Theo Baker is graduating from Stanford this spring with something most seniors don’t have: a book deal, a George Polk Award that he received for his investigative reporting as a student journalist, and a front-row account of one of the most romanticized institutions in the world.

His forthcoming How to Rule the World: An Education in Power at Stanford University was excerpted Friday in The Atlantic and based on that alone, I can’t wait to see the rest. The only question worth asking is the same one Baker himself might be too close to answer, which is: Can a book like this actually change anything? Or does the spotlight, as it always seems to, send more students racing to the place?

The parallel that keeps coming to my mind is “The Social Network.” Aaron Sorkin wrote a film that was an indictment in many ways of the particular sociopathy that Silicon Valley tends to reward. What it seemingly did was make a generation of young people want to be Mark Zuckerberg. The cautionary tale became a recruitment video. The story of the guy who — in the movie, at least — steamrolled his best friend on his way to billions didn’t discourage ambition; it further glamorized it.

Judging by the excerpt, Baker’s portrait of Stanford is far more granular. He talks with hundreds of people to roundly describe the “Stanford inside Stanford.” “You sort of join it freshman year or you don’t,” one student tells Baker. It’s an invite-only world where venture capitalists wine and dine 18-year-olds, where “pre-idea funding” worth hundreds of thousands of dollars gets handed to students before they’ve had an original idea, and where the boundary between mentorship and predation is nearly impossible to discern. (The shame of chasing teenage founders, if it ever existed, is gone; not chasing them is no longer an option for most VCs.) Steve Blank, who teaches the school’s legendary startup course, tells Baker that “Stanford is an incubator with dorms,” which is not meant as a compliment.

What’s new isn’t that this pressure exists but that it has been fully internalized. There was a time, maybe 10, maybe 15 years ago, when Stanford students felt the weight of Silicon Valley expectation pressing down on them from outside. Now, many of them arrive on campus already expecting, as a matter of course, to launch a startup, to raise money, to become rich.

I think about a friend — I’ll call him D — who dropped out of Stanford a few years ago, partway through his first two years, to launch a startup. He was barely past his teens. The words “I’m thinking of take a leave of absence” had just escaped his mouth before the university, by his own account, gave him its cheerful blessing to dive full bore into the startup. Stanford doesn’t fight this anymore, if it ever did. Departures like his are an expected outcome.

D is now in his mid-twenties. His company has raised what would register in any normal context as an astonishing amount of money. He almost certainly knows more about cap tables, venture dynamics, and product-market fit than most people learn in a decade of conventional careers. By every metric the Valley uses, he’s a success story. But he also doesn’t see his family (no time), has barely dated (no time), and the company, which keeps growing, doesn’t seem inclined to provide him with that kind of balance anytime soon. He is already, in some meaningful sense, behind on his own life.

This is the part that Baker’s excerpt hints at without fully landing on, maybe because he’s still inside it himself. The costs of this system aren’t just distributed in the form of fraud — though Baker is direct about this, describing it as pervasive and largely consequence-free. The costs are also more personal: the relationships not formed, the ordinary milestones of early adulthood traded away in exchange for a billion-dollar vision that, statistically, almost certainly won’t materialize. “100% of entrepreneurs think they’re visionaries,” Blank tells Baker. “The data say 99% aren’t.”

What happens to the 99% at age 30? At age 40? These aren’t questions Silicon Valley is set up to answer, and they’re certainly not questions Stanford is about to start asking.

Baker also surfaces something that Sam Altman articulates best. Altman — OpenAI CEO, former Y Combinator head, precisely the kind of person these students aspire to become — tells Baker that the VC dinner circuit has become an “anti-signal” to the people who actually know what talent looks like. The students doing the rounds, performing founder-ness for rooms full of investors, tend not to be the real builders. The real builders, presumably, are somewhere else, building things. The performance of ambition and the thing itself are increasingly hard to tell apart, and the system that was ostensibly designed to find genius has gotten very good at finding people who are good at seeming like geniuses.

How to Rule the World sounds like exactly the right book for this moment in time. But there’s a certain irony in the strong likelihood that this critically minded book about Stanford’s relationship to power and money will be celebrated by the same class of people it critiques, and — if it does well (it has already been optioned for a movie) — used as further evidence that Stanford produces not just founders and fraudsters but important writers and journalists, too.

For those first venturing into sailing, it can be overwhelming since the experience is thick with jargon and skills that don’t often show up in life ashore. With endless choices, including monohulls versus catamarans, fiberglass versus wood, fractional versus masthead rigs, and sloops versus ketches, a new sailor risks doing something like single-handing a staysail schooner when they should have started on a Bermuda-rigged dinghy without a spinnaker. Luckily, there are some shortcuts to picking up the hobby, like the venerable Sunfish or Hobie ships. It’s also possible to build a simple sailing vessel completely out of materials from a local hardware store, as [Cumberland Rover] has been demonstrating.

[Cumberland Rover] has a number of homemade vessels under his belt, from various kayaks and rowboats. His latest project is a 12-foot rowboat, which has the option to add a mast and sail. The hull is made from two 1×12 pieces of lumber, bent around a frame and secured. Plywood makes the bottom, and a few seats finish out the build. He’s also using standard hardware to fasten everything together, which helps with maintenance. It came in handy when he recently added some height to the bow of the boat to improve seaworthiness.

For sailing, the mast is made out of two pieces of 2x lumber glued together and then worked into a more cylindrical shape. It’s unstayed, reducing complexity, and although he broke one in extremely high winds, it is more than strong enough for most of his sailing. The ship is gaff-rigged, with a square sail hoisted up the mast by a wooden spar. All of these design choices make it quick and easy to set the sail up when the wind is good or pack it away fast when it’s time to row.

Although there are paid plans available on his website, the methods used in the video show how simple it can be to get into rowing or sailing with a minimal cost. You’ll still want to learn the basics of sailing before taking one of these out into open water. DIY speedboats are also possible and accessible as well, but there’s the added complexity of a motor here to think about, as well as registration requirements that often accompany powered craft.

X, the social platform formerly known as Twitter, has officially launched its standalone messaging app, XChat, on iOS. The move marks a significant step in the company’s broader push to evolve beyond a traditional social network and into a more expansive communication ecosystem.

A Messaging App That Signals X’s Bigger “Everything App” Strategy

At launch, XChat brings a familiar but feature-rich messaging experience. Users can connect directly with their existing X contacts, send messages, share files, and make audio or video calls, along with participating in group chats.

The app also leans heavily into privacy-focused features. It supports disappearing messages, the ability to edit or delete messages for everyone in a chat, and even includes protections like blocking screenshots. X has also claimed that the app does not include ads or tracking mechanisms, positioning it as a cleaner alternative to traditional messaging platforms.

This launch is important because it reflects a broader strategic shift. X is no longer trying to keep everything inside a single app. Instead, it is beginning to break out core features – like messaging – into standalone experiences. That approach aligns with Elon Musk’s long-stated ambition to turn X into an “everything app,” similar to China’s WeChat, but executed through a modular ecosystem.

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Why This Move Matters In The Messaging Landscape

The messaging space is already crowded, dominated by platforms like WhatsApp, Telegram, and Signal. X entering this space with a standalone app signals that it wants to compete more directly, rather than treating messaging as a secondary feature.

What makes XChat notable is its integration with the existing X network. Unlike most messaging apps that rely on phone numbers or contact syncing, XChat leverages social graph connections already built within the platform. That lowers friction for users and could make onboarding significantly easier.

At the same time, the app’s privacy claims and features suggest X is trying to position itself as a more secure alternative. However, questions remain about how robust those protections are, especially compared to established end-to-end encrypted platforms.

Why You Should Pay Attention As A User

For users, XChat introduces a different way to think about messaging. Instead of being tied to phone numbers, communication becomes account-based, similar to social media interactions but in a private setting.

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This could simplify how you connect with people online, particularly if you already use X regularly. It also means fewer apps competing for attention, as conversations tied to your social presence move into a dedicated space.

However, it also raises practical considerations. Adopting a new messaging app requires network effects – your contacts need to be there. Without that, even feature-rich apps struggle to gain traction.

What Comes Next For XChat

The iOS launch is just the beginning. Reports suggest that an Android version is expected soon, which will be critical for broader adoption. X is also restructuring other parts of its platform, including shutting down underperforming features like Communities, as it shifts focus toward messaging and AI-driven experiences.

If successful, XChat could become a central pillar of the platform’s future. If not, it risks becoming another entrant in an already saturated market. Either way, the direction is clear. X is no longer just a place to post – it wants to be where conversations happen.

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Quordle was one of the original Wordle alternatives and is still going strong now more than 1,400 games later. It offers a genuine challenge, though, so read on if you need some Quordle hints today – or scroll down further for the answers.

Enjoy playing word games? You can also check out my NYT Connections today and NYT Strands today pages for hints and answers for those puzzles, while Marc’s Wordle today column covers the original viral word game.

Good morning! Let’s play Connections, the NYT’s clever word game that challenges you to group answers in various categories. It can be tough, so read on if you need Connections hints.

What should you do once you’ve finished? Why, play some more word games of course. I’ve also got daily Strands hints and answers and Quordle hints and answers articles if you need help for those too, while Marc’s Wordle today page covers the original viral word game.

Strands is the NYT’s latest word game after the likes of Wordle, Spelling Bee and Connections – and it’s great fun. It can be difficult, though, so read on for my Strands hints.

Want more word-based fun? Then check out my NYT Connections today and Quordle today pages for hints and answers for those games, and Marc’s Wordle today page for the original viral word game.

China’s Ministry of Commerce issued a formal condemnation on Saturday after the European Union included approximately 27 Chinese and Hong Kong entities in its 20th sanctions package against Russia, the largest round of listings in two years. Beijing said the move “runs counter to the spirit of the consensus reached between Chinese and EU leaders, and seriously undermines mutual trust and the overall stability of bilateral relations,” and warned that China would “take necessary measures to resolutely safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese enterprises” with “the EU side bearing all consequences.” Within 24 hours of the sanctions’ adoption on April 23, China placed seven EU entities on its own export control list, banning all dual-use exports to them. The retaliatory designations targeted defence firms in Belgium, Germany, and the Czech Republic, but Beijing framed the restrictions not as a response to the Russia sanctions but as punishment for “arms sales to or collusion with Taiwan,” a diplomatic sleight of hand that allows China to escalate without acknowledging the underlying dispute.

The package

The EU’s 20th sanctions package was adopted on April 23 after a two-month delay caused by vetoes from Hungary and Slovakia, which had linked their approval to the resumption of Russian oil flows through the Druzhba pipeline. When flows resumed, both countries dropped their objections. The package adds 120 new individual and entity listings, targets 56 entities in Russia’s military and energy sectors, imposes transaction bans on 20 Russian banks and four third-country financial institutions involved in circumvention, lists 46 additional shadow fleet vessels for a total of 632, introduces new restrictions on cryptocurrency platforms and digital ruble transactions, and, for the first time, designates an entire jurisdiction, the Kyrgyz Republic, as a “systematic and persistent circumvention risk.” Alongside the sanctions, the EU adopted a 90 billion euro loan to Ukraine. Kaja Kallas, the EU’s high representative for foreign affairs, announced that work on the 21st package had already begun.

The Chinese entities were sanctioned across two categories. Sixteen entities in third countries, including China, the UAE, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, were designated under asset freezes for providing dual-use goods or weapons systems to the Russian military-industrial complex. Twenty-eight of 60 entities added to the enhanced export restrictions list are located in China and Hong Kong, facing tighter controls on dual-use technology exports. China Space Sanjiang Group, a state-owned enterprise, was sanctioned under the Belarus sanctions regime for the first time as co-founder of Volat-Sanjiang, which produces wheeled chassis for military equipment including multiple launch rocket systems. The escalation is clear: the 16th package in February 2025 hit 7 Chinese entities; the 17th added 5; the 18th added 2 financial institutions; the 19th targeted 12, including Chinese refineries buying Russian crude; and the 20th reaches 27. Each package goes further, and each response from Beijing grows sharper.

The trade

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China-Russia bilateral trade stabilised at $245 billion in 2024, more than double the 2020 level, before declining 6.9% in 2025 as financial sanctions complicated payment channels and Chinese banks grew cautious about secondary sanctions exposure. The decline did not extend to the goods that matter most to the sanctions debate. China exported $1.9 billion in “high priority” dual-use items to Russia in the first half of 2025 alone. Full-year dual-use shipments exceeded $4 billion in both 2024 and 2025. Manganese ore exports to Russia surged from 42 tonnes in 2023 to 47,000 tonnes in 2024 to 126,000 tonnes in the first half of 2025. Chinese turbojet engine exports to Russia in the first half of 2025 exceeded the combined total for 2023 and 2024 by 37%. Prices for export-controlled Chinese goods shipped to Russia rose by an average of 87% between 2021 and 2024, compared with 9% for the same goods shipped to other countries. The premium reflects the risk and the leverage: Chinese suppliers know the goods are scarce and charge accordingly.

The United States has been sanctioning Chinese firms for Russia support since 2024, earlier and more aggressively than the EU. In October 2024, the Treasury Department sanctioned two Chinese drone companies for producing long-range attack drones for the Russian Air Force, the first US designations of Chinese firms for directly manufacturing weapons for Russia. In 2025, more than 20 Chinese and Hong Kong companies were sanctioned for providing critical inputs to Russia’s defence industry. The Commerce Department blacklisted Shanghai Fudan Microelectronics for technology transfers. Congress introduced the STOP China and Russia Act to codify sanctions against mutual military support. The EU’s 20th package brings European policy closer to the American posture, which Beijing views as coordinated containment. Escalating chip export controls targeting China, including the MATCH Act advancing through Congress, reinforce Beijing’s narrative that Western technology restrictions are designed to suppress Chinese industrial capacity, not merely to enforce sanctions on Russia.

The retaliation

China’s response was immediate and calibrated. The seven EU entities placed on China’s export control list are all defence firms: FN Herstal and FN Browning in Belgium, HENSOLDT AG in Germany, and OMNIPOL, EXCALIBUR ARMY, SPACEKNOW, and VZLU AEROSPACE in the Czech Republic. All are banned from receiving any Chinese dual-use exports, and overseas organisations are prohibited from transferring China-origin dual-use items to them. The framing as a Taiwan matter rather than a Russia matter is diplomatically useful for Beijing because it avoids legitimising the premise that Chinese firms are materially supporting Russia’s war effort while still imposing costs on European industry.

The broader retaliation operates through China’s rare earth export controls. The EU imports 98% of its rare earth magnets from China. Licensing approvals for European firms have fallen below 25% in some sectors. Rare earth prices have spiked up to six times higher outside China than within it. European carmakers, semiconductor fabs, and defence companies have been forced to cut utilisation rates or temporarily shut production lines. Record defence tech investment across Europe, which saw nearly $1 billion flow into European defence startups in the first half of 2025 alone under the EU’s ReArm Europe plan, depends on the very rare earth supply chains that Beijing can restrict. Europe’s booming dual-use technology sector, exemplified by German drone makers reaching unicorn valuations on the strength of battlefield-tested products, relies on components that trace back through supply chains Beijing controls. The sanctions target China’s role in arming Russia. China’s retaliation targets Europe’s ability to arm itself.

The trap

The EU is caught in a structural contradiction. Its sanctions policy against Russia requires restricting Chinese entities that supply dual-use technology to the Russian military-industrial complex. Its defence policy requires rare earth magnets, critical minerals, and electronic components that China dominates. Its trade relationship with China, worth 759 billion euros in bilateral goods trade in 2025 with a 360 billion euro deficit in China’s favour, creates dependencies that limit the EU’s willingness to escalate. Ukraine’s emergence as a defence tech powerhouse, with an 800-fold increase in drone production since the invasion, demonstrates why cutting off Russian access to Chinese dual-use goods matters militarily. But every sanctions package that hits Chinese firms moves Beijing closer to a retaliatory threshold that could damage European industry more than it damages Russian supply chains.

The EU’s broader decoupling from China in sensitive technology areas, including blocking Chinese institutions from core Horizon Europe research grants in AI, semiconductors, quantum computing, and biotech, shows that the sanctions on Russia-linked Chinese firms are not isolated measures but part of a systematic rebalancing. The EU-China relationship has entered what European diplomats describe as a “do no harm” phase, which in practice means both sides are doing incremental harm while trying to avoid a rupture. The 20th sanctions package advanced that incremental process. The 21st, which Kallas has already announced, will advance it further. Beijing’s warning that the EU will “bear all consequences” is a statement about the trajectory, not the current moment. The consequences are cumulative. Each package adds designations. Each response adds export controls. Each round of retaliation narrows the space for the trade relationship that both sides publicly claim to value. The question is not whether the EU-China relationship can survive another sanctions package. It is how many packages it can absorb before the incremental damage becomes structural, and which side reaches that threshold first.