Jun Du and Oleksandr Shepotylo argue that, with the UK and EU set to impose major new tariffs on steel imports, the UK would benefit from seeking to coordinate its trade defence policy with the EU. 

In March 2026, the UK government announced its new Steel Strategy. From July, tariff-free quotas for steel imports will be cut by 60% and a 50% tariff will apply to above-quota imports — matching US tariffs imposed last year. The US first raised steel tariffs to 25%, then doubled them to 50%. The UK was exempted from the doubling of the rate under the Economic Prosperity Deal.

The UK’s aim is to shield domestic producers from a global market awash with overcapacity, now estimated at 602m tonnes and forecast to reach 721m by 2027. But the policy matters well beyond the steel sector itself. It is being implemented at precisely the moment the UK–EU relationship is being renegotiated, and at the moment the European Commission is proposing to double its own out-of-quota steel tariff to 50% and cut tariff-free quotas by nearly half. Around 80% of UK steel exports are destined for European markets, so the EU decision is potentially more consequential for UK producers than the US one. How the UK should position itself within – or outside – that emerging European regime is a live question, and the evidence now exists to answer it.

In a new paper from the Centre for Business Prosperity at Aston University, we estimate the effects of the 2025 US steel and aluminium tariffs using large-scale product-level trade data and employ the Kiel Institute’s general equilibrium model for the policy impact evaluation.

US steel imports fell by around 20%, aluminium by around 10%, and the doubling of tariffs doubled the trade shock. But the costs did not remain at the border, with 70-80% of the tariff hit passed through to downstream buyers, including the firms that use steel as an input. US consumer prices for the covered products rose by approximately 27% for steel and 32% for aluminium.

The impact on UK exports was far from uniform across products. Aerospace components alone account for 43% of UK steel and aluminium exports to the US, and absorbed the shock almost entirely through volumes, with prices held firm by long-term contracts and certification requirements. Automotive inputs followed a similar pattern. Commoditised products, such as hot-rolled coil and steel plate, by contrast, adjusted by cutting their margins by 21-23%, with foreign exporters accepting lower profits to hold on to market share.

There is also evidence that the tariffs chilled new trade relationships without destroying established ones. The probability of a new bilateral, UK-US export relationship forming fell by 0.8 percentage points, while exit rates among existing exporters were essentially unchanged. The damage is done quietly, in the trade that never begins.

These findings matter for the UK because the government is about to impose a tariff of the same magnitude on its own border. The 300,000 workers in downstream steel-using industries (automotive, aerospace, construction, fabricated metals) outnumber the 30,000 in primary steelmaking by ten to one. It is the downstream industries who will absorb the cost, through higher input prices and, ultimately, through prices in the shops. This is a cost-of-living issue as much as an industrial one.

The government is three months from implementing a 50% above-quota tariff with no published impact assessment. The pass-through estimates, the scale of downstream exposure, and the chilling effect on new exporters ought to feature in any serious evaluation.

The more striking finding for the UK–EU debate comes from the general equilibrium modelling. Under current conditions (the UK on a 25% US tariff, most competitors on 50%), preferential access to the US market is worth approximately £482m a year. That is a real gain. But it is structurally fragile: it exists only while the differential holds, it is subject to US review, and it could be withdrawn at any point.

More importantly, the modelling shows what happens when the EU acts. When the EU imposes its own steel tariffs alongside the US, the UK’s gain edges down. Coordinated European trade policy provides a cushion the UK cannot replicate alone.

The UK-EU ‘reset’ has so far delivered limited economic results, and the Prime Minister and Chancellor have made clear that they want to pursue greater alignment with the single market at the next UK-EU summit, in the hope of delivering greater economic benefits.

Much of the discussion around alignment focuses on regulatory standards: SPS, product safety, emissions trading. Trade defence policy is at least as consequential, and inseparable from the regulatory alignment now being discussed for industrial goods such as cars and chemicals. The steel evidence suggests that, in a world of escalating tariff conflicts between major blocs, a key question for a medium-sized economy is whether it can afford to conduct trade defence policy alone, absorbing the costs without the benefit of collective action. The chilling effect on new trade relationships means the answer is being shaped now, invisibly, in the export links that never form.

The case for coordination, though, does not rest solely on cushioning against shared losses. The UK and the EU have complementary strengths in technology, scale and industrial capability that, combined, could build competitive advantage rather than merely defend against disruption. In a geoeconomic landscape where the US, China and the EU are all reshaping trade around strategic interests, the opportunity is to develop joint approaches to competitiveness. That means shared investment in low-carbon steel production and coordinated standards that create scale advantages, alongside trade instruments designed to build industries rather than simply protect them. This is a different proposition from alignment as damage limitation and is the conversation the reset ought to be having.

None of this is to dismiss the strategic case for domestic steel capacity — with production at its lowest since the 1930s, there is a legitimate argument for maintaining capability for defence, infrastructure and the energy transition. But our results price that choice: they show what downstream sectors and consumers will pay for tariff-based protection, so that the strategic decision can be made with its costs in view.

Steel is an unusually clean test case. What it reveals is that the costs of going it alone are quantifiable, and that the gains from coordination could extend well beyond loss reduction — if the ambition is there to pursue them.

By Jun Du, Professor of Economics at Aston Business School and Founding Director of the Centre for Business Prosperity, and Oleksandr Shepotylo, Associate Professor at Aston Business School. The paper, ‘Steel and aluminium tariffs: impact assessment for the US, UK, and broader markets’, is co-authored with Yujie Shi and Lisha He.

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Soon to join the ranks of six historic Representation of the People Acts, which introduced landmark changes including votes for women and votes at eighteen, this Labour government’s Representation of the People Bill 2026 is set to take yet another leap towards a fairer, more representative, and more secure electoral system.

I stood proudly on the manifesto commitment to extend the right to vote to 16 and 17-year-olds, and now I am even more proud to see this set in motion. It is a common-sense change, keeping pace with our evolving world and its increasing social and digital interconnectedness. When, at the age of sixteen, young people can already pay taxes, join our Armed Forces, and learn about any political issue with just a few clicks, it is only right that they have a say in decisions that will be deeply consequential for their future.

My Luton South and South Bedfordshire constituency is a young one, filled with engaged and enthusiastic voices who deserve to be heard. Through my ongoing engagement with many young constituents on this issue and others, their desire to participate and highlight the issues that matter most to them is clear. We must grant this opportunity, also reaping the resulting benefits of increased participation and earlier political engagement across society.

Legislation is only one piece of the puzzle, though. Beyond this Bill, I look forward to seeing the government work with schools and youth organisations to promote genuine understanding of our elections, democracy, and the key issues facing our country.

At a recent roundtable discussion I held, young people from my constituency made it clear that practical help to encourage sustained youth participation would be a vital part of these reforms. They suggested more time dedicated to education about democracy in the classroom, a need for trusted and unbiased information about political parties, and training to resist rising misinformation online.

The young people I spoke to had insightful contributions on issues ranging from youth employment and the cost of living to climate change and reproductive health. We must continue to push for work beyond this Bill to deliver viable and lasting pathways to participation, ensuring they can be heard.

As well as encouraging broader voter turnout, a key pillar of this Bill is ensuring that our elections are truly open to a whole breadth of candidates. As only the 539th woman elected to the House of Commons, I take the work to ensure that more women and those from all backgrounds feel confident to put themselves forward to represent their communities incredibly seriously.

Unfortunately, this has not been the case in recent years due to rising abuse and intimidation. At the last general election, the Electoral Commission found that over half of candidates felt they had experienced harassment, intimidation, or abuse, with women twice as likely and ethnic minority respondents three times as likely to report serious cases. I have seen this in my constituency, where groups of men in cars shouted abuse at and intimidated young female Muslim councillors who were out campaigning. This is completely unacceptable and has the concerning effect of deterring many passionate, talented women from standing in elections.

I wholeheartedly welcome the tougher measures and protections proposed in this Bill, including giving courts the power to treat hostility towards electoral candidates, staff and campaigners as an aggravating factor and the introduction of police contact forms so candidates can be made aware of concerns for their safety. These measures will be a vital deterrent for those who seek to damage our democracy or intimidate those who uphold it, ensuring that a wide plurality of voices can participate, and everyone can see themselves represented.

As a member of the Speaker’s Committee on the Electoral Commission, I was particularly pleased to see that this Bill is set to repeal the power of the government to impose a strategy and policy statement on the Electoral Commission. I opposed this measure when introduced by the previous Conservative government due to the clear risk of undermining the Commission’s independence and allowing political interference.

Delivering these practical measures to bolster our democracy, alongside the landmark progressive step to enfranchise 16 and 17-year-olds, is exactly the kind of work I am proud our Labour government is carrying out. As elected representatives, it is our duty to safeguard and work to improve the system, ensuring it instils early the importance of participation, upholds the integrity of and trust in our elections, and keeps pace with our ever-changing world.

Rachel Hopkins is Labour MP for Luton South and South Bedfordshire

Energy security is at the top of the political agenda as a result of the conflict in the Middle East. This crisis is a reminder that, in a more uncertain world, the United Kingdom must become more resilient to external pressures and shocks. That is especially true for fuels.

The UK fuels sector provides 47 per cent of the UK’s final energy consumption. It supports transport, freight, aviation and manufacturing, and provides hundreds of other non-fuel products that feed chemicals, building and other sectors. Domestic refining capacity has fallen from nine refineries in 2000 to four today, with two closures in 2025 alone. Import dependence has grown sharply.

Once domestic refining capacity is lost, it is almost impossible to replace.

Resilience is not simply about whether imports are available in stable times. It is about whether the UK has the right balance of domestic capability, flexibility and supply diversity when international markets tighten or global tensions rise. The ability to refine crude oil provides stronger protection for British supply.

To preserve our energy resilience, the UK needs to level the playing field for domestic refiners so they can be globally competitive. On carbon costs, this can be achieved through the introduction of a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) that includes refined products.

UK refiners face carbon costs that many international competitors do not. That creates a clear imbalance, particularly against producers in the United States, the Middle East and India. Other countries have understood that if carbon costs rise too far ahead of competitors, investment falls and domestic capacity is put at risk. The UK should take the same practical approach.

Government has already recognised the issue. In the Autumn Budget, it committed to explore the inclusion of refined products within the UK CBAM. But the sector has been told that it has been turned down for 2028, with no guarantee of a later date.

At such an important time, that is a blow to an industry that underpins critical infrastructure and long-term energy security.

But it is not too late.

The government still has it within its gift to implement this policy by 2028, should it choose to do so, by making changes in this year’s Finance Bill that would avoid further job losses and a weakening of UK energy security.

This is not about abandoning net-zero; the CBAM supports climate ambition. It is about ensuring policy works in practice and in the UK interest. If domestic production is displaced by imports, it does not eliminate demand or reduce global emissions. It simply exports production, and the associated carbon, as well as jobs, abroad.

A CBAM would help prevent that.

It would support investment, protect domestic capability and ensure the UK’s climate ambition strengthens, rather than weakens, long-term energy security.

Now is the time to act.