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Inside Trump’s Effort To “Take Over” The Midterm Elections

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from the a-test-of-democracy dept

This story was originally published by ProPublica. Republished under a CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 license.

In mid-December 2020, federal officials responsible for protecting American elections from fraud converged in a windowless, dim, fortified room at the Justice Department’s downtown Washington, D.C., headquarters.

They had been summoned by Attorney General William Barr.

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Over the preceding weeks, Donald Trump’s claims that the presidential election had been stolen from him had reached a crescendo. He’d become obsessed with a conspiracy theory that voting machines in Antrim County, Michigan, had switched votes from him to Joe Biden. 

With each day, Trump ratcheted up the pressure to unleash the might of the federal government to undo his defeat. 

Barr interrogated experts from the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, crammed in beside top FBI officials around a cheap table. He needed the group of around 10 to answer a crucial question: Was it really possible the 2020 presidential vote had been hacked?

ProPublica’s description of the previously unreported meeting comes from several people who were in the room or were briefed on the gathering. Everyone understood that the meeting represented an important moment for the nation, they said. Barr, who did not respond to requests for comment, had walked a delicate line with Trump, instructing the FBI to investigate allegations of election irregularities while declaring publicly there had been no evidence “to date” of widespread fraud.

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The nonpartisan specialists from CISA, backed by their FBI counterparts, explained they’d unravelled what had happened in Antrim County. A clerk had made a mistake when updating ballot styles on machines, leading to a software problem that initially transferred votes from Republicans to Democrats, they said. There was no fraud, just human error — which would soon be publicly confirmed through a hand count of the county’s ballots.

Listening intently, Barr seemed to understand both the truth and that telling it to the president would almost certainly cost him his job. 

At the end of the meeting, Barr turned to his top deputy, made hand motions as if he was tying on a bandana and said he was going to “kamikaze” into the White House. 

What happened next is well known. When Barr met with Trump in the Oval Office on Dec. 14, the president launched into a monologue about how the events in Antrim County were “absolute proof” that the election had been stolen. Barr waited to get a word in edgewise before telling his boss what the experts from CISA had told him.

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Then Barr offered his resignation letter, which Trump accepted. Barr left believing he’d done his part to preserve democratic norms. 

“I was saddened,” Barr wrote of Trump in his memoir. “If he actually believed this stuff he had become significantly detached from reality.”

Barr was one of many federal officials — most of them Trump appointees — who refused to bend to the president’s demands, which only intensified after Barr was gone. Although rioters inspired by Trump managed to delay the certification of his defeat by storming the Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021, ultimately the institutional guardrails of American democracy held — barely.

But if faced with the same tests today, the guardrails and people that held the line would largely be missing, an examination by ProPublica found. 

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ProPublica scrutinized what happened the last time Trump lost a national election. Some of that happened in plain sight: After a cascade of defeats in court, Trump began pressuring state and local officials to overturn the results. But more happened behind the scenes, like the meeting that helped persuade Barr to hold the line.

Our reporting uncovered previously undisclosed aspects of a federal effort to safeguard the results of the 2020 vote, which involved at least 75 people across several agencies. Today, nearly all of those people are gone, having resigned, been fired or been reassigned, particularly in the departments of Justice and Homeland Security. That included the cybersecurity specialists who had established that the Antrim County allegations were false and reported their findings to Barr. 

The people we identified as resisting attempts to overturn the 2020 results have been replaced by roughly two dozen people Trump has installed in positions that could affect elections. Ten of them actively worked to reverse the 2020 vote, and the rest are associates of such people. In some cases, ProPublica found, officials have been hired from activist groups that are pillars of the election denial movement. Experts warn that shows the movement has merged with the federal government.

These new officials could influence how Trump reacts to the upcoming midterms as polling shows Republicans are approaching what could be a significant electoral loss, with the president’s approval rating nearing record lows, and public concern growing about the weak economy, the administration’s mass deportation effort and the war on Iran. Seemingly in preparation to head off such a blow, Trump has stepped up his efforts to “nationalize” the 2026 elections, saying that Republicans need “to take over” the midterms. Democrats who monitored Trump’s attempts to block his 2020 loss have begun to question whether he will allow a “blue wave,” particularly if it flips control of a House of Representatives that impeached him twice in his first term.

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ProPublica’s examination reveals new details on how the president has unleashed his loyalists to transform elections. This includes the background of this year’s FBI raid in Georgia to seize 2020 election materials and how they are using federal resources to search for noncitizens voting. Ultimately, ProPublica’s reporting shows how thoroughly and expansively the Trump administration has overhauled the federal government into what some fear is a vehicle for making sure elections go his way.

ProPublica’s reporting is based on interviews with roughly 30 current or former executive branch officials familiar with the work of Trump loyalists installed in election roles. Most spoke on condition of anonymity because they fear retribution, including those knowledgeable about the December 2020 Barr meeting. 

The Trump administration maintains its actions will make U.S. elections fairer and more secure — and keep those prohibited from voting, such as noncitizens, from doing so.

“Election integrity has always been a top priority for President Trump,” White House spokesperson Abigail Jackson said in a statement. “The President will do everything in his power to defend the safety and security of American elections and to ensure that only American citizens are voting in them.”

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Spokespeople for the DOJ and DHS emphasized that their departments are focused on ensuring elections are free and fair, and that they are working closely with the states to achieve those goals. Contentions to the contrary, they say, are false.

A few guardrails have endured, preventing Trump from fully realizing his agenda for elections. Judges have blocked key parts of a March 2025 executive order in which Trump attempted to exert greater federal control over aspects of voting, and some Republican state officials have fought back against Justice Department lawsuits demanding state voter rolls. 

Late last month, Trump issued another executive order on elections that attempts to exert unparalleled federal control over mail-in voting and voter eligibility, which Democrats and voting rights groups are challenging in court.

Experts say 2026 will serve as an unprecedented stress test of the integrity of American elections.   

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“Our election system withstood” Trump’s “attacks following the 2020 election,” said Sen. Alex Padilla, a California Democrat who has led the pushback to the administration’s actions on elections, “but this will be an even tougher test, with more election deniers having access to federal power than ever before.”

The Dismantling

Barr has said that in the high-stakes days following the 2020 election, he felt like he was playing Whac-A-Mole with Trump’s “avalanche” of false election claims.

The investigators at DHS’ Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency supplied intelligence that disproved many of them, not just those involving Antrim County.

CISA was created by Trump in his first term to counter cyber threats in the aftermath of Russia’s efforts to influence the 2016 vote. It soon came to provide crucial expertise and support to thousands of local election officials grappling with increasingly sophisticated attacks. 

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After the 2020 election, it also played a crucial part in puncturing fallacies spread by Trump supporters, producing a “Rumor Control” website to rebut them. And it partnered with state officials and technology vendors to release a statement calling the election “the most secure in American history.” Trump swiftly fired Chris Krebs, whom he had appointed to lead CISA, but Krebs’ defense of the election’s soundness reverberated widely in the media and on Capitol Hill.

Among Trump’s first actions upon returning to the Oval Office was eviscerating CISA. 

Starting in February 2025, DHS leadership put employees focused on countering disinformation and helping safeguard elections on leave. The leadership also froze the agency’s other election security work, which included assessing local election offices for physical and cybersecurity risks, and disseminating sensitive intelligence information on threats. Eventually, all three dozen or so CISA employees specializing in elections were fired or transferred to work in other areas. 

“It took years of dedicated, bipartisan, cross-sector partnership to build the security infrastructure we’ve had, and dismantling CISA leaves a gaping hole,” said Kathy Boockvar, an elections security expert who served as Pennsylvania’s secretary of state from 2019 to 2021. “We are making the job of securing our democracy exponentially harder.”

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A DHS spokesperson told ProPublica that the changes at CISA were in response to “a ballooning budget concealing a dangerous departure from its statutory mission,” which included “electioneering instead of defending America’s critical infrastructure.” The spokesperson said that CISA’s mission is still to coordinate protection of critical infrastructure, including by supporting local partners against cyber threats.

It isn’t just CISA that’s been gutted. 

The Trump administration has discarded or diminished other federal initiatives with roles in protecting election integrity or blocking foreign interference. While many of these actions have been reported, together they reveal the full sweep of the changes. 

First, the administration got rid of the National Security Council’s election security group, which convened departmental leaders to coordinate federal actions related to voting. Then in August, the administration dismantled the Foreign Malign Influence Center, a branch of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence that had stymied efforts by Russia, China and Iran to interfere in the 2024 election. 

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A spokesperson for ODNI said the center was redundant and that its functions were folded into other parts of the office’s intelligence apparatus in ways that “arguably makes our ability to monitor and address threats from foreign adversaries stronger, more efficient and more effective.”

However, former national security officials, including one who had worked at the center, told ProPublica that its functions had largely ceased. Caitlin Durkovich, who led the NSC’s election security work during the Biden administration, said that under Trump the federal government has “abandoned” its traditional role in preserving election integrity and security.

“Nearly every program and capability to stop bad actors and support election administrators has been dismantled,” she said. “Heading into the midterms, this leaves states and localities exposed, without the intelligence support or federal coordination they need to detect and respond to threats in real time — precisely when the stakes are highest.”

The early months of the second Trump administration also brought seismic changes to three parts of federal law enforcement with central roles in elections.

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Kash Patel, the FBI’s new director, dismantled the public corruption team, which had been deployed in previous administrations to help monitor possible criminal activity on Election Day. The Foreign Influence Task Force, which aimed to combat foreign influence in U.S. politics, was also disbanded. (An FBI spokesperson said the bureau “remains committed to detecting and countering foreign influence efforts by adversarial nations.”)

Furthermore, the Justice Department substantially reduced the role of its Public Integrity Section, which had been responsible for making sure the department’s inquiries weren’t improperly influenced by politics. 

After the 2020 election, senior lawyers in the section warned against having the FBI investigate fraud claims raised by Trump allies, saying that the agency’s involvement could damage its reputation and appear motivated by partisanship. In this instance, they were overruled by Barr and his deputies, but former officials said this was a rare case in which their guidance was ignored. The need to directly overrule the unit, they said, made it a roadblock — one that no longer exists.

A month after Trump returned to the Oval Office, the unit’s top staff resigned when agency leaders directed them to dismiss corruption charges against then-New York City Mayor Eric Adams. More resigned later or were transferred. The 36-person section was reduced to two. The administration no longer mandates that it review politically sensitive cases, according to multiple people familiar with the matter.

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Another key DOJ office, the Civil Rights Division’s voting section, had enforced federal laws that protect voting rights, particularly those that combat racial discrimination. In December 2020, the assistant attorney general overseeing the Civil Rights Division was one of the many department leaders who said they would resign if Trump promoted Jeffrey Clark, a leader who supported Trump’s efforts to overturn the election results, to head the department after Barr’s resignation. This mass threat of resignation ultimately led Trump to not promote Clark.

But now, nearly all of the section’s roughly 30 career lawyers have resigned or been moved. This largely started last spring after Harmeet Dhillon, Trump’s assistant attorney general for civil rights, put out a memo saying their mission would shift from ensuring voting rights to enforcing Trump’s executive order on elections.

The Trump administration then filled the section with conservative lawyers who are now litigating against the lawyers they replaced. At least four of those newly appointed lawyers participated in challenging the 2020 vote or have worked with people who helped Trump try to overturn the 2020 election.

“It’s just a shocking and depressing reversal of the federal government’s role in making real the promise of nondiscrimination in voting and racial equality,” said Anna Baldwin, an appellate attorney for the Civil Rights Division who resigned last year and is now one of those litigating against the Justice Department in a new role at Campaign Legal Center.

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The Justice Department didn’t respond to specific questions about the dismantling of the Public Integrity Section or the change in mission for the Civil Rights Division.

In all, at least 75 career officials who’d played important roles in elections work at DHS, DOJ and other departments have left or been fired, ProPublica found.

Team America

Late last summer, after the Trump administration had forced out most of the career specialists, a small group of political appointees began convening at the Department of Homeland Security’s headquarters. 

The group — which once called itself “Team America,” according to sources familiar with the matter — looked for federal levers it could pull to make Trump’s March executive order about elections a reality, an effort that has not been previously reported. 

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They represented the new type of people running the show.

Its core members included David Harvilicz, a DHS assistant secretary tasked with overseeing the security of election infrastructure, including voting machines, and three of his top staffers. As ProPublica has reported, Harvilicz had co-founded an AI company with an architect of Trump’s claims about Antrim County.

Despite the setbacks the executive order had met with in court, there “was not a whole lot of discussion or disagreement” about acting on the directive from Harvilicz or one of his deputies, said a former federal official who interacted with group members. “It was just us saluting to do it.” 

This small group was part of a wider team at DHS, DOJ and the White House seeking to push forward the president’s agenda. Some of Trump’s new guard are well known: After the 2020 election, Patel pressured military officials to help investigate a conspiracy theory about voting machines, according to a former Justice Department official. (Patel did not respond to a request for comment but claimed in congressional testimony that he did not recall the event.) Others, like Harvilicz, are more obscure but still wield consequential powers.

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These newcomers are seeking to carry out Trump’s executive orders and are unlikely to push back against his false claims that American elections are rife with fraud. 

Team America members have echoed or spread such material themselves. 

Heather Honey, who serves under Harvilicz in a newly created position focused on elections, falsely asserted that there were more ballots cast in Pennsylvania than voters in the 2020 presidential election. Trump cited this claim, which has been traced back to her, while exhorting his followers to march on the Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021. 

At least 11 administration appointees, including Honey, have ties to the Election Integrity Network, a conservative grassroots organization seeking to transform American elections. It is led by Cleta Mitchell, a lawyer who tried to help Trump overturn the 2020 election. Gineen Bresso, who holds a top job in the White House counsel’s office, coordinated with the network’s leadership in 2024 as the Republican National Committee’s election integrity chair, ProPublica has reported. Since moving into government, Honey has maintained close ties to Mitchell’s organization, and she and at least two other federal officials have given its members private briefings

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Experts say these former activists who helped forge a movement built on the idea that the 2020 election was stolen from Trump are seeking to make sure that does not happen again.

“The election denial movement is now interwoven within the federal government, and they are working together toward a shared goal of reshaping elections” in ways that undermine the freedom to vote, said Brendan Fischer, a director at the Campaign Legal Center, a nonpartisan, pro-democracy legal organization. “It’s not just last-minute slapdash attempts to overturn the results” as in 2020, “but more systematic efforts to influence how elections are run months ahead of time.”

In response to questions sent to DHS, Harvilicz and Honey, a DHS spokesperson disputed that they were seeking to use the department’s powers to advantage Trump, writing that its employees “are focused on keeping our elections safe, secure, and free” and working to “implement the President’s policies.” In response to questions about their ties to the election denial movement, the spokesperson wrote, “To meet the diverse and evolving challenges the Department faces, we hire experts with diverse backgrounds who go through a rigorous vetting process.”

Mitchell did not respond to detailed questions from ProPublica. The White House answered questions sent to Bresso about her connection to Mitchell’s network by reiterating its commitment to making American elections secure. 

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Through the fall and winter, as the Justice Department demanded that states turn over confidential voter roll information, Team America worked to solve problems hindering the use of digital tools to comb the lists for noncitizens who had illegally registered to vote. Honey and others ironed out the technical details of merging information from different agencies and crafted data-sharing contracts. When Honey or others hit roadblocks, they’d go to the White House or senior DHS leaders who “would come in hot” to clear her path, said officials who interacted with them. 

Initially, the plan was to run voter information obtained by DOJ through a Homeland Security tool called the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements system. 

More recently, according to two people familiar with the matter, Team America has worked to harness a more powerful tool used by another branch of DHS, Homeland Security Investigations, to increase its ability to search for noncitizen voters and bring criminal charges against them. 

While DHS told ProPublica that SAVE has identified more than 21,000 potential noncitizens on voter rolls in the past year, officials who have checked those results in detail have found vast inaccuracies, as ProPublica has reported. Most states — including those with millions of voters — have eventually marked only a few to a few hundred potential noncitizens as registered to vote, and far less have ever voted. The DHS spokesperson also called SAVE “secure and reliable.”

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As the election approaches, current and former officials and election security experts expressed concerns that Harvilicz and Honey, who’ve espoused debunked conspiracy theories about elections, are in positions to control the narrative around the vote’s soundness. 

It’s hard to debunk false claims “coming with the seal of the federal government,” said Derek Tisler, counsel and manager with the Brennan Center for Justice’s elections and government program. “I certainly worry what damage that could do to voters’ confidence.”

Red Flags

Perhaps nothing better reflects the breakdown of the guardrails that thwarted Trump’s rashest impulses in 2020 than his creation last fall of a special White House post reinvestigating his loss to Biden. 

In December 2020, just days after Barr rebuffed Trump’s Antrim County claims, lawyers in the White House counsel’s office helped prevent the president from heeding activists’ call to essentially declare martial law to seize voting machines. This multihour shouting and cussing match has been called the craziest meeting of the first Trump administration.

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But the lawyer whom Trump hired in 2025 as his director of election security and integrity, Kurt Olsen, had worked to overturn Trump’s loss in court in 2020 and was later sanctioned by judges, including for making baseless allegations about Arizona elections.

Olsen’s work in the second Trump administration has breached the firewall between the White House and DOJ officials, established after Watergate to prevent law enforcement officers from making decisions based on political pressure, said Gary Restaino, a former U.S. attorney in Arizona.

“This is not a constitutional or even a statutory requirement,” Restaino said, “but it’s a democracy requirement to make sure that citizens throughout America understand that decisions about life and liberty are being made in an objective and consistent manner.”

In a previously unreported series of events, around the end of 2025, Olsen flew to Georgia to meet with Paul Brown, the head of the FBI’s Atlanta field office, according to people familiar with the matter. 

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Olsen wanted the FBI to seize 2020 ballots from Fulton County, a Democratic stronghold, and gave Brown a report he claimed would justify the extraordinary action. Brown and his team emphasized to Olsen that any investigation his team did would be independent and fair. 

When Brown and his team examined the report, they found that Georgia’s election board had already looked into its allegations, dismissing many altogether, and concluding that others came down to human error, not criminal wrongdoing. The report had been assembled by a longtime ally of Olsen’s and participant in the Election Integrity Network who had a history of discredited claims, ProPublica has reported.

Based on their own investigation, Brown’s team submitted an affidavit to their superiors at DOJ that did not make a strong enough case to move forward with what Olsen wanted.

Soon after, Brown was offered a choice: retire or be moved to a new office, people with knowledge of the exchange told ProPublica. 

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Olsen did not respond to requests for comment.

An FBI spokesperson said that Brown “elected to retire” and that its “work in the election security space is entirely consistent with the law.”

Brown’s ouster after refusing to carry out the seizure of 2020 election materials has been reported, but Olsen’s involvement and the details of their interactions leading to Brown’s retirement have not been previously disclosed. 

With Brown gone, the case moved ahead under his replacement. 

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Trump administration officials also took another step to keep control of the investigation. 

Then-Attorney General Pam Bondi chose Thomas Albus, whom Trump had appointed as U.S. attorney for the Eastern District of Missouri, to prosecute the case even though it fell far outside his usual regional jurisdiction. Albus had been meeting with Olsen since around the time the White House lawyer was hired, ProPublica has reported. (Albus declined a request for comment.)

In late January, the FBI carried out an unprecedented raid in Fulton County — and the agency’s affidavit, put together by Albus and Brown’s replacement, cited a version of the report Olsen gave to Brown as evidence supporting the seizure. ProPublica was part of a news coalition that sued to unseal the affidavit.

An FBI spokesperson said that its agents “followed all procedure to ensure everything was in proper order, and FBI evidence team had the necessary court-authorized search warrant before they arrived on site.” 

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Ryan Crosswell, who worked in the Justice Department’s Public Integrity Section for around half a decade, handling a number of election cases, called Brown’s replacement and Albus’ involvement a “red flag” because of the unusual circumstances of their appointments. 

“They’re just moving through people until they find someone who’s willing to do exactly what they want,” Crosswell said.

The Justice Department did not respond to a question about Crosswell’s comment.  

The extraordinary raid was also enabled in a previously unreported way by the destruction of the DOJ’s Public Integrity Section.

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Multiple former lawyers for the section said they likely would have tried to block the Fulton County investigation because it lacked strong evidence, had a clear political slant and went against department directives that actions should not be taken “for the purpose of giving an advantage or disadvantage to any candidate or political party.” 

Crosswell said, “Based on everything we know, if PIN was still there, we’d say no.”

John Keller was principal deputy chief of the Public Integrity Section from 2020 to 2025 and was acting chief when he resigned in early 2025. He worries that allegations of irregularities in the upcoming election will be handled on a partisan basis.  

“Without that review and without apolitical, objective, honest brokers involved in the process, there is a much greater risk for intentional manipulation or inadvertent interference,” Keller said.

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“Dismantling the Brain”

The week the FBI seized Fulton County’s ballots, about half of the nation’s secretaries of state converged on Washington, D.C., for their winter conference. 

They had urgent questions about elections for Bondi, then-DHS Secretary Kristi Noem and other luminaries who had promised to appear at the event. But none of the headline names showed, leaving conference attendees staring at an empty podium, until the session was abruptly canceled.

The breakdown was emblematic of a widening chasm between state officials and the parts of the federal government that had, until recently, worked with them to secure American elections.

Shenna Bellows, Maine’s Democratic secretary of state, said in an interview that the trust between the Trump administration and states is “absolutely demolished.” 

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This loss of trust reflects that election deniers have assumed so many top roles at federal agencies. Honey sometimes represents DHS on cross-departmental conference calls with state election chiefs, an unsettling reality for those who spent years countering the false claims she made from outside the government. 

On a February call, state officials expressed confusion about whether the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency would still assess their election systems for physical and cyber vulnerabilities. Honey said it would, but Bellows said she’d been told it wouldn’t. 

Two DHS officials told ProPublica CISA’s remaining staff avoids election work, afraid they could lose their jobs if they engage with state and local officials. “In CISA, elections are a toxic poison,” one said. 

A DHS spokesperson said state and federal officials are still working together “every single day” to protect elections and that “The claim that DHS has a broken partnership with states and made our elections less secure is simply false.”

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The cuts to career election specialists and their divisions have eliminated information channels that spotlighted threats as voting took place, including Election Day command posts run by the Justice Department and FBI. Another information channel, which DHS used to fund, will still operate but will be available only to state and local election offices, not the federal government.

Jessica Cadigan, a former FBI intelligence analyst who investigated Election Day threats, said FBI headquarters’ command post was critical to her cases.

“That is dismantling the brain, if you will,” she said. “They are the ones that piece the whole thing together.”

An FBI spokesperson said the agency will still have capabilities to monitor the situation on the ground through designated election crimes coordinator experts in all its field offices.

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Jena Griswold, Colorado’s Democratic secretary of state, has come to see the federal government as adversarial to elections and election administration, rather than a partner. 

Colorado is one of around 30 states the Justice Department has sued for confidential voter roll information. At least four courts that have fully considered those cases so far have dismissed them, although the Justice Department has appealed most of the decisions. (The others are pending.) Griswold told ProPublica she has added another lawyer to her staff to fight whatever comes next from the Trump administration.

“Donald Trump,” she said, “has made American elections less safe.”

Filed Under: democracy, donald trump, elections, midterms

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Weekend Apple Watch Series 11 deals deliver prices as low as $299

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Save $100 on numerous Apple Watch Series 11 styles this weekend, including aluminum and titanium options.

Two Apple Watch Series 11 models, one gold with white band and one silver with metal mesh band, with bold red Best Price label on dark geometric background
Grab an Apple Watch Series 11 from just $299 this weekend – Image credit: Apple

Amazon’s Apple Watch deals have ramped up for the second half of April, with the 42mm Series 11 returning to $299, the lowest price on record, for the weekend.
Buy Apple Watch S11 for $299
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Quordle hints and answers for Saturday, April 18 (game #1545)

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Quordle was one of the original Wordle alternatives and is still going strong now more than 1,400 games later. It offers a genuine challenge, though, so read on if you need some Quordle hints today – or scroll down further for the answers.

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Amazon payments to Bezos’ Blue Origin reach $1.8B as shareholders cite conflicts of interest

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Jeff Bezos
Jeff Bezos, the billionaire founder of Amazon and Blue Origin, shows off a mockup of the New Shepard suborbital space capsule during a 2017 conference in Colorado. (GeekWire Photo / Kevin Lisota)

Amazon paid about $1.8 billion last year to Blue Origin, the space company owned by its founder and board chair Jeff Bezos — nearly triple the amount the year before — as the tech giant prepared to ramp up deployment of its own low-Earth orbit satellite constellation. 

The increase comes as shareholders weigh a proposal calling for a mandatory independent board chair, citing Bezos’ business interests outside Amazon as potential conflicts of interest. 

Bezos stepped down as Amazon’s CEO in 2021 but remains executive chairman.

According to the filing, the company paid approximately $2.2 billion total under satellite launch agreements during the past fiscal year, with an estimated $1.8 billion going to Blue Origin. The prior year’s proxy showed Blue Origin receiving about $578 million out of $1.7 billion total. 

Amazon is building a constellation of 3,236 low-Earth orbit satellites under the Amazon Leo program, formerly known as Project Kuiper, to beam broadband internet to consumers and businesses. The company has deployed 243 satellites so far and has asked the FCC for a two-year extension on a July deadline to launch roughly half of the fleet. 

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The company this week also announced a $10.8 billion deal this week to acquire Globalstar, a satellite operator that has used SpaceX as its primary launch provider. 

Blue Origin’s New Glenn rocket made its debut flight in January 2025 but has not yet reached the launch cadence needed for the rollout. In addition to Blue Origin, Amazon has launch agreements in place with United Launch Alliance and Arianespace, and has also tapped Blue Origin rival SpaceX’s Falcon 9 for some launches, as Reuters reported this week

Bezos is also co-founder and co-CEO of AI startup Project Prometheus, a venture focused on applying AI to manufacturing and engineering across a variety of commercial sectors. 

The shareholder proposal calling for a mandatory independent chair, submitted by the AFL-CIO Reserve Fund, points to Bezos’ expanding role outside Amazon as cause for concern. 

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“As a technology company, Project Prometheus could be a potential competitor or a business partner with our Company, raising potential conflicts of interest,” the proposal states, also citing Amazon’s multibillion-dollar launch agreements with Blue Origin as a potential conflict.

It notes that Amazon also has done business with the Bezos-owned Washington Post.

Amazon’s board recommends voting against the proposal, arguing that its lead independent director structure provides sufficient oversight. The role is currently held by Jamie Gorelick, a former U.S. Deputy Attorney General. The company’s annual meeting is set for May 20. 

The Blue Origin contracts have drawn scrutiny before. A shareholder lawsuit filed in 2023 alleged Amazon’s board spent less than 40 minutes approving the launch agreements without considering SpaceX as an alternative. Delaware’s Court of Chancery dismissed the case, and the state Supreme Court affirmed that ruling in November 2025.

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NYT Connections hints and answers for Saturday, April 18 (game #1042)

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US-sanctioned currency exchange says $15 million heist done by “unfriendly states”

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Grinex, a US-sanctioned cryptocurrency exchange registered in Kyrgyzstan, said it’s halting operations after experiencing a $13 million heist carried out by “western special services” hackers.

Researchers from TRM, which has confirmed the theft, put the value of stolen assets at $15 million after discovering roughly 70 drained addresses, about 16 more than Grinex reported. Neither TRM nor fellow blockchain research firm Elliptic has said how the attackers slipped past Grinex’s defenses. Grinex said it has been under almost constant attack attempts since incorporating 16 months ago. The latest attacks, it said, targeted Russian users of the exchange.

Damaging “Russia’s financial sovereignty”

“The digital footprints and nature of the attack indicate an unprecedented level of resources and technology available exclusively to the structures of unfriendly states,” Grinex said. “According to preliminary data, the attack was coordinated with the aim of causing direct damage to Russia’s financial sovereignty.”

“Due to the attack, the Grinex exchange is forced to suspend operations,” Grinex continued. “All available information has been transferred to law enforcement agencies. An application has been submitted to the location of the infrastructure to initiate a criminal case.”

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TRM said that TokenSpot, a second Kyrgyzstan-based exchange, was also breached. Two of the exchange’s addresses sent funds to the same consolidation address used by the affected Grinex-linked wallets. What’s more, both exchanges became inoperable on Wednesday, suggesting they were hit by the same attacker.

TRM said TokenSpot was a front for Grinex, which the US Treasury Department sanctioned last year. The department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control said that Grinex, in turn, was a rebrand of Garantex, an exchange it had sanctioned in 2022. The department said then that Ganantex had “directly facilitated notorious ransomware actors and other cybercriminals by processing over $100 million in transactions linked to illicit activities since 2019.” Last year’s sanctions against Grinex came a few months after TRM said that the exchange was likely a front for Ganantex.

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A Chinese AI just solved a decade-old math problem in 80 hours with zero human help and proved it

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  • The dual agent AI system autonomously solved Anderson’s conjecture from 2014
  • Rethlas explores problem-solving strategies like a human mathematician would
  • Archon transforms potential proofs into projects for the Lean 4 verifier

A research team led by Peking University developed a dual-agent AI system capable of solving advanced mathematical problems while also verifying its own results.

The system resolved a conjecture proposed in 2014 by Dan Anderson, completing the process within 80 hours of runtime.

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How Threat Actors Vet Stolen Credit Card Shops

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Credit Cards

The underground market for stolen credit card data has long operated as a volatile and highly deceptive ecosystem, where even experienced actors routinely fall victim to scams, exit schemes, and compromised services.

In recent years, this environment has become even more unstable, driven by increased law enforcement pressure, internal distrust among criminals, and the rapid turnover of marketplaces. As a result, threat actors are increasingly forced to adopt more structured approaches to identifying reliable suppliers and minimizing risk within their own illicit operations.

A guide found on an underground forum by Flare analysts sheds light on how threat actors themselves navigate the volatile world of credit card (CC) marketplaces.

The document, titled “The Underground Guide to Legit CC Shops: Cutting Through the Bullshit”—provides a structured look at how actors attempt to reduce risk in an ecosystem plagued by scams, law enforcement infiltration, and short‑lived operations.

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Analysis of the guide reveals more than just practical advice. It outlines a methodology for vetting carding shops, operational security practices, and sourcing strategies, effectively documenting how today’s fraud actors think about trust, reliability, and survivability.

While parts of the guide appear to promote specific services, suggesting a possible vested interest from its author, it still offers a valuable glimpse into the inner workings of the carding economy, and the evolving standards actors use to operate within it.

From Opportunistic Fraud to Supplier Vetting Discipline

One of the most striking aspects of the guide is how it reframes carding from opportunistic fraud into a process‑driven discipline. Rather than focusing on how to use stolen cards, the document emphasizes how to evaluate suppliers.

This shift reflects a broader evolution within underground markets, where the primary risk is no longer just operational failure, but being defrauded by other criminals or interacting with compromised infrastructure.

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Screenshot from one of the recommended shops in the guide, named
Screenshot from one of the recommended shops in the guide, named “CardingHub”

The author repeatedly stresses that legitimacy is not defined by branding or visibility, but by survivability. In other words, a “real” shop is one that continues operating over time despite law enforcement operations, scams, and internal instability.

This aligns with observed trends in underground economies, where the lifespan of marketplaces has become increasingly unpredictable, forcing actors to adopt continuous verification practices.

The guide makes it clear that what separates a “legitimate” shop from the rest isn’t branding or uptime, it’s the quality of the stolen data it delivers. References to “fresh bins” (BIN = Bank Identifiable Number) and low decline rates point directly to the sources behind the data, whether from infostealer infections, phishing campaigns, or point-of-sale breaches. In this ecosystem, reputation isn’t built on promises but on consistently providing cards that actually work.

Shops that fail to maintain reliable data sources are quickly exposed, while those with steady access to fresh compromises rise to the top.

Carding actors are adopting disciplined workflows to source and test stolen financial data.

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Flare continuously monitors underground forums and marketplaces, giving your team early visibility into exposed credentials, compromised cards, and emerging fraud infrastructure.

Keep up with threat actors for free

Building Trust in a Trustless Market

Transparency is another recurring theme. The guide highlights the importance of clear pricing models, real‑time inventory, and functional support systems, including ticketing and escrow services. These characteristics closely mirror legitimate e‑commerce platforms, underscoring how leading carding shops have adopted business practices designed to build user confidence and reduce friction.

Equally important is the role of community validation. The guide dismisses on‑site testimonials as unreliable, instead directing users toward discussions in closed or invite‑only forums. This reflects a broader fragmentation of the underground landscape, where trust is increasingly tied to controlled environments and long‑standing reputations.

Actors are encouraged to look for sustained discussion threads and historical presence, rather than isolated positive feedback.

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The document also reveals a strong awareness of adversarial pressures. The emphasis on security‑first infrastructure, such as mirror domains, DDoS protection, and the absence of tracking mechanisms, suggests that operators are actively defending against both law enforcement monitoring and competing criminal groups.

In effect, these marketplaces function not only as distribution platforms, but as hardened environments designed to ensure operational continuity.

Screenshot from one of the recommended shops in the guide, named
Screenshot from one of the recommended shops in the guide, named “CardingHub”

The Technical Checklist 

Beyond high‑level principles, the guide introduces a step‑by‑step vetting protocol that provides insight into how threat actors conduct due diligence. Technical checks such as domain age, WHOIS privacy, and SSL configuration are presented as baseline requirements.

While these checks are relatively simple, they demonstrate an effort to apply structured analysis to what has historically been a trust‑based decision process.

The guide also highlights the importance of identifying mirror infrastructure and backup access points, noting that established operations rarely rely on a single domain. This reflects a practical understanding of the instability of underground services, where takedowns and disruptions are common. The presence of multiple access points is framed as an indicator of operational maturity and resilience.

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Social intelligence gathering plays an equally significant role. Rather than relying on direct interactions with vendors, users are encouraged to analyze forum discussions, track vendor histories, and identify patterns of behavior over time.

Particular attention is given to detecting coordinated endorsement campaigns, such as multiple positive reviews originating from newly created accounts, a tactic frequently associated with scams.

Operational Security 

Another critical component of the guide is its focus on operational security. The recommendations provided, while framed in the context of carding, closely mirror practices observed across a wide range of cybercriminal activities. Users are advised to avoid direct connections, utilize proxy services aligned with target geographies, and compartmentalize their environments through dedicated systems or virtual machines.

The discussion of cryptocurrency usage is particularly notable. The guide strongly discourages direct transactions from regulated platforms, instead advocating for intermediary wallets and privacy‑focused assets such as Monero. This reflects a growing awareness among threat actors of blockchain analysis capabilities and the risks associated with traceable financial flows.

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Taken together, these OPSEC recommendations highlight an important shift: actors are no longer relying solely on tools to evade detection, but are adopting layered strategies designed to reduce exposure across the entire operational chain. This level of discipline suggests that even mid‑tier actors are increasingly adopting practices once associated with more advanced threat groups.

Scale vs. Exclusivity

The guide further categorizes carding shops into distinct operational models, including large automated platforms and smaller, curated vendor groups. This segmentation reflects the diversification of the underground economy, where different actors prioritize scale, accessibility, or quality depending on their objectives.

Automated platforms are described as highly efficient environments, often featuring integrated tools and instant purchasing capabilities. These operations resemble legitimate online marketplaces in both structure and functionality, enabling users to quickly acquire and test data at scale.

In contrast, boutique vendor groups emphasize exclusivity, higher quality, and controlled access, often relying on invitation‑based systems and long‑term relationships.

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Commercial Interests and Operational Reality

Despite its structured approach, the guide is not without bias. The inclusion of a direct endorsement for a specific platform suggests that the author may have a vested interest in promoting certain services. This is a common pattern in underground communities, where informational content is often used as a vehicle for subtle advertising or affiliate activity.

Such endorsements should be viewed with caution. However, they do not necessarily invalidate the broader insights provided by the guide. Instead, they highlight the complex interplay between information sharing and commercial interests within cybercriminal ecosystems.

From a defensive perspective, the guide offers valuable intelligence into how threat actors assess risk and make operational decisions. The emphasis on verification, community validation, and layered security reflects a level of maturity that complicates traditional disruption efforts. Rather than relying on single points of failure, actors are increasingly building redundancy and adaptability into their workflows.

Ultimately, the document serves as both a playbook and a signal. It demonstrates that the carding ecosystem became more structured, more cautious, and more resilient. For defenders, understanding these dynamics is critical to anticipating how these markets will continue to evolve, and where opportunities for disruption may still exist.

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How Flare Can Help

Flare helps organizations stay ahead of fraud by continuously monitoring underground forums and marketplaces, revealing how threat actors source, vet, and use stolen credit card data. This provides early insight into attacker behavior, including how they optimize success rates, build trust, and adapt to defenses.

By turning this intelligence into actionable insights, Flare enables security teams to detect exposures, anticipate fraud campaigns, and disrupt attacker workflows-shifting from reactive response to proactive, intelligence-driven defense.

Learn more by signing up for our free trial.

Sponsored and written by Flare.

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Are electric vehicles about to take off for good?

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London School of Economics’ Viet Nguyen-Tien and University of Birmingham’s Gavin Harper and Robert Elliott examine whether EVs have passed a tipping point for adoption.

Click here to visit The Conversation.

A version of this article was originally published by The Conversation (CC BY-ND 4.0)

When the Strait of Hormuz first closed in March and oil hit $120 a barrel, a very old question came back: is this finally the moment electric vehicles (EV) take off for good – or just another false start?

EVs have been here before. They surged after the 1973 oil embargo, collapsed when oil fell, and surged again. Each wave died when the external pressure eased.

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We think this time is different. In a new discussion paper, we argue that the economic case for electric vehicles is now improving on its own terms. This is because of what has happened to batteries, not because of the oil price. The same evidence, though, shows the transition creates new problems as serious as the ones it solves.

Why this time is different

Battery costs have fallen 93pc since 2010. That is the number that changes everything. A pack that cost more than $1,000 per kilowatt-hour in 2010 cost $108 by late 2025, driven down by a decade of learning, investment and policy support.

Research on the global battery industry finds that every time cumulative production doubles, costs fall by around 9pc. More buyers, more production, lower costs, more buyers.

Unlike the 1970s, this loop does not need an oil crisis to keep spinning. Electric cars have crossed lifetime cost parity with petrol vehicles across much of Europe; in the used-car market they now have the lowest total cost of ownership. Newer models even match petrol cars in estimated lifespan – something early EVs could not claim.

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Global sales surpassed 17m in 2024, one of the fastest technology diffusion processes in the history of transport. Norway is near-fully electrified. And Ethiopia reached around 60pc EV sales share in 2024, powered by cheap hydroelectricity – some way ahead of the US, for instance, which sits at around 8pc.

An economic platform, not just a better engine

The deeper reason this wave will not fade is not technical – it is economic. An EV is a platform. Its value grows as the network around it grows, just as smartphones became indispensable not because of the hardware but because of everything connected to it.

Every charger built makes the next EV more attractive. Every software update raises the value of every car already on the road. Every recycled battery feeds back into the supply chain that makes the next one cheaper. It’s part of the reason some other technologies like hydrogen fuel cell vehicles have struggled to get off the ground in numbers – the tech exists, but all the other elements aren’t quite there.

One study of 8,000 drivers in Shanghai found that range anxiety – the fear of running out of charge – has a real economic cost due to unnecessarily avoided trips. But that cost is falling sharply, not because batteries improved, but because charging networks expanded.

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Making real-time charger availability visible could add six to eight percentage points to market share by 2030. And because EV charging is far more flexible than other household electricity demand, drivers can shift away from peak hours remarkably easily when the price is right – turning the car into a grid asset, able to store and release electricity when needed. These are economic network effects, not engineering features.

Swapping one dependency for another

Ending oil dependence does not end geopolitical exposure. It relocates it.

In late 2025, China introduced rules requiring government approval for exports containing more than 0.1pc rare earths. The leverage that once came from control of oil flows now comes from control of processing capacity and component supply chains.

The minerals at stake – lithium, cobalt, nickel, graphite and neodymium to name but a handful – carry their own geopolitical risks and, as we have written elsewhere, serious human costs in the communities that mine them. This creates a predictable cycle of social contestation that threatens to stall the transition unless the industry commits to responsible, sustainable innovation.

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The metal cobalt traditionally helped EVs travel further on the same charge. And when prices spiked, so did research into making batteries with less or even no cobalt. Today, more than half of all EV batteries sold globally are cobalt free.

Four decades of patent data show the same pattern: higher mineral prices consistently redirect research and development toward mineral-saving technologies.

Recovering lithium and cobalt from used batteries is becoming economically viable too, shifting part of the supply chain away from geopolitically exposed extraction sites. In addition, Norway and other countries are looking to exploit new critical mineral resources to diversify supplies.

The transition is real – but not risk-free

The Hormuz crisis is a reminder of what concentrated energy dependence costs. The EV transition does not need it. The learning curve keeps falling, the platform keeps compounding, the economics keep improving. That is what makes this wave different.

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What it does not do is eliminate geopolitical risk. Unlike oil, where leverage comes from energy flows, EV supply chains concentrate power at materials, processing capacity, and technological bottlenecks – supply chains that are highly concentrated and carry their own serious risks. Fuel dependence becomes mineral dependence. That dependence is highly concentrated.

Traditional carmaking regions are already absorbing concentrated job losses, and history shows such disruptions leave persistent scars even if the long-term aggregate effects are positive. Yet electric vehicle assembly is proving more labour-intensive in western countries than expected – requiring more workers on the shopfloor, not fewer, at least in the ramp-up phase. Contrast this with China, where massive automation has led to the creation of ‘dark factories’ where there are so few humans, internal lighting isn’t required.

The same regions facing losses could benefit. But the gains and losses do not fall on the same people. That is where the work remains.

The Conversation
By Dr Viet Nguyen-Tien, Dr Gavin D J Harper and Prof Robert Elliott

Viet Nguyen-Tien is an applied economist at the Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) at the London School of Economics (LSE) with an interest in economic and political issues related to technology, energy and the environment.

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Gavin Harper is a research fellow at the Birmingham Centre for Strategic Elements & Critical Materials in Birmingham Business School at the University of Birmingham focused on issues at the critical materials/energy nexus.

Robert Elliott is an applied economist at the University of Birmingham who works at the intersection of international economics, development economics, environmental and energy economics and international business.

Don’t miss out on the knowledge you need to succeed. Sign up for the Daily Brief, Silicon Republic’s digest of need-to-know sci-tech news.

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Kevin Weil and Bill Peebles exit OpenAI as company continues to shed ‘side quests’

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OpenAI is losing two of the architects of its most ambitious moonshots. Kevin Weil, who led the company’s science research initiative, and Bill Peebles, the researcher behind AI video tool Sora, both announced their departures on Friday. The exits come as OpenAI consolidates around enterprise AI and its forthcoming “superapp.”

The departures follow OpenAI’s decision to cut back on “side quests,” including customer-facing bets like Sora and OpenAI for Science. Sora, which was losing an estimated $1 million per day in compute costs, was shut down last month.

OpenAI for Science was the internal research group behind Prism, an AI-powered platform that promised to accelerate scientific discovery. It’s being absorbed into “other research teams,” according to Weil’s social media post announcing the news.

“It’s been a mind-expanding two years, from Chief Product Officer to joining the research team and starting OpenAI for Science,” Weil wrote. “Accelerating science will be one of the most stunningly positive outcomes of our push to AGI.”

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The team had a short and bumpy road after its formal announcement in October 2025. Weil deleted a tweet claiming GPT-5 had solved 10 previously unsolved Erdős mathematical problems, but that claim fell apart immediately when the mathematician who runs the website erdosproblems.com called it out.

Weil’s departure comes a day after his team released GPT-Rosalind, a new model to accelerate life sciences research and drug discovery.

In a social media post announcing his departure, Peebles credited Sora with igniting a “huge amount of investment in video across the industry,” and argued that the kind of research that produced the video tool requires space away from the company’s mainline roadmap.

“Cultivating entropy is the only way for a research lab to thrive long-term,” he wrote.

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OpenAI is also losing Srinivas Narayanan, its chief technology officer of enterprise applications, Wired reports. Narayanan reportedly announced the news internally that he was leaving to spend more time with family.

This article was updated to include the departure of Srinivas Narayanan.

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NASA built a spacecraft computer that can lose three systems mid-flight and still keep astronauts alive 250,000 miles from Earth

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  • The Orion spacecraft uses eight processors running identical instructions simultaneously
  • A fail-safe design prevents faulty computers from sending incorrect commands
  • Triple redundant memory corrects single-bit errors automatically on access

The NASA Artemis II mission relies on a computing system built to remain operational under extreme conditions and hardware faults.

Unlike the Apollo program, where onboard computers handled limited functions, the Orion spacecraft manages life support, navigation, and communication through integrated flight software.

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