employment report, which unsettled interest-rate-sensitive technology holdings.

The share price decline also coincided with Broadcom’s quarterly earnings announcement on Wednesday evening, which seemed to cool enthusiasm across the artificial intelligence sector.

Throughout his Seoul trip, Huang conducted meetings with chairpersons from SK Group, Samsung, LG Group, Hyundai Motor Group, and Naver to address supply expansion commitments and physical AI strategic alliances.

NVIDIA has confirmed that meetings are arranged with all principal South Korean technology and industrial conglomerates as the company advances plans to expand Vera Rubin implementation worldwide.

Here is the puzzle. On May 29, 2026, a security researcher hired by Zcash developers found a critical bug in the network’s Orchard privacy pool, a flaw that could have let an attacker mint unlimited, undetectable counterfeit ZEC.

The development team moved fast: they disclosed it, coordinated an emergency fix, disabled the vulnerable component within days, and re-enabled it with a patched circuit through a hard fork by June 1. No funds were stolen.

No inflation was detected. By almost any standard of incident response, this was a model of how to handle a critical vulnerability. And the market punished ZEC anyway. The token, which had been trading above $600 earlier in the week, has crashed roughly 45% to around $314, wiping more than $3 billion off its market value. The bug was fixed, and the price collapsed regardless.

 Understanding why reveals something fundamental about privacy coins that the celebratory “we patched it” framing misses entirely. This piece explains the paradox, and what it means for every privacy coin, not just Zcash.

What the bug was

To grasp why the fix did not save the price, you first need to understand what the bug actually threatened.

The vulnerability lived in Orchard, Zcash’s most advanced privacy pool, specifically in the cryptographic circuit that makes its shielded transactions work. Zcash’s whole purpose is private transactions: using zero-knowledge cryptography, it lets users send and receive funds without revealing addresses or amounts. 

Orchard is the engine that delivers that privacy. The bug was a flaw in that engine, and its consequences were severe. As Shielded Labs, the nonprofit developer that disclosed it, described, the flaw could have allowed an attacker to create an unlimited number of counterfeit ZEC tokens, completely undetected.

The cleanest analogy comes from the disclosure itself: think of it as someone secretly gaining access to the Federal Reserve’s dollar printing press, except in this case, even the Fed could not tell the extra dollars had been printed. A security engineer named Taylor Hornby, brought on specifically to hunt for protocol vulnerabilities, found the flaw on May 29 using an advanced AI model to conduct a targeted review of the Orchard circuit. 

He wrote a complete working exploit and confirmed that, in a local testing environment, it generated unlimited, undetectable counterfeit ZEC. Shielded Labs stated plainly that if the same tool had been run on the live Zcash network, it would have produced counterfeit tokens in the attacker’s wallet.

This is about the worst kind of bug a cryptocurrency can have. The entire value proposition of a fixed-supply digital asset rests on the supply being exactly what everyone believes it is. A flaw that lets someone secretly mint unlimited counterfeit coins attacks that foundation directly. So the severity was real. But severity alone does not explain the crash, because the bug was caught and fixed before any known exploitation. The explanation lies in two words: “undetected” and “undetectable.”

The fix worked. So why did it crash?

By the numbers, the response was a success. The flaw was found by the team’s own hired researcher before any malicious actor was known to have used it. It was disclosed responsibly. It was patched within days through coordinated emergency action. Some analysts even framed the episode as cautiously bullish, evidence that Zcash’s developers could rapidly coordinate a critical security fix without funds being stolen or inflation occurring. Robust crisis management, in other words.

And yet the market did the opposite of rewarding it. The reason is a problem the fix could not touch, and Shielded Labs was admirably honest about it. Because of Orchard’s privacy properties and the nature of the bug, there is no definitive way, using cryptography alone, to determine whether the flaw was exploited before it was discovered and fixed. The developers patched the door, but they cannot prove no one walked through it during the four years it was unlocked. They themselves stressed this uncertainty rather than hiding it.

That is the crux of the paradox. With a transparent blockchain like Bitcoin, if a similar bug were found, auditors could examine the public ledger and verify whether the total supply matched what it should be. The transparency that privacy advocates often criticize is exactly what would allow a clean “we checked, no counterfeits exist” conclusion. 

Zcash cannot do that. The shielded transactions that protect users by hiding amounts and addresses also hide whether counterfeit coins were created. The privacy is the feature, and in this moment, the privacy is the problem. You cannot audit what is designed to be unauditable.

So the market was not reacting to the bug, which was fixed. It was reacting to the permanent, unresolvable uncertainty the bug exposed. Investors were asked to hold a token whose supply integrity can never be fully proven, in the specific knowledge that a counterfeiting vulnerability existed undetected for four years. The fix addressed the future. It could do nothing about the doubt it cast over the past, and that doubt is what crashed the price.

Four years is the part that stings

The detail that turned a serious situation into a confidence crisis is the timeline. The bug was not introduced last month. It had been present since Orchard’s activation in May 2022. It existed, undetected, for four years.

This matters for two reasons, and both are corrosive to trust. The first is the obvious one: four years is a long window. Even if exploitation is unlikely, the sheer length of time during which the flaw sat open expands the space of “what if.” Anyone who used Orchard over those four years operated on a system that could, in theory, have been compromised, and there is no way to retroactively verify it was not. The longer the window, the harder it is to wave away the possibility with “it was probably never exploited.”

The second reason cuts deeper. The bug evaded years of scrutiny by experienced cryptographers. Zcash is not an obscure project; it is one of the most respected privacy coins, built and reviewed by some of the most capable cryptographers in the industry. That such a severe flaw survived four years of that scrutiny, and was found only through a deliberate, AI-assisted hunt by a specifically hired researcher, raises an uncomfortable question. 

If a bug this serious could hide for four years in a system this heavily reviewed, what confidence can anyone have that there are not others? Shielded Labs is now pursuing formal verification, a mathematical proof that no further bugs exist in the Orchard circuit, precisely because the four-year miss shattered the assumption that expert review was sufficient.

Shielded Labs makes a reasonable case that exploitation probably did not happen. The bug evaded everyone for years and surfaced only with cutting-edge tools and a skilled researcher working deliberately to find it, then was fixed quickly, leaving little window for anyone else to have found and used it in the gap. 

As they put it, they think their researcher “probably succeeded” in finding it before any malicious actor. But notice the language. “Probably.” In a system built on cryptographic certainty, the best the developers can honestly offer about the supply is a probability, and markets pricing a privacy asset do not like paying full price for “probably.”

What it means for every privacy coin

The Zcash episode is not just a Zcash problem. It exposes a structural tension that sits at the heart of every privacy-focused cryptocurrency, and that is why it deserves attention beyond ZEC holders.

The tension is this: privacy and auditability are in direct conflict. The more completely a coin hides its transactions, the more completely it also hides whether its supply is sound. A fully transparent chain can always prove its supply integrity by public inspection, at the cost of user privacy. A fully private chain protects its users absolutely, at the cost of ever being able to prove, to a skeptic, that no counterfeiting has occurred. 

This is not a flaw in Zcash’s implementation that better engineering eliminates. It is a fundamental trade-off baked into the concept of private money. Monero, the other major privacy coin, faces the same structural reality: its privacy guarantees are also its auditability limits.

What Zcash is now attempting is the industry’s most serious effort to thread that needle, and it is worth watching. Shielded Labs has proposed a network upgrade that would let anyone independently verify the integrity of the ZEC supply, involving a new shielded pool and “turnstile” accounting that tracks coins moving out of the compromised Orchard pool. 

The goal is to restore provable supply integrity without abandoning privacy. If it works, it could become a template for how privacy coins handle the auditability problem. If it proves clunky or incomplete, it will underline how hard the trade-off is to escape. Either way, Zcash is being forced to solve in public a problem the entire privacy-coin category has mostly been able to ignore.

The market’s reaction also surfaced a colder truth about privacy coins as investments. The selloff was sharpened by news that a prominent privacy-coin holder, BitMEX co-founder Arthur Hayes, sold his entire ZEC position. When a flagship holder exits over an unresolvable supply question, it signals that even sophisticated believers have a limit to how much “probably fine” they will tolerate. For a privacy coin, trust is not a soft attribute; it is the entire product, because you cannot verify the thing yourself. Once that trust takes a hit that cannot be cryptographically repaired, the discount can be severe and durable.

The honest read

Zcash did almost everything right and still got punished, and that is the lesson worth sitting with.

The developers hired a researcher to hunt for exactly this kind of flaw before attackers could. The researcher found it. The team disclosed it transparently, fixed it within days, and is now proposing a supply-integrity upgrade and pursuing formal verification to prevent a repeat. As a piece of security response, it is close to a best-case playbook, and in a transparent system it might even have been a confidence-building moment, proof the network’s defenses worked.

But Zcash is not a transparent system, and that is the whole point. Its privacy, the feature that gives it its reason to exist, is also what makes it impossible to prove the bug was never exploited during the four years it existed. 

The crash from above $600 to around $314 is the market pricing of that unresolvable uncertainty: not the bug itself, which is gone, but the permanent doubt it cast over a supply that can never be fully audited. The four-year window made the doubt larger, and a flagship holder’s exit made it concrete.

For ZEC specifically, the path back runs through the supply-integrity upgrade. If Shielded Labs can deliver a credible way to verify the supply independently, some of the fear should fade, because the core wound, unprovability, would begin to heal. If it cannot, the discount may persist as a permanent risk premium on an asset that asks you to trust what you cannot check. 

For the broader privacy-coin category, the episode is a reminder that the privacy guarantee and the supply guarantee are two sides of the same coin, and you cannot strengthen one without weakening the other. 

Zcash just learned, in public and at the cost of $3 billion, what that trade-off looks like when it goes wrong. The bug is fixed. The question it raised is not, and may never be.

This article is for informational purposes and does not constitute financial or investment advice. Cryptocurrency markets are highly volatile. The figures and analysis described reflect data available as of June 5, 2026. Always do your own research and consult with qualified financial professionals before making investment decisions.

The U.S. economy added 172,000 jobs in May, nearly double economists’ expectations, strengthening the case for Federal Reserve rate hikes this year.

The unemployment rate held steady at 4.3%, according to data released Friday by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Bitcoin BTC$62,015.10 remained under pressure following the report, trading below $62,000 as the broader crypto market nursed steep overnight declines.

The 10-year Treasury yield jumped to 4.52% following the report. U.S. equity index futures were also lower, the Nasdaq 100 index down 1.2%. Oil prices edged modestly lower at $94 per barrel, while gold slid 1.1% to around $4,400 per ounce.

Recent economic data continue to point to a resilient U.S. economy this week. Both the ISM Manufacturing PMI and ISM Services PMI came in above expectations and remained in expansionary territory.

U.S. equities have had an incredibly strong run, with the S&P 500 about to post gains for 10 consecutive weeks and rising roughly 10% year-to-date. However, some exuberance has faded from the semiconductor sector following Broadcom’s earnings report, which disappointed investors with a weaker-than-expected outlook for AI-related chip demand.

Key takeaways

• ZEC is down 45% and is now trading around $309 per coin.
• The vulnerability was fixed within days, and findings suggest that actual exploitation of the bug is unlikely.

Zcash Zcash fell sharply on Friday after researchers disclosed a critical vulnerability in its Orchard shielded transaction pool that could have theoretically enabled the creation of unlimited counterfeit tokens.

The price dropped about 45% to $309 with most of the decline occurring shortly after the security disclosure was made public.

Critical flaw found in Zcash Orchard shielded pool

The vulnerability was identified by security researcher Taylor Hornby during an audit commissioned by Shielded Labs, an independent support organization for the Zcash ecosystem.

According to the report, the issue was located in the Orchard circuit, the zero-knowledge proof system that secures private transactions within Zcash’s shielded pool.

The flaw allowed under-constrained inputs in elliptic curve computations, making it possible to pass invalid values as valid proofs

In a test environment, researchers were able to generate an undetectable counterfeit ZEC. The bug has existed since Orchard’s activation in May 2022. The vulnerability was patched on June 1, shortly after discovery.

Despite the severity of the issue, Shielded Labs said there is no clear evidence that the vulnerability was exploited in the wild.

Reasons cited include: The complexity of Orchard’s privacy system obscures transaction tracing, the bug remained undetected for years despite cryptographic scrutiny, and no confirmed anomalies in supply have been identified

However, the organization acknowledged that absolute certainty is impossible due to the privacy-preserving nature of shielded transactions.

ZEC dips by 45%. Will it recover soon?

The ZEC/USD 4-hour chart is bearish and efficient as Zcash has lost 45% of its value in the last 24 hours.

The momentum indicators have flipped bearish, with the RSI of 33 indicating an oversold condition. The MACD lines are also within the negative territory, adding further confluence to the bearish bias.

sell

If the selloff continues, ZEC could drop below the Friday low of $245 and retest the $200 pychological level.

However, the bounce back above $300 indicates that the selloff could end soon. If the bulls regain control, ZEC could surge towards the first major resistance level at $413, with further hurdles around the $527 zone.