On 8 September, Northland Securities upgraded Intel to Outperform with a price target of $120, citing a shortage of server processors, progress in the company’s business turnaround and potential benefits from its involvement in the Terafab project with Tesla and SpaceX. On the same day, reports emerged that Intel was planning to raise processor prices by around 10% from October amid rising costs and limited supply across the supply chain. The combination of higher prices and a positive rating revision is helping to sustain investor interest in Intel shares against the backdrop of strong performance across the semiconductor sector.

Intel Technical Analysis

From 30 June to 29 July, a short-term trend formed on the INTC four-hour chart. Following a decline, the market corrected higher, with the rebound forming an ascending trendline. The price subsequently broke below this trendline, but the attempted breakout was not confirmed by the RSI + MAs indicator. As a result, the price reversed direction and quickly moved through the current market profile, breaking above its upper boundary at $100.00 and is now attempting to establish itself above this level.

It is worth noting that the red resistance level at $109.00 is relatively close to the current price, while the RSI + MAs indicator currently stands at 75, 56 and 51. The RSI has already entered overbought territory, while the moving averages have yet to leave the neutral zone, making the current breakout attempt look questionable. If the market produces another false breakout, a return into the market profile could bring several important levels into play, including the Point of Control (POC) at $92.00 and the lower boundary of the profile at $86.00. Below this level, and relatively close to it, lies the green support level around $82.00.

Key Takeaways

The RSI being in overbought territory while the moving averages remain in the neutral zone casts doubt on a potential breakout of the profile. The short distance to the red resistance level could also strengthen the current resistance zone. Investor reaction to the planned price increase in October could provide an additional factor influencing the stock’s price action.

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TransparentBusiness Inc., which does business as Unicoin, sued Universal Navigation Inc., which does business as Uniswap Labs, in the Southern District of New York, seeking declarations that its UNICOIN mark does not infringe or dilute Uniswap’s claimed marks.

TransparentBusiness argued in a complaint filed Tuesday that its UNICOIN mark does not infringe or dilute Uniswap’s claimed UNI, UNISWAP and UNICHAIN marks. It also asked the court to cancel US trademark registration for UNI.

The complaint says Uniswap’s counsel sent three demand letters on June 3, July 17 and Aug. 14, accusing Unicoin of trademark infringement, dilution, cybersquatting and unfair competition, and threatening further legal action. The letters demanded that Unicoin stop using UNICOIN and other UNI-formative marks, transfer its unicoin.com and unicoin.org domains, provide an accounting of revenue and profits, and reimburse Uniswap’s legal fees.

The complaint also seeks a declaration that unicoin.com and unicoin.org domains do not violate the federal Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act.

Cointelegraph has approached Uniswap for comment on the lawsuit.

At the time of writing, DeFiLlama ranked the Uniswap protocol first among decentralized exchanges by 24-hour volume, with more than $3.9 billion.

The lawsuit was filed weeks before the Sept. 28 public launch date that Unicoin lists on its website for the UNCN token.

Related: Pudgy Penguins accused of infringing Original Penguin trademark

Cointelegraph is committed to independent, transparent journalism. This news article is produced in accordance with Cointelegraph’s Editorial Policy and aims to provide accurate and timely information. Readers are encouraged to verify information independently.

Former Silvergate Bank CEO Alan Lane says the bank’s 2023 voluntary wind-down was driven less by internal weaknesses and more by political and regulatory pressure, arguing that Silvergate remained solvent after meeting withdrawal demands in late 2022.

In an inaugural post on his Substack published Tuesday, Lane claimed Silvergate could have continued operating after satisfying withdrawals equal to 70% of its demand deposits during the fourth quarter of 2022, and he characterized the decision to liquidate as a response to “political pressure” rather than an inability to access liquidity.

Key takeaways

• Lane argues Silvergate had sufficient liquid resources to withstand heavy withdrawals in Q4 2022 and that liquidation followed political pressure.
• Federal regulators’ accounts emphasize different causes, pointing to concentrated crypto deposits, funding and governance risks, and compliance shortcomings.
• Lane disputes claims that regulators proved Silvergate’s anti-money laundering (AML) controls failed, even as enforcement actions followed.
• The SEC alleged failures in monitoring certain high-volume transaction flows tied to FTX entities; the case resulted in a settlement without admitting or denying wrongdoing.
• Regulatory guidance on crypto issued in 2023 was later withdrawn in April 2025, adding another layer to the debate over pressure versus policy.

Lane’s liquidity argument and the Q4 2022 numbers

Lane’s core claim is that Silvergate’s balance sheet gave it options even amid stress. He said the bank had held liquid assets that could be sold or pledged as collateral as withdrawals accelerated.

He also pointed to Silvergate’s own January 2023 business update, which reported a sharp contraction in digital asset-related deposits during the fourth quarter of 2022. According to the update, digital asset deposits fell 68% from $11.9 billion to $3.8 billion over the quarter.

In that same update, Silvergate said it sold $5.2 billion of debt securities and recorded a $718 million loss. The bank reported $4.6 billion in cash and equivalents at year-end. Lane’s Substack post uses these figures to support the argument that the bank had liquidity capacity and therefore did not necessarily face unavoidable collapse at that stage.

Still, Lane’s narrative directly challenges the dominant regulator view that Silvergate’s issues were structural—rooted in how quickly its funding base eroded, how its risk controls were implemented, and how governance handled the rapidly changing environment.

What regulators said instead: governance, risk management, and compliance

A September 2023 review by the Federal Reserve Board’s Office of Inspector General concluded that Silvergate’s reliance on crypto depositors, its rapid growth, and multilayered funding risks contributed to its liquidation. The review also cited weaknesses in corporate governance and risk management, and said supervisory actions could have been more aggressive and decisive.

That assessment contrasts with Lane’s position that the wind-down was not evidence of a solvency crisis driven by internal failure. Lane said he had not seen a regulator demonstrate that Silvergate’s AML program had been proven to be ineffective.

The regulatory record he referenced is more complicated. After the bank’s winding down, the SEC moved to enforce against Silvergate Capital and its leadership. In July 2024, the SEC charged Silvergate Capital, Alan Lane, and former chief risk officer Kathleen Fraher with misleading investors about the bank’s AML program and monitoring of crypto customers.

Per the SEC’s allegations, Silvergate’s automated system did not monitor more than $1 trillion in transactions, and the bank allegedly failed to detect nearly $9 billion in suspicious transfers among FTX entities.

Enforcement outcomes and the stakes for the crypto-banking debate

Lane said he settled rather than contested the SEC’s case. According to the reporting linked in the source material, Lane settled the charges without admitting or denying wrongdoing, agreeing to a $1 million penalty and a five-year officer-and-director bar.

Separately, the Federal Reserve fined Silvergate $43 million over transaction-monitoring deficiencies. Those actions, while not identical in scope to the Office of Inspector General review, reinforce the regulator emphasis on compliance and monitoring failures rather than solely on funding concentration.

For investors and market participants tracking whether banking access to crypto is shrinking due to policy pressure, the Silvergate dispute has become a proxy for a larger question: was the outcome primarily caused by crypto-adjacent funding volatility, or by how risk management and controls were applied to that business model?

Lane’s Substack intervention matters because it adds a first-person account that highlights a timeline in which the bank still had liquidity tools available and depositors withdrew only up to a point that Lane says could have been managed without liquidation.

Policy guidance, then withdrawal: did “pressure” shift bank behavior?

Lane also pointed to interagency statements about crypto risk that were issued in early 2023. He cited them as evidence that US regulators were applying pressure to banks operating in crypto-adjacent markets.

According to the source material, those statements urged banks to take a cautious approach to crypto-related activities. However, the Federal Reserve said institutions were not prohibited from serving any specific customer class and were not discouraged in a way that barred particular types of relationships.

In April 2025, government agencies withdrew the statements. That development is significant to the broader debate because it suggests the guidance—at least as originally formulated—was not meant to remain authoritative indefinitely.

Lane’s argument is therefore best understood as a claim about decision-making under regulatory uncertainty: even if regulators did not formally ban banks from serving crypto clients, he argues that the tone and direction of policy encouraged a conservative posture that became difficult to reverse as deposit pressures intensified.

As the debate continues, readers should watch whether further details emerge from Lane’s account that directly address the regulator findings on monitoring and governance, and whether regulators provide clearer guidance on how banks can balance crypto services with demonstrable controls—particularly now that the earlier 2023 crypto-risk statements have been withdrawn.

PayPal, M0 and MoonPay officially launched the PYUSDx custom stablecoin platform on Sept. 9 with three active projects that the companies said have collectively processed more than $100 million.

PYUSDx allows businesses to issue application-specific stablecoins backed by PayPal USD. Companies can give their tokens separate names and configure access restrictions, reward distribution, collateral policies and cross-chain availability.

The partners initially announced the framework in February. As crypto.news previously reported, PayPal and MoonPay introduced the custom stablecoin infrastructure as a way for developers to create branded digital dollars without independently building issuance and liquidity systems.

M0 developed the programmable token infrastructure used by PYUSDx. Its system lets issuers configure individual components instead of accepting a fixed stablecoin model. MoonPay contributes issuance, onboarding and distribution services. PayPal supplies the ecosystem connection through PYUSD. The arrangement extends the role of PayPal’s stablecoin beyond direct payments by allowing other financial applications to use it as an underlying reserve asset.

The companies said the structure can reduce the time required to create a customized stablecoin from several months to days. That remains a company claim and will depend on the project, its technical requirements and applicable regulatory approvals.

PYUSDx is not a stablecoin itself. It is an issuance framework supporting separate digital tokens. Each participating company can configure a token for its own settlement, credit, treasury or decentralized-finance use case.

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Three PYUSDx projects bring more than $100 million

Saturn, Concrete and Cap are the first projects operating through the platform. M0 said the three businesses brought more than $100 million in combined processed volume at launch. The disclosed figure refers to activity connected with those projects rather than the market capitalization of PYUSDx.

Saturn uses the system for USDat, a dollar-denominated token designed for settlement. Concrete launched concUSD for its on-chain vault infrastructure, while Cap introduced cUSD as the native dollar asset for its credit platform.

The projects retain control over branding and certain operating rules. They can also determine how returns or incentives are distributed, subject to their chosen structures and applicable laws.

The companies have not provided a breakdown showing how much of the reported $100 million came from each project. They also have not disclosed whether the figure represents transfers, settlement volume, minting activity or another measure across every participating token.

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The absence of a detailed breakdown means the figure should not be treated as the platform’s revenue or assets under management. It is a reported measure of processed activity supplied by the companies behind the launch.

USD.AI and Fairblock are expected to integrate later. Neither project disclosed a confirmed activation date in the launch materials. Their participation should therefore be treated as planned until their tokens become operational through the platform.

PYUSDx tokens are not issued directly by PayPal

MoonPay Digital Assets Limited issues the custom tokens created through PYUSDx. PayPal and Paxos do not directly issue those derivative tokens, despite their connection to the PYUSD reserve asset. Paxos Trust Company issues the underlying PYUSD stablecoin. PayPal’s official disclosure says PYUSD is redeemable one-to-one for U.S. dollars and backed by dollar deposits, U.S. Treasuries and similar cash equivalents.

Moreover, Paxos publishes information about those reserves through its transparency page. The issuer provides monthly reserve reports and third-party attestations covering the assets supporting PYUSD.

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The distinction between PYUSD and a PYUSDx token matters for users assessing issuer and redemption risk. Holding a custom token does not necessarily create the same direct relationship that a holder of Paxos-issued PYUSD may have with its issuer.

A PYUSDx token’s terms can also depend on the participating business, MoonPay’s issuance structure and the smart contracts governing conversions. Users must examine each token’s documentation rather than assuming that every project offers identical redemption rights.

Regulatory treatment may vary between jurisdictions and applications. A token used for lending, rewards or restricted settlement could face different rules from a stablecoin used mainly for payments.

PayPal and Venmo do not support PYUSDx tokens

PYUSDx tokens cannot currently be sent, received or used for payments inside PayPal or Venmo. Those restrictions separate the new platform from the consumer-facing PYUSD services available through PayPal’s applications.

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Eligible PayPal customers can buy, hold, transfer and sell PYUSD. Businesses can also use the original stablecoin for supported payments. Those functions do not automatically extend to USDat, concUSD, cUSD or future PYUSDx assets.

The limitation means PayPal’s brand and underlying stablecoin should not be interpreted as a guarantee that every custom token will work across PayPal’s payment network. The platform’s immediate use cases remain centered on external blockchain applications and specialized financial products.

PayPal has continued to expand the original stablecoin’s blockchain reach. In related coverage, PYUSD became available through Polygon’s Open Money Stack, providing businesses with additional payment, compliance and fiat-conversion infrastructure.

The company has also positioned stablecoins as part of its wider payments strategy. As crypto.news reported, PayPal made stablecoins a corporate growth priority after processing $486.4 billion in quarterly payment volume.

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PYUSDx gives PayPal another way to increase demand for its stablecoin without directly operating every application built around it. If participating projects grow, they may require more PYUSD as backing. The partners have not published targets for future issuance or reserve demand.

What happens next for PYUSDx

The next confirmed stage is the planned addition of USD.AI and Fairblock. The companies have not announced precise launch dates, supported networks or initial issuance amounts for either integration.

PayPal, M0 and MoonPay may also add more businesses seeking customized settlement assets. Any new token will require its own disclosures covering issuance, reserves, conversions, access controls and user eligibility.

More detailed reporting on the first three projects would help establish what the $100 million figure represents. Reserve verification will also be important because users need to distinguish the amount of underlying PYUSD from transaction volume generated by the custom tokens.

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PYUSDx therefore enters operation as an infrastructure layer rather than a direct replacement for PYUSD. Its early progress will depend on whether businesses adopt its programmable features and whether holders can reliably convert custom tokens into the underlying reserve asset.