Binance Wallet has added USDT gas-fee payments on four blockchain networks as of Sept. 25, allowing users to transact without first holding each chain’s native gas token.

According to Binance’s updated support documentation Binance Wallet gas-fee guide, the option currently works on BNB Smart Chain, Ethereum, Solana and TRON. Users with USDT in Binance Wallet can select the stablecoin to cover the network fee when completing supported transactions.

Previously, users generally needed BNB for transactions on BNB Smart Chain, ETH on Ethereum, SOL on Solana and TRX on TRON. A wallet without the required native token could leave the user unable to complete an on-chain transaction even when it held the asset being transferred.

Binance said its wallet calculates the network fee based on current blockchain conditions. The company said more networks will gain support later, though it has not provided a rollout timetable.

Binance Wallet uses USDT for gas on four networks

The USDT option changes how Binance Wallet users can fund transaction costs, but it does not remove the underlying blockchain fee. Validators or other network participants still receive the network charge required to process the transaction.

Binance states in its support guide that “none of the network fee goes to Binance.” The company distinguishes blockchain gas from service fees that Binance Wallet may charge for certain products, including swaps.

Network charges remain dynamic. Binance says congestion can push fees higher on Ethereum Virtual Machine networks and Solana as users compete for transaction processing. Lower activity can reduce the amount required.

TRON operates differently through its resource model, which uses bandwidth and energy. Users can obtain resources through mechanisms such as staking TRX or renting energy. When available resources cannot cover a transaction, TRX may be burned to pay the remaining cost, according to Binance’s explanation.

For Binance Wallet users, USDT now serves as another payment method for those costs on supported chains. Binance has not said the networks themselves have changed their native fee mechanisms.

Exchange balances provide another way to cover gas

Users without enough USDT in Binance Wallet can use supported balances held in their Binance Exchange accounts on the same four networks.

The official Binance support page lists BNB, USDT, USDC, ETH and SOL among assets that can be used through eligible Spot, Funding or Earn balances. Users select the Exchange Account option when choosing how the network fee will be paid.

Binance lists several other routes when neither wallet USDT nor an eligible exchange balance is available. Users can transfer the required gas token from Binance Exchange, receive it from another wallet or buy supported assets using a bank card.

A separate option lets eligible users draw BNB from their Spot or Funding Account for gas on BNB Smart Chain, Ethereum and opBNB. Binance says users need more than 0.01 BNB in the relevant account before selecting that payment method.

The company continues to warn users to select the correct blockchain when moving assets between Binance and another wallet. Its withdrawal guide says choosing an incompatible network can result in assets becoming unrecoverable.

TRON users get a separate zero-gas offer

The rollout follows a separate Binance Wallet promotion for transfers on TRON.

Starting Sept. 23, eligible users can receive zero gas fees when sending USDT and other TRC-20 tokens through Binance Wallet. The campaign runs through Dec. 22, 2026, according to a Binance Wallet announcement.

Binance said the offer is supported by TRON DAO and remains subject to available campaign spots. After the promotional period, the company said qualifying transfers will receive a discounted fee of 1 USDT per transaction.

To use the promotion, users start a transfer through Binance Wallet, select the token and destination, then choose the network-fee payer when signing the transaction. USDT can be selected as the payment method before confirmation.

The TRON promotion and the four-network USDT feature cover related transaction costs under different terms. The support documentation presents USDT as a payment option for gas on BNB Smart Chain, Ethereum, Solana and TRON, while the TRON campaign temporarily reduces eligible TRC-20 transfer charges to zero.

Binance Wallet has been reducing transaction friction

Binance has made several changes to its self-custody wallet since renaming Binance Web3 Wallet in December 2024.

As crypto.news previously reported, the rebranded Binance Wallet introduced a unified wallet interface and changes to asset management and its airdrop section. Binance said at the time that upgrades would arrive in several stages.

Network fees remained separate from trading fees in later wallet promotions. In February 2025, Binance waived trading charges on eligible wallet swaps, while users still had to pay blockchain gas fees, as crypto.news reported.

Binance Wallet has since expanded the number of services available through the self-custody product. In April 2026, the wallet introduced perpetual futures trading through its app and web interface, with an Alpha Points campaign tied to trading volume, according to related crypto.news coverage.

By May, Binance Wallet had integrated Event Rush on BNB Chain, where verified users could trade tokens linked to event outcomes using USDT. The service operates through a third-party decentralized application and is restricted in some regions, as crypto.news reported.

Binance’s current documentation identifies Binance Wallet as a self-custody product provided by Binance Barbados Limited. The company states that the wallet services are not supervised by the Financial Services Regulatory Authority or another regulatory authority.

At the United Nations General Assembly, Iran proposed an agreement to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, a major oil chokepoint disrupted by the war, for a seven-day period and pause fighting, followed by broader negotiations on issues.

Trump, however, rejected the proposal, saying that Iran is looking for a deal because it was under heavy pressure. Trump also stressed on Truth Social that Iran “cannot have a nuclear weapon.”

This lingering geopolitical uncertainty has stoked inflation fears since the war began in early March, lifting Treasury yields. The 10-year yield has risen by 127 basis points to 5.20%, the highest since 2007, amid inflation fears, Fed rate-hike bets and debt concerns.

Bitcoin fell early this year, but has bounced back strongly in the third quarter, shrugging off these uncertainties. Prices are up 42% in three months, outperforming every major asset, including Nasdaq and gold.

Analysts are now watching incoming data for cues about the next move in the cryptocurrency.

“For investors, the 83,800-84,000 zone is an important near-term support. The 85,000-85,800 area is the immediate resistance zone. It would be prudent to avoid chasing the rally at current levels,” Vikram Subburaj, CEO of India-based Giottus exchange, said in an email.

Zano has rolled back roughly a month of blockchain history after it identified a vulnerability tied to “Gateway Addresses” that, according to the project’s core team, enabled unauthorized ZANO and Freedom Dollar (fUSD) to enter circulation.

In an update shared Sunday, Zano said the network was restarted at block 3,833,000—immediately before Hard Fork 6, which introduced the affected functionality. The recovery now depends on ecosystem participants, including nodes, miners, stakers, exchanges, and other services, upgrading to the revised software.

Key takeaways

• Zano restarted the chain at block 3,833,000, rolling back about a month of activity tied to an exploit linked to Gateway Addresses.
• The rollback removes both legitimate transactions from that window and the unauthorized ZANO and fUSD that entered circulation.
• Payments already completed on other blockchains cannot be undone, limiting how far the recovery can reverse real-world settlement.
• Zano says it will handle remediation for affected parties through a reimbursement and claims process, though details have not yet been published.
• The fix requires coordinated adoption by infrastructure operators and service providers, including exchanges and other third parties that integrate with Zano.

Hard Fork 6 and the Gateway Address vulnerability

Zano has not published a full post-mortem as of publication, but it has confirmed that the problem originated with Gateway Addresses—a feature designed to simplify how external platforms such as bridges, exchanges, and payment services integrate with the Zano network.

According to the project’s explanation, Gateway Addresses enable these services to manage funds using a single “account-style” balance rather than handling payments as scattered transaction outputs.

Before Gateway Addresses existed, Zano wallets operated using separate transaction outputs (UTXOs). For exchanges and similar services, that meant incoming funds required blockchain scanning to identify which outputs belonged to a platform, followed by selecting specific outputs for withdrawals.

The introduced feature changed that workflow by offering a different way to account for funds—one that, in Zano’s view, became the pathway for the vulnerability that allowed unauthorized tokens to be minted or otherwise introduced into circulation.

What the rollback does—and what it cannot fix

Zano’s rollback invalidates the on-chain record of the affected period. The project states that transactions processed during that time will no longer appear on the restored chain. It also says the unauthorized ZANO and fUSD created or introduced through the exploit will be removed from the recovered ledger.

However, Zano cautioned that the rollback cannot reverse payments already settled on other blockchains. That distinction matters for users and service operators: if cross-chain transfers or off-chain settlements were completed before the restart, those transfers may not be recoverable even if the originating chain history is rewritten.

Zano also indicated that it is working to account for losses and will publish a reimbursement and claims process. The project did not provide the mechanics of how losses will be calculated or what documentation will be required within the material available at the time of writing.

Why Zano chose to restart the network

Zano’s head of marketing and growth, Quinten van Welzen, framed the decision as a trade-off between restoring the integrity of the currency supply and accepting a painful loss of history.

In statements shared alongside the rollback announcement, van Welzen argued that “doing nothing” would have allowed unauthorized ZANO and fUSD to remain in circulation without limits—effectively diluting holders and breaking what he described as the basic promise a currency makes: a fixed supply. He also suggested that allowing the attacker to retain value would set a dangerous precedent.

He acknowledged that restarting the chain from before Hard Fork 6 carries costs, including the disappearance of about a month of transaction history. At the same time, van Welzen said the rollback restores the supply that users expected and leaves a path for rebuilding trust.

Gateway Addresses and the risks of integration features

Zano’s broader context helps explain why the exploit mattered. The project launched in May 2019 as a layer-1 blockchain focused on private payments. Standard private transactions are designed to conceal senders, receivers, transferred amounts, and asset types.

Beyond its native token (ZANO), Zano allows users to deploy and mint custom digital assets. Freedom Dollar (fUSD) is one such token operating on the Zano blockchain. The vulnerability therefore wasn’t confined to a single token: unauthorized issuance affected both ZANO and an issued asset tied to the same underlying system.

Gateway Addresses were created to make integrations easier—especially for services that need to handle deposits and withdrawals without scanning UTXOs manually. But Zano’s response underscores a central theme in blockchain security: features that simplify custody and balances for third parties can also concentrate risk if they introduce new assumptions or pathways an attacker can abuse.

In that light, the coordination requirements for the restart carry practical weight. Zano said the recovery requires participating nodes, miners, stakers, exchanges, and other services to adopt the update. Without broad adoption, the network could split between versions, complicating settlement and increasing operational risk for trading venues and custodial providers.

For users, the rollback also highlights a limitation that extends beyond Zano itself: even if the originating chain is corrected, downstream effects—especially those involving cross-chain transfers or already-completed settlement—may remain permanent.

Looking ahead, attention should focus on the reimbursement and claims process Zano said it will publish, as well as how quickly exchanges and infrastructure operators finalize adoption of the restart. The project’s next security communications—whether it eventually releases a deeper technical post-mortem—will also be important for assessing whether Gateway Addresses will be reworked to prevent similar failures.

Zano has rolled back approximately a month of blockchain history after a vulnerability involving Gateway Addresses allowed unauthorized ZANO and Freedom Dollar to enter circulation, according to its core team. 

The Zano blockchain has been restarted at block 3,833,000, immediately before Hard Fork 6, which introduced the affected feature. The recovery requires participating nodes, miners, stakers, exchanges and other services to adopt the update, the team said Sunday. 

The rollback invalidates a month of legitimate transactions along with the unauthorized tokens, meaning transactions made during that period will no longer appear on the recovered chain and may need to be reconciled. It also cannot reverse payments already settled on other blockchains. The team said it is working to account for any losses and will publish a reimbursement and claims process. 

“Doing nothing meant unauthorized ZANO and fUSD in circulation without limit, diluting every holder and breaking the most basic promise a currency makes: a fixed supply,” said Zano’s head of marketing and growth Quinten van Welzen. “It would also tell every future attacker that exploited coins get to keep their value. No project survives that.” 

Zano identifies Gateway Address exploit 

Zano has not released a post-mortem at the time of publication, but confirmed the issue came from Gateway Addresses, a feature developed to make it easier for bridges, exchanges and payment services to integrate with Zano by letting them manage funds through a single account-style balance (similar to other blockchains). 

Before Gateway Addresses, Zano’s ordinary wallets tracked funds as separate transaction outputs (UTXOs), rather than a single account balance. Exchanges and other services had to scan the blockchain to identify incoming payments, track those outputs and select which ones to spend when processing withdrawals.

Zano launched in May 2019 as a layer-1 blockchain focused on private payments. Its standard private transactions conceal senders, receivers, transferred amounts and asset types. While it has a native token, ZANO, the blockchain also allows users to deploy and mint custom digital assets. Freedom Dollar (fUSD) is one such token that operates on the Zano blockchain. 

Related: Bitget CEO suspects North Korea behind $352M hack, citing IP clues 

“Restarting the chain from before Hard Fork 6 costs a month of history, and it costs trust, which we’ll have to earn back,” said van Welzen. 

“But it restores the supply everyone signed up for, and it leaves a path to rebuild. Which is better than 7 years of hard work left to die. We know it hurts. But not doing it would have hurt more.”

Magazine: THORChain under fire over Bitget, ETH evolves beyond blockchain: Hodler’s Digest

Cross-chain custody and censorship resistance collided with a high-profile breach narrative this week after Bitget publicly urged the decentralized liquidity protocol THORChain to block addresses allegedly tied to stolen funds. The dispute has reignited questions about what “decentralization” requires—and what it does not—when theft victims point to on-chain activity they believe is known to be malicious.

The push began after Bitget reported unauthorized transfers that it later revised upward, with the exchange attributing the suspected actor to North Korea based on preliminary investigative signals. In response, THORChain’s stance—whether it can meaningfully blacklist the relevant addresses, and whether it should—has become the center of an argument that is now spilling beyond technical governance and into the broader ethics of permissionless networks.

Key takeaways

• Bitget said unauthorized transfers rose from $351.6 million to $387.5 million, and later pointed to IP clues it believes link the activity to VPN infrastructure used by a North Korean hacking group.
• Bitget CEO Gracy Chen publicly asked THORChain to block addresses tied to the alleged theft connected to the Bybit-linked flow on THORChain.
• THORChain’s compliance position is unclear in practice because its ability to blacklist specific addresses has been questioned, including references to earlier admin-key changes.
• The debate is also exposing an asymmetry: decentralized funds may still be traceable after swaps, but protocols differ in whether they can or should exert address-level controls.
• While governance and security principles are at stake, THORChain has also faced criticism of its operational decentralization compared with networks like Bitcoin and Ethereum.

Bitget’s breach claims and the “block the addresses” demand

Bitget disclosed that it had detected “unauthorized transfers” tied to a security incident on September 25. According to Cointelegraph reporting, the exchange initially put the figure at $351.6 million, before updating it to $387.5 million. Bitget also stated that a preliminary investigation had linked IP addresses involved in the incident to VPN services associated with North Korean hacking operations, though the evidence was described as suggestive rather than definitive.

Bitget CEO Gracy Chen publicly argued that decentralized protocols should not serve as a destination for funds connected to theft. She said decentralization is a design principle, not a shield for facilitating known stolen assets, and urged THORChain to block addresses it believed were tied to the incident.

That framing matters because it reframes a typical “hack victim versus exchange” story into a “hack victim versus liquidity routing” story. If a stolen-flow path crosses a decentralized exchange-like venue, the conversation shifts from incident response alone to the network-level question of whether platforms can limit interaction with suspected addresses.

Why THORChain is at the center of the argument

As Bitget’s criticism spread, the broader context involved a prior major breach attributed to North Korean actors: the Bybit hack, reported by Cointelegraph as a $1.5 billion incident. Cointelegraph coverage also noted that funds from that attack were reportedly swapped on THORChain.

THORChain has often been described as a decentralized liquidity mechanism rather than a privacy mixer, and the general claim in the surrounding debate is that funds are still traceable after being swapped. That traceability is crucial: it gives victims and investigators a basis for arguing that specific on-chain participants should be restricted, even if the destination is a decentralized protocol.

However, what victims want—address-level blocking—may not align with how THORChain is technically or politically structured. The article notes that THORChain previously paused its chain quickly following its own $10.7 million hack in May. That detail highlights that the protocol can react decisively to security events, even as it faces scrutiny over whether it can selectively censor or restrict particular counterparties.

Can THORChain blacklist, and should it?

Whether THORChain can blacklist addresses is described as unclear in the reporting. The text points to a reference from February 2025, when THORChain said it had retired an admin key that would have provided the power to blacklist certain addresses.

This uncertainty is important for readers because it changes the nature of the request from “should a protocol do this?” to “can the protocol do this at all without undermining its own design?” Even if governance messaging supports compliance, protocol capabilities and key management can set hard boundaries on what is feasible.

Meanwhile, critics of address blocking argue that allowing decentralized protocols to respond to coercive demands would create a censorship precedent. The debate also includes an “ethics versus practicality” tension: victims emphasize harm reduction and reducing stolen-fund liquidity, while decentralization advocates emphasize permissionless access as an anti-tyranny safeguard.

At the same time, the article draws attention to concerns about THORChain’s decentralization level compared with Bitcoin or Ethereum. It cites the idea that THORChain does not match the governance model of the most decentralized networks and references past claims around administrative functionality. Those points are used to argue that the protocol’s permissionless claims may be overstated in practice.

For traders and builders, the operational reality is what matters most: if a protocol cannot enforce address-level exclusions, then users may still be exposed to flows they would rather avoid. If it can enforce them, then the network may face governance attacks, reputation risk, and the possibility of politically motivated address targeting. Either way, the outcome affects how participants assess risk and compliance expectations.

Market reaction and what to watch next

The controversy has not only sparked governance debate; it also appears to have attracted market attention. The article states that THORChain’s native token RUNE surged 50% over a week amid the publicity around the dispute.

Looking ahead, the key question is whether THORChain will clarify what address-level controls it can implement—if any—and what governance process would apply if requests from centralized exchanges are escalated. Readers should also watch how the underlying theft narrative evolves: Bitget’s attribution remains tied to preliminary investigation signals, and the strength of the evidence will influence whether future calls for restrictions gain wider traction.

In parallel, this episode underscores a broader industry challenge: even in decentralized systems, “who can stop stolen funds?” will increasingly depend on technical capabilities, governance choices, and the willingness of markets to treat permissionless routing as either a resilience feature or a liability.