Callum Price is Director of Communications at the Institute of Economic Affairs, and a former Government special adviser. 

For someone who talks so much about how much he hates Westminster, Andy Burnham really enjoys popping down to SW1 to give a speech to an establishment think tank – particularly if there are live questions about the Labour leadership swirling around.

Last month, it was the IFS to talk about his brand of ‘Manchesterism’. This week it was the Resolution Foundation to discuss re-focusing politics on ‘un-sung Britain’. Among the usual huff and puff about the evils of unregulated markets (are these unregulated markets in the room with us now, Andy?) and how good the buses in Manchester are, he sought to address his previous comments about being ‘in hock to the bond markets’.

He never meant that we should ignore the bond markets, or even blame them, his clarification goes. It is the decisions of politicians that have led us to being in hock to those markets, and it is only the decisions of politicians that can get us out of this situation.

So far, so good. Next time the Labour Party is in crisis, he is welcome to come and speak to the IEA about how politicians need to get serious about our debt and spending problems.

But then it reverts.

The decisions that he wants politicians to take are not, in fact, to reduce spending; but to spend more. He argues that if we give away control of the essentials, we give away control of their costs. The key to getting costs down then, is to take control back through compulsory purchases and nationalisation. The markets, I’m sure, will be delighted.

The example he gives is housing: it is hard to control public spending when you need to chase private rented sector rents through the benefits system. He quotes research by the National Housing Federation that suggests building 90,000 social homes could save the Exchequer £3.3 billion in reduced Universal Credit claims over the next thirty years. Burnham extrapolates that to pay for a new target he sets, of building 500,000 new social homes by 2030, which he says will save £18 billion in the long run.

The same NHF report puts the cost of building those 90,000 social homes to the government at £12 billion, so following Burnham’s logic his target would require an outlay of £66 billion now, to save £18 billion over the next thirty years.

These numbers won’t exactly fill our creditors with confidence, but Andy has a plan to make us think more long-term and in a more market-friendly way.

In his mind, the broken Westminster political system has led to short-termism and instability, prevented politicians taking sensible long-term decisions and thus made the markets view us with distrust.

His diagnosis may not be entirely wrong – politics incentivises short termism. Westminster works to five-year windows (like his own 2030 hosing target), and governments will prioritise reforms that bear fruit sooner rather than later.

So, should we therefore make politics less important, take power out of the hands of a dysfunctional system and instead into one, the market, that empowers individuals, reduces prices, and drives living standards? Unfortunately, not for Burnham.

His prescription would only make the problem significantly worse. Firstly, he wants to renationalise swathes of the economy. He spoke about how bitter he was at having to pay millions for taking bus-depots back into public ownership after a fight in the courts, and wants to give councils the powers to compulsorily buy rented properties that aren’t up to standard.

If businesses care about one thing above all else when investing in a country, it is whether their assets are likely to be stripped from them by the state on arbitrary grounds. While the unique ability of a government to raise money through taxation is one of the things that enables it to borrow money at vast scales, a programme of appropriation is not the sort of things markets look for to secure a return on their government bonds. It will lead to a collapse in private investment and with it, tax receipts.

Secondly, Burnham wants ‘root and branch reform’ of Westminster and a new political culture. In practice, this means electoral reform, reform of the ‘whips’ system to empower individual MPs over the government, and Lords reform. This, he argues, would make a more stable and collaborative system in which the markets would have greater confidence and certainty.

I’m not sure what sort of stability Burnham has in mind here, but for anyone who has ever paid attention to Westminster politics, empowering MPs to vote and behave as individual actors over members of a governing party does not exactly scream consensus and unity. Maybe I am just a product of the failed Westminster consensus, but the ability of a government to whip its MPs in order to pass vital legislation like finance bills seems like a pretty important pre-requisite for stability.

Further to this, while British party politics is not exactly a bastion of majoritarian stability at the moment, it would be fair to assume that under a PR system the Greens and Reform would have had a larger seat at the table much sooner. One may argue that this is only fair given their vote shares, but to hold that this is the path to consensus and stability is a more questionable assertion.

Burnham’s diagnosis of the relationship between the British state and the bond markets is closer to the mark than often suggested. But given the solutions he proposes, it is no wonder those markets have a wobble every time he gets close to Westminster.

Opposition parties and housing activists have denounced a new housing bill passed in the Dáil. People Before Profit (PBP) TD Paul Murphy described it as a “landlord’s charter written by a landlord’s government”.

On the face of it, the housing bill seems to introduce a series of useful new protections for tenants. These include:

• No-fault evictions only allowed in very limited circumstances—for landlords with four tenancies or fewer who face certain forms of hardship such as financial difficulties or separation from a partner.
• A new minimum tenancy of six years that operates on a rolling basis.
• The whole of Ireland is treated as a Rent Pressure Zone (RPZ). This means that rents on tenants in-situ can only be raised by a maximum of 2% each year.

However, the right of landlords to raise rents for new tenancies or every six years is likely to still mean tenants pay extortionate sums, the key existing problem of the Irish housing crisis.

Housing rights groups hammer new bill

This was the thrust of Murphy’s stance when he said:

This is a bill for rip-off rents. That’s the purpose of it. It’s not an accidental outcome of it, that’s the purpose. The government strategy explicitly is to get rents to rise higher in order to attract more investment.

The government is indeed clear about this, with the minister for housing, local government and heritage James Browne saying:

I want to grow the supply of rental homes available – attract more landlords and retain existing landlords in the market. Providing the policy conditions for a sustained increase in supply is essential because it will help ease price pressures across the rental market, and will widen the pool of available rental properties, thereby facilitating greater choice for individuals and families.

So rather than proper public investment in housing, the government continues to trust in the private sector to solve a problem it has thus far totally failed at.

Tenants union CATU emphasised this, with organiser Helen Moynihan saying:

We have a really precarious housing setup that already overly relies on the private market, and now we’re looking at legislation that will make that even more precarious. So we’re especially concerned about the fact that landlords can raise [rent] to market [rate].

It’s just it’s really important not to get confused about this word supply. Houses that are not affordable for ordinary everyday workers do not increase supply. And this is the increase of the kind of properties we’re going to see. They’re not affordable for us. They’re not supply for your everyday worker.

Housing charity Threshold pointed out how those moving home will be unfairly penalised:

Threshold is concerned that the option for landlords to set market rents between tenancies may result in an unintended consequence whereby renters, particularly those who need to move home, end up paying high rents within three to four years and see their overall rental security undermined.

We are not aware of any modelling done to determine the impact this change could have on market rent levels. The recent Threshold and Housing Rights NI all-island survey of renters shows that approximately 25% of renters in the Republic of Ireland left their last rental tenancy voluntarily. Market trends already show tenants who move home pay higher rents, this will only be exacerbated by the proposed legislation.

Rushed through — ‘a truly appalling way to make legislation’

Protesters rallied outside the Dáil as the housing bill was ‘debated’, though in reality only:

…nine of 69 amendments that had been put forward by opposition parties were discussed.

The government accepted none of these, and Sinn Féin housing spokesperson Eoin Ó Broin described the ramming through of the bill as a:

…truly appalling way to make legislation.

Party leader Mary Lou McDonald raised the spectre of Irish people once again fleeing abroad as so many previous generations have, saying:

Seven thousand Irish medical professionals were registered to work in Australia last year. If your bill goes through, we will lose many many more. Because the rent hikes will be off the charts.

Predictably, landlords were unhappy at even the limited concessions being made to tenants. The Irish Property Owners Association (IPOA) said:

At the Irish Property Owners Association, we’re concerned that, as it stands, the Bill could unintentionally push more private landlords out of the market and reduce rental supply even further.

They continued:

Tenants need security and certainty, and that matters. But landlords also need clarity, fair treatment and confidence that they can manage or sell their properties when circumstances change. If too many landlords feel boxed in, the reality is they may sell up – leaving fewer homes, less choice and more pressure on renters.

In other words, won’t someone think of the poor landlords, the people who typically own multiple properties? They may have a point, though—if landlords get fed up, supply may indeed evaporate. That’s not an argument for giving in to their demands. It’s a reason to scrap a system that treats housing as a commodity, and relies  heavily on the whims of those looking to turn a profit from something that should be a basic human right.

Featured image via Unsplash/the Canary

5 min read45 min

In short – they cannot. Gaza cannot be rebuilt – physically or psychologically – without a credible political horizon that speaks to dignity, security, and self-determination.

I have spent many years engaged directly in the Middle East Peace Process, working with Israeli and Palestinian leaders across successive crises, ceasefires, and diplomatic initiatives.

One lesson stands above all others: when politics is deferred, violence returns. When the end goal is unclear, even the most well-intentioned interim arrangements eventually collapse under the weight of mistrust. Three decades on from the Oslo Accords, one state exists, Israel – the other, Palestine, does not.

It is in that context that the Olmert–Al-Kidwa initiative deserves renewed attention and support – not as an artefact of a more optimistic past, but as one of the clearest demonstrations in recent decades of what serious political courage looks like. It is the only living document signed by a prominent Israeli and a Palestinian.

I had the privilege of working directly with both Ehud Olmert and Nasser Al-Kidwa on their plan. They approached the task not as a public relations exercise, nor as a symbolic gesture to the international community, but as a genuine attempt to resolve the conflict at its core. Their dialogue was rooted in realism, honesty, and an unflinching recognition of each other’s national narratives and security concerns.

The Olmert–Al-Kidwa plan does something rare: it spells out, in practical and detailed terms, how a negotiated two-state solution could actually be delivered. It addresses borders based on the 1967 lines with agreed land swaps; it deals seriously with security arrangements to ensure Israel and Palestine’s long-term safety; it proposes an internationally supported framework for Jerusalem that respects the religious and national attachments of both peoples; and it confronts the refugee issue with realism rather than slogans.

Crucially, it makes clear that Palestinian statehood is not an abstract aspiration or a diplomatic reward to be deferred indefinitely. It is the organising principle of the entire process.

The objective is not merely recognition on paper, but the establishment of a viable, sovereign Palestine – living in peace and security alongside Israel, with borders, institutions, and legitimacy rooted in international law and mutual recognition.

This initiative has been sustained through years of quiet engagement, and notwithstanding the tragic terror attack on Israel of October 7th  2023 and the ensuing war on Gaza – facilitated discreetly by the International Communities Organisation (ICO), who provided a space for political thinking to continue when optimism was in short supply.

The plan demonstrates that even when official negotiations stall, conflicts ignite. Political thinking must not. They are practitioners and experienced political leaders who understand that peace requires both technical solutions and moral courage.

At the time, the plan received considerable attention, most notably across Europe. In France, in particular, the proposal helped re-energise high-level thinking around Palestinian self-determination and recognition.

The subsequent return to violence was not a refutation of that political work; rather, it underscored what happens when such efforts are abandoned and progress is not consolidated during brief windows of opportunity.

The US led Phase 2 announcements – focused on governance structures, demilitarisation, and reconstruction – contain echoes of that earlier thinking. But echoes are not enough. Administration without legitimacy, reconstruction without reconciliation, and security without political destination will not hold.

Having worked through previous ceasefires and collapses, I am deeply wary of approaches that promise order while avoiding the harder questions of statehood, sovereignty, and rights.

Palestinians must be able to see that reconstruction leads not to permanent limbo, but to genuine self-determination. Israelis must be able to trust that political progress will deliver enduring security, not temporary quiet.

If Phase 2 is to be more than a holding pattern, it must reconnect explicitly to a political end-state. The Olmert–Al-Kidwa plan shows that such an end-state is not imaginary. It is negotiable, achievable, and grounded in the lived realities of both peoples.

The recent establishment of President Trump’s ‘Board of Peace’ and its endorsement by many Arab countries and some key nations across the wider Islamic World also provides an opportunity, if seized, to a genuine pathway to sustainable peace and with a united political will to finally deliver upon a sovereign state of Palestine.

Gaza’s ruins will not be cleared by technocrats alone. Its future will be secured only when the international community has the courage to insist that today’s plans lead somewhere real –towards a Palestine living in peace and security with Israel, and towards a settlement that finally brings an end to a conflict that has exacted too heavy a price from both nations and people. Let us grasp this moment and make peace a living reality.

Lord Tariq Ahmad of Wimbledon, Chair of ICO’s Advisory Board, is a British diplomat and parliamentarian who served as a Minister of State at the UK Foreign Office, with responsibility for the Middle East, South Asia, the Commonwealth, and human rights, and as the Prime Minister’s Special Representative on Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict.

October 2019: People’s Vote march, London | Image by: Paul Smyth / Alamy

6 min read12 min

Brexit has generated a literature of noise. There are books of recrimination and adulation, books of confession and books that replay the referendum campaign as if it were a war diary. Morgan Jones has written something different. No Second Chances is about what happened after the shouting, when politics returned to its habitual setting of process and drift. Her subject is the campaign for a second EU referendum. Her larger point is that Britain and the remain world lost control, not in a single calamity but in instalments.

Jones begins where the movement began, not in Millbank Tower but in market towns and Facebook groups and improvised street politics. The bEUret, that blue beret with yellow stars, becomes a symbol of identity and unease. It signals devotion and a problem. The professionals who wanted to shift Parliament needed the base and they also feared being defined by it. The base wanted reversal. The professionals wanted a route that sounded like constitutional repair, not revenge; a way to put the question back to the country while insisting they were cleaning up a mess rather than overturning a result. Between them sat a public that was tired and often hostile and not much inclined to be told it must vote again for its own good.

The book’s climax is not Westminster drama but organisational breakdown

The chosen instrument was the People’s Vote, a phrase designed to sound less like a rerun and more like a right. It offered unity to a fragmented remain world and it offered a single ask that donors could fund and journalists could recognise. It also carried an ambiguity the campaign never solved. Was the purpose to secure a vote, to stop Brexit, or to build a remain campaign in waiting? Jones shows how these aims were spoken as one and acted as several, which is fatal in any campaign and doubly so in a country already split into identities. 

At its best, this was civic mobilisation. Jones captures the scale of the marches and the ingenuity of local organisers and the stubborn humour that kept people going. She also records the cost. Abuse flooded inboxes and threats became routine. Yet mobilisation was never the same as persuasion. The movement could fill Whitehall and still struggle to move the MPs who mattered. When staff tried to soften the visual language, offering Union flags in place of EU flags, many activists refused. A movement that could not persuade could still console itself with numbers, and it did.

Her most telling pages are about institutions and incentives. Britain Stronger in Europe became ‘Open Britain’ and Open Britain became the shell that housed the new campaign. That inheritance brought data and money, and it also brought suspicion, because the grassroots remembered the failure of the official remain effort. Governance was improvised. Authority was contested. Strategy was repeatedly subordinated to ego and donor preference and the daily demands of press and social media. The campaign could raise money and win headlines, but it could not settle its own line, and it could not decide whether it was a pressure group, a brand, or a government in exile. 

Jones’s account of Labour is equally sharp. After 2017 Labour held the casting votes in any parliamentary route to a new referendum. Yet the party could not decide whether Brexit was a fact to manage or a project to reshape. Jones sets out the internal groups and the factional traps and shows how conference procedure became the proxy for strategy, a way to postpone a choice while claiming to respect the members. The so-called shadow cabinet Brexit sub-committee, which met in secret specifically to prevent the deputy leader from attending, was not merely dysfunctional; it was emblematic of a political culture that mistook internal control for strategic clarity. This is my own experience of the period rather than a scene Jones reports. I was prohibited from attending and with all internal avenues of negotiation closed, I had no compunction about supporting the People’s Vote campaign.

The book’s climax is not Westminster drama but organisational breakdown. The People’s Vote implodes in a struggle over control and roles and data. Roland Rudd fires Tom Baldwin and James McGrory, staff walk out and the campaign evaporates on the eve of the election that ends the argument. 

Jones does not treat this as soap opera. She treats it as parable. She is careful, too, to show why the rupture mattered inside the building. The young staffers, by and large, “adored” Baldwin and McGrory, and that loyalty became a force in its own right.

No Second Chances offers no comfort. Jones is sceptical that a second referendum was ever within reach, and she shows why the movement could get close and still fail. Yet she is also clear that failure has consequences. Many of those who cut their teeth in this world are now back in politics, carrying their instincts with them. Jones has written an anatomy of a near miss and a self-deception. Britain did not lose control in a single act. It lost it in instalments, through respectable procedures and misplaced confidence and the inability to align passion with power. That is why the title lands. In politics, as in life, you can squander your first chance and still tell yourself you are keeping your options open. You are not.

Lord Watson of Wyre Forest is a Labour peer and former deputy leader of the Labour Party

No Second Chances: The Inside Story of the Campaign for a Second EU Referendum

By: Morgan Jones

Publisher: Biteback

How does a typical daily commute impact our skin, particularly in busy cities?

What is one of the most common habits you see people doing on commutes that could lead to skin breakouts?

Are certain skin types more vulnerable to commute-related damage?

How exactly does pollution damage skin, and what signs should we look out for?

Can makeup or sunscreen act as a barrier against environmental aggressors during our commute?

Are there any skincare misconceptions you’d love to debunk?

It’s always a challenge keeping good news a secret in Westminster and Whitehall. An underwhelmed air hung over the latest Allocation Round as the pot 3 budget for offshore wind, announced in October set at £900m, was forecast to deliver far fewer gigawatts than required to neither put a spring back in the step of industry nor make government deployment targets for 2030 a likely reality.

So with the announcement on 14^th January 2026 that a staggering 8.44 GW of offshore wind projects were granted Contracts for Difference (CfDs), enabled by an enhanced budget of almost £1.8bn, the biggest surprise was that the government had actually managed to keep this a secret until the very last minute.

The success of the auction is not just in big numbers though. Crucial floating offshore wind projects in the Celtic Sea (Erebus) and North Sea (Pentland) were awarded CfDs, and at a strike price 10 per cent lower than the administrative strike price for AR7. This gives much needed answers to geographic questions about floating offshore wind deployment. This is combined with large procurement of fixed offshore wind capacity in key regions in Scotland, North East England and East Anglia.

All in all, this bumper allocation round provides a strong signal to offshore wind developers, manufacturers and supply chain companies up and down the country that this government doesn’t just back offshore wind, but is committing it right to the heart of the future energy system. We’ve heard similar rhetoric from previous governments without such follow through, so this is a welcome message, strongly conveyed. Indeed, the decision to extend the budget would presumably have gone through both HM Treasury and No10 for sign off, indicating that this industry has support right from the top of the Labour Administration.

Now that colours are firmly nailed to the offshore wind mast (or should that be turbine), attention must turn to getting the supply chain match-fit to deliver on getting them built. With 8.4GW to deliver, the supply chain can comfortably invest; to quote a colleague, “There are many companies looking to establish themselves into offshore wind, and with this scale of opportunity on the horizon, it’s easier for investors to get on board”. With clearing prices around £90/MWh, UK companies should be able to compete with cheaper imports that have geopolitical risk attached. It should also provide a signal to foreign direct investment that while other markets might be increasingly unstable or too nascent to justify the risk, the UK is open for offshore wind business and a key location for manufacturing.

We must focus on the core technologies highlighted with the Industrial Growth Plan, ensuring that the UK plays to our strengths in turbine blades, cables, substructures and operations and maintenance. Attention must turn to efficiency and innovation; how can we get consents delivered faster, manufacturing times reduced and operational costs down in the long term. Use of drones, UAVs, continuous at sea sensors and predictive AI modelling have a role to play in this process. The UK has a wealth of expertise, academic throughput and innovation credentials; harnessing them can provide an economic boom that supercharges the industry and delivers on the job creation and regional economic growth that this government has deemed among its highest priorities.

The late 2020s now hold significant potential for growth of the offshore wind sector in the UK, which is complemented by the developing international market for these technologies. If the UK leverages this boom correctly, we can lead the way on technology, standardisation and regulation. If the government plays this right, we will have a multigenerational industry that rivals the domestic aerospace and automotive sectors in terms of regional, national and international significance.

Gas turbines at Elon Musk’s xAI data centre in Memphis, USA. (Associated Press / Alamy)

8 min read27 min

By Keir Starmer’s own admission, AI – and the scramble to support its development – is the “global race of our lives”. Just over 12 months ago, the Prime Minister pledged that Britain would be at the front of that race and become “one of the great AI superpowers”.

Perhaps the most significant barrier to realising that ambition is the UK’s ageing electricity grid, which is heavily congested – especially in parts of the country where AI companies are most interested in sitting their data centres.

The government knows this and is establishing ‘AI growth zones’ in areas that can demonstrate access to at least 500MW of power capacity by 2030.

Yet for AI companies, the pull of Greater London and other energy-constrained urban areas is considerable. Being close to those places means better proximity to internet exchanges and to many of their key customers, such as tech firms and financial services.

Providing energy connections to data centres is seen as urgent for the country’s economic growth, but experts agree that there is a mismatch between what the grid can realistically deliver in the short term and the speed with which the government wants to see these facilities built.

While this situation is not unique to the UK, according to consultancy Ember Energy the average wait here for a data centre seeking a grid connection – around nine years – is longer than in many other countries.

To get round those grid constraints, data centre developers across the world are increasingly turning to gas.

In 2025, the US almost tripled its planned gas-fired capacity to 252GW. According to Global Energy Monitor (GEM), a US-based NGO, more than a third of that capacity is intended to provide on-site power generation for data centres.

Gas-powered data centres have also been built or are in development in Ireland and a handful of other European countries.

While GEM is not aware of any UK data centres currently using gas-fired power plants as their primary energy source, there are indications that such projects are on their way.

The House has learned that National Gas, the private operator of Britain’s gas transmission network, has so far received eight separate enquiries from data centre developers about the feasibility of getting a pipeline connection to their facilities.

All but one are located in the South of England. While no formal applications have yet gone live, a few have submitted draft applications through National Gas’ customer hub.

National Gas’ understanding is that these projects are interested in the option of temporarily using the gas network as their sole power source. Once an electricity connection becomes available, the gas could then be used as back-up generation or to provide balancing services during periods of tight electricity margins.

Howard Forster, chief operating officer of Cadent, one of the UK’s regional gas distribution companies, says having a gas link is attractive for data centre developers who may be wary of relying solely on the electricity grid.

“I suspect they may go for both types of connection in any event, in order to have that resilience. Like many large industrial users, they look for that resilience from the get-go, rather than being a response to a delay,” he tells The House.

“But certainly, what the connection will allow them to do is progress their project sooner rather than later in some instances, for sure.”

Cadent has struck nine connection agreements with data centres over the last year, with gas expected to start flowing to some of them over the coming months. As the locations and scope of those projects is commercially confidential, however, it is unclear whether some or any of them intend to use the gas as their sole power source.

Forster adds that the carbon impact of gas-burning can be mitigated through the use of purchase agreements with biomethane producers. Cadent already has 47 biomethane producers connected to its network and is working to increase that number.

But it is clear that in overall terms a surge in gas use by data centres would have an impact on the UK’s 2030 clean power mission. Under that target, the government wants at least 95 per cent of Great Britain’s power generation to come from “clean” sources in a “typical weather year” from 2030 onwards.

Tone Langengen, a senior policy adviser at the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change (TBI), believes the adoption of some gas power as a “bridging” approach – while more renewable power sources are being developed – would be a “pragmatic” way for the government to achieve its AI growth ambitions. In October, TBI published a report arguing that the government should drop the 2030 clean power mission.

“Our view is that is the wrong target at this moment and it is much more important that the UK thinks about a slightly slower paced, but more effective, route to net-zero, which maintains our competitiveness in the AI era,” says Langengen. “That means keeping energy bills low, making sure we can build the data centres we need…

“I think nuclear will be a really big part of the solution in future, but we can’t wait for those to be developed.”

In its UK Compute Roadmap, the government revealed its “forecast” that “the UK will need at least 6GW of AI-capable data centre capacity by 2030”, a threefold increase on data centre capacity at the time of the document’s publication in July last year. 

But even that scale of increase may have been an underestimate, as it cautioned: “Should the capabilities and adoption of AI accelerate, demand could exceed this baseline significantly.”

Whether gas can play an increased role in the UK’s AI economy is being discussed at the highest level. Some of the biggest names in the sector – Google, Microsoft, Amazon and others – hold regular meetings via the AI Energy Council with Science Secretary Liz Kendall and Energy Secretary Ed Miliband.

Minutes from the group’s June 2025 meeting state that “temporary on-site generation, including natural gas fuel cells, was raised as an interim measure to meet power needs during grid connection delays”. The minutes do not make clear which attendee raised the topic.

Experts in the sector tell The House that the issue remains a source of tension between the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (Dsit) and the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (Desnz).

“There is quite a lot of internal friction and issues between those teams,” says one expert, who adds that it is “unclear” whether No 10 realises that there may be a conflict between their AI ambitions on the one hand and the clean power mission on the other.

Another expert says the government has failed to seriously engage with the issue: “The Cabinet don’t understand the scale of the problem and the trade-offs that they’re facing. There’s this kind of mythology that everything will work out, when fundamentally it won’t.”

Perhaps the clearest clue to the government’s thinking in this area emerged at a select committee hearing in late January with the energy minister Michael Shanks, who said the AI Energy Council’s discussions had been “forward-leaning” on the topic of “self-build” power solutions.

Polly Billington, Labour MP for East Thanet and a former adviser to Miliband, asked Shanks: “Do you feel that the adoption of gas-fired power stations would be ‘forward-leaning’?”

The minister replied: “Obviously, our clean power action plan is to decarbonise the power system. So, it is not going to be our position that – post-2030 – we should see unabated gas, and that’s very clear from us.

“But there’s a need for us to provide capacity for the data centres that we want to bring to this country, for hugely important economic growth reasons, that [means] we will be open to how a self-build model might work.”

New infrastructure must be future-proofed, not locked into the broken fossil fuel model of the past

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Labour’s environmentalist MPs will be watching such developments closely.

“Relying on gas is outdated, risky and exactly what drove the energy bills crisis for British industry in the first place,” Billington tells The House. 

“New infrastructure must be future-proofed, not locked into the broken fossil fuel model of the past.”

Olivia Blake, chair of Parliament’s cross-party Climate and Nature Caucus, meanwhile says the prospect of gas-fired data centres in Britain is “really concerning” and that it would be “interesting” to hear the view of the UK’s independent Climate Change Committee.

“We know they [data centres] require a huge amount of energy, so it would be quite a significant amount of gas that would be burnt,” the Labour MP for Sheffield Hallam says.

“I think the government has been incredibly ambitious, they’re really doing exceedingly well on offshore wind, and we’ve seen some really good policies coming through Desnz. It would be a shame for that to be undermined by this new strain on the gas network.”

A spokesperson for the National Energy System Operator (Neso) commented: “The demand pipeline is a critical lever for unlocking capacity and enabling projects that matter most for the UK’s economic growth and ambitions in areas such as AI and data centres.

“Alongside government and Ofgem, Neso will work with the wider energy industry to shape reforms that balance innovation, fairness, and system resilience.”

A government spokesperson said: “The AI Energy Council is exploring opportunities to attract investment and support the development of clean power for data centres.

 “We are also working with Ofgem and network companies to reform the outdated connections process and speed up delivery of new infrastructure, freeing up grid capacity to make it easier for data centres to secure a timely connection.”

Ofgem, the energy regulator, confirmed it will publish an update on those reforms “in the coming weeks”.