Goldman Sachs has agreed to acquire NEOS Investments in a deal worth up to $2.25 billion. The transaction combines cash and equity, and final terms depend on performance benchmarks. This move strengthens Goldman’s position in the fast-growing active ETF market.

Deal Structure And Expected Timeline

Goldman Sachs will pay through a mix of cash and equity for NEOS Investments. The final payout remains tied to service and performance commitments over time. Regulators must still approve the transaction before it becomes final.

The companies expect the deal to close during the first quarter of 2027. This timeline allows both firms to complete regulatory reviews and integration planning. Goldman will fold NEOS into its existing asset management structure once approved.

NEOS currently manages nineteen systematic options-based income ETFs for its clients. The firm held roughly $30 billion in assets under management as of June. Some reports suggest that figure has since grown closer to $32 billion.

Neos Brings Scale To Goldman’s Options-Based Fund Lineup

NEOS launched in 2022 and quickly built a reputation in options-income investing. Its strategies focus on generating steady income while managing market exposure. This approach appealed to both individual and institutional investors seeking balance.

This acquisition follows Goldman’s earlier purchase of Innovator Capital Management, another options-focused firm. Innovator specializes in defined-outcome and buffer ETFs for risk-conscious investors. Together, these deals show Goldman’s clear strategy of expanding options-based offerings.

Co-founders Troy Cates and Garrett Paolella will join Goldman Sachs Asset Management as partners. The broader NEOS team is also expected to transition into Goldman’s structure. Goldman’s leadership described the acquisition as complementary to its buffer, income, and outcome-based strategies.

Combined ETF Platform Surpasses $130 Billion In Assets

After the deal closes, Goldman’s total ETF platform will exceed $130 billion in assets. Active ETFs alone will account for roughly $80 billion of that total. This scale places Goldman among the largest active ETF providers in the industry.

Morningstar data ranks Goldman as the eighth-largest active ETF provider as of June. That ranking reflects steady growth across the firm’s broader asset management division. The NEOS acquisition should push Goldman further up that competitive ranking.

Options-based income ETFs have expanded rapidly across the wider market in recent years. The category now holds about $180 billion in total assets industry-wide. Annualized growth has topped seventy percent since 2021, according to Morningstar figures.

Broader Market Context And Industry Trends

Demand for options-income strategies has grown steadily among everyday and institutional investors alike. These products aim to generate income while limiting downside exposure to market swings. That balance has made them increasingly popular within traditional ETF structures.

Goldman’s acquisitions of NEOS and Innovator reflect a broader shift toward specialized ETF products. Large asset managers continue consolidating smaller, innovative firms to diversify their offerings. This pattern suggests further consolidation may follow across the active ETF sector.

Once the deal closes, Goldman plans to operate NEOS alongside its current ETF lineup. The firm aims to expand its overall product range and total assets under management. Goldman’s latest move signals continued ambition within the actively managed ETF space.

Four consecutive weeks of sales. A $102 million realized loss. An $8.2 billion quarterly write down. The company that made corporate Bitcoin treasuries a category is quietly rewriting the playbook it created.

Michael Saylor built his reputation on a single trade. In August 2020, MicroStrategy announced that it had converted $250 million of its corporate treasury into Bitcoin, becoming the first publicly traded company to adopt the cryptocurrency as its primary reserve asset. Over the next five years, the company, which renamed itself Strategy in 2025, accumulated more than 843,000 BTC through a combination of operating cash flow, convertible note offerings, at the market equity sales, and preferred stock issuances.

The accumulation was relentless. Through bull markets and bear markets, through the collapse of FTX and the SEC’s enforcement campaign, through Bitcoin’s decline from $69,000 to $15,500 and its subsequent recovery to $108,000, Strategy never sold. The position grew larger with each quarterly filing. Saylor became the public face of corporate Bitcoin adoption, and his company’s stock became a leveraged proxy for Bitcoin exposure, trading at a premium to its net asset value that reflected the market’s belief in the perpetual accumulation thesis.

That thesis ended in June 2026.

Strategy has now sold Bitcoin for four consecutive weeks. The most recent disclosure showed a sale of 1,637 BTC, reducing the company’s holdings to 842,138. A separate sale of approximately $218 million in BTC was made to cover preferred stock dividend obligations. The company’s quarterly filing recorded an $8.2 billion loss on its digital asset holdings. And on August 11, CEO Phong Le described Strategy as “the central bank of Bitcoin,” a description that, intended or not, carried the implication that central banks sometimes sell reserves.

The shift has been quiet. Strategy has not held a press conference to announce a change in strategy. It has not revised its public guidance on Bitcoin as a treasury reserve. The sales appear in SEC filings and on chain data, not in marketing materials. But the numbers are unambiguous, and their implications extend beyond a single company’s balance sheet to the Bitcoin market’s structural demand profile, to the corporate treasury movement that Strategy created, and to the question of whether leveraged accumulation strategies can survive the kind of drawdown that Bitcoin delivers in every cycle.

This piece examines what the sales mean for Strategy’s financial structure, for the Bitcoin market’s supply dynamics, and for the broader corporate treasury thesis that Saylor’s trade inspired.

The financial mechanics of the sell decision

Strategy’s Bitcoin sales are not arbitrary. They follow from the financial engineering that funded the accumulation. The company issued approximately $7 billion in convertible notes between 2020 and 2025, along with multiple tranches of preferred stock and billions of dollars in at the market equity offerings. Each instrument carries financial obligations: convertible notes require interest payments, preferred stock requires dividend payments, and equity dilution requires maintaining a stock price that keeps the premium to net asset value positive.

When Bitcoin’s price was rising, these obligations were easy to meet. The appreciation in the company’s Bitcoin holdings inflated its balance sheet, supported its stock price, and allowed it to issue new instruments at favorable terms to buy more Bitcoin. The flywheel worked as long as the price went up.

When Bitcoin’s price declined from $108,000 in January 2026 to $63,800 in August, the flywheel reversed. The value of Strategy’s holdings declined by approximately $37 billion. Its stock price fell, making new equity issuances more dilutive. Its convertible note holders began to calculate conversion values that made the notes less attractive as equity substitutes. And its preferred stock dividends became a cash obligation that the company’s software business, which generates approximately $500 million in annual revenue, could not cover without tapping the Bitcoin reserve.

The $218 million sale to cover preferred stock dividends is the most significant of the company’s recent transactions because it crosses a threshold that Saylor publicly committed to avoiding. For years, the company’s messaging was clear: Bitcoin is a permanent hold, not a source of liquidity for operational expenses. The preferred stock sale breaks that commitment. It is a sale driven by financial necessity rather than strategic choice, and it signals to the market that Strategy’s Bitcoin holdings are no longer a one way bet but a balance sheet asset that is subject to the same liquidity demands as any other corporate reserve.

The $8.2 billion loss and what it means under new accounting rules

The $8.2 billion loss in Strategy’s quarterly filing deserves contextualization because it reflects accounting treatment that has changed recently. Prior to 2025, companies that held Bitcoin were required to use impairment accounting, which meant they could write down the value of their holdings when the price declined but could not write it back up when the price recovered. Under the new FASB fair value rules that took effect in January 2025, companies mark their crypto holdings to market each quarter.

Strategy’s $8.2 billion loss reflects the decline in Bitcoin’s price from the start of the quarter to the end. It is a paper loss in the sense that the company still holds the Bitcoin and could recover the value if the price rises. But it is a real loss in the sense that it flows through the income statement and affects the company’s reported earnings, its tax position, and its attractiveness to institutional investors who screen for profitability.

The new accounting rules were supposed to make corporate Bitcoin holdings more attractive by allowing companies to recognize gains as well as losses. In practice, the first major test of fair value accounting for a large Bitcoin holder produced an $8.2 billion headline loss that dominated media coverage and reinforced the perception that corporate Bitcoin treasuries carry unmanageable volatility. The outcome may discourage other public companies from following Strategy’s lead, which is the opposite of the effect that the accounting standards update was designed to produce.

The realized loss on the $218 million preferred stock sale, reported at $102 million, adds a different dimension. This is not a paper loss. It is cash that the company paid to cover dividends that exceeded the proceeds from selling Bitcoin acquired at higher prices. The realized loss confirms that some of Strategy’s Bitcoin was purchased above the current market price, which means the company’s overall cost basis is above the current spot level for at least a portion of its holdings.

The ETF offset: why Strategy’s selling has not crashed the price

One of the most important dynamics in the current Bitcoin market is that Strategy’s selling has been absorbed by ETF inflows without producing a measurable price impact. This is not a coincidence. It reflects the structural change in Bitcoin’s demand profile that occurred with the launch of spot Bitcoin ETFs in January 2024.

Bitcoin spot ETFs held approximately $62 billion in assets under management by August 2026. The daily inflow rate has averaged approximately $150 million per day in 2026, with significant variation. On days when Strategy’s sales hit the market, ETF inflows have been sufficient to absorb the supply and prevent the kind of price cascade that a sale of this magnitude would have caused in prior cycles.

The arithmetic illustrates the point. Strategy’s 1,637 BTC sale at current prices represents approximately $104 million. A single strong day of ETF inflows can exceed $300 million. The sale is large by historical standards for a single corporate seller, but it is small relative to the daily flow of capital into Bitcoin through the ETF channel.

This dynamic creates a strange equilibrium. Strategy sells Bitcoin to meet financial obligations. ETFs buy Bitcoin as retail and institutional allocators add exposure. The net effect on price is approximately zero, which allows Strategy to continue selling without triggering the price decline that would make its financial position worse. The ETF channel is, in effect, providing liquidity for Strategy’s exit from a portion of its position without the market consequences that would normally accompany a sale of this scale.

The risk is that this equilibrium is fragile. If ETF inflows slow, whether because of a broader risk off event, regulatory uncertainty, or simply because the marginal allocator has already made their Bitcoin allocation, Strategy’s sales would land in a thinner market. The same volume of selling that produced no price impact in a strong ETF flow environment could produce a meaningful decline in a weak one.

The “central bank of Bitcoin” claim

CEO Phong Le’s description of Strategy as “the central bank of Bitcoin” was delivered during a public appearance on August 11. The phrase is provocative by design. Central banks hold reserve assets, issue currency, and conduct monetary policy. Strategy holds Bitcoin, has issued Bitcoin backed securities, and is now selling reserves. The analogy is closer than Le may have intended.

Central banks sell reserves when they face balance of payments pressures, when they need to defend a currency peg, or when they are conducting open market operations to manage liquidity. Strategy is selling Bitcoin for analogous reasons: to meet financial obligations that its operating business cannot cover from cash flow alone. The “central bank” framing inadvertently highlights the structural vulnerability of a corporate treasury strategy built on a volatile asset.

Saylor’s own public posture has shifted in subtle ways. While he continues to post on social media about Bitcoin’s long term value proposition, his messaging has moved from “we will never sell” to hints about future buying. A recent post reading “what’s next” was interpreted by the market as a signal that Strategy might resume accumulation, but no purchase has been announced since June.

The gap between the public narrative and the financial reality is the most important data point for investors who own Strategy stock as a Bitcoin proxy. If the company has transitioned from a permanent accumulator to a periodic seller, the premium to net asset value that justified a stock price well above the per share Bitcoin value loses its foundation. Strategy stock at a 50% premium to NAV makes sense if the company is always buying. It makes less sense if the company is sometimes selling.

What the corporate treasury movement looks like without its leader

Strategy’s shift from buyer to seller has implications beyond its own stock price. The company’s original accumulation inspired a wave of corporate Bitcoin adoption. Companies like Marathon Digital, Metaplanet, and dozens of smaller public firms followed Strategy’s lead, adding Bitcoin to their balance sheets and pitching their stocks as crypto exposure vehicles.

If the company that started the trend is now selling, the thesis that corporate treasuries provide a structural demand floor for Bitcoin needs revision. Strategy’s 842,138 BTC represents approximately 4% of Bitcoin’s circulating supply. The company’s transition from accumulator to seller removes a source of demand that the market has priced in since 2020.

The practical effect depends on whether other corporate holders follow Strategy’s lead. Marathon Digital, which holds a significant Bitcoin position of its own, was flagged by on chain analytics for large BTC transfers from its wallets in the same week as Strategy’s sales. The correlation may be coincidental, but it raises the question of whether the corporate treasury sector is experiencing a synchronized shift from accumulation to distribution.

If multiple corporate holders begin selling simultaneously, the ETF absorption capacity becomes the critical variable. The ETF channel can handle one large corporate seller. It may not be able to handle several, particularly if the selling occurs during a period of weak retail demand or negative macro sentiment.

The longer term question is whether the corporate Bitcoin treasury model survives Strategy’s change in behavior. The model depends on the assumption that Bitcoin is a permanent store of value that appreciates over time. Strategy’s sales do not invalidate that assumption, but they do show that even the most committed corporate holder can be forced to liquidate by the financial engineering that funded the accumulation. The lesson may be that corporate Bitcoin treasuries work, but only if the funding structure allows the company to hold through drawdowns without selling. Strategy’s convertible notes and preferred stock created obligations that Bitcoin’s volatility eventually made impossible to service without tapping the reserve.

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The 100x claim and the math behind it

Phong Le made another claim during his August 11 appearance that requires examination. He stated that Strategy has achieved “100 to 200x scale” since its initial Bitcoin entry in 2020. The number refers to the growth in the company’s total enterprise value, which has expanded from approximately $1.2 billion in August 2020 to a peak above $120 billion in early 2026.

The arithmetic is correct on its face. A company that was worth $1.2 billion and grew to $120 billion did achieve roughly 100x appreciation in enterprise value. But the claim obscures the source of that growth. Strategy’s software business has grown modestly, from approximately $480 million in annual revenue to roughly $500 million. The overwhelming majority of the enterprise value increase came from the appreciation of its Bitcoin holdings and from the premium that investors assigned to the company’s accumulation strategy.

That premium was the market’s way of saying that Strategy’s ability to buy Bitcoin with leverage, through convertible notes and preferred stock, was worth more than simply holding the Bitcoin itself. A dollar of Bitcoin on Strategy’s balance sheet was valued at $1.50 or more by the stock market because the market believed Strategy would use that dollar to acquire more Bitcoin, which would appreciate, which would allow more issuance, which would allow more buying.

The premium is the flywheel, and the flywheel works only in one direction. When Strategy buys, the premium expands. When Strategy sells, the premium compresses. A 100x increase built on a buying premium can reverse faster than it accumulated if the market decides the buying is over. MSTR stock dropped as much as 8% intraday during the week when the most recent sales were disclosed, and the premium to NAV has been compressing steadily since June.

The 100x figure is historically accurate but forward looking investors should treat it as a record of what happened under the old regime, not as evidence of what will happen under the new one. The financial instruments that funded the accumulation now constrain it, and the premium that rewarded the buying will penalize the selling.

The opposing case: why the sales may be temporary

The bearish interpretation of Strategy’s sales, that the accumulation thesis is permanently broken, deserves scrutiny alongside the strongest version of the bull case. Strategy’s defenders argue that the sales are a short term response to a specific financial obligation, the preferred stock dividends, and that the company will resume buying once Bitcoin’s price recovers and the financial pressure eases.

This argument has some support in the data. Strategy’s software business generates positive operating cash flow, which means the company is not insolvent. Its Bitcoin holdings still exceed the total value of its debt obligations by a significant margin, even at current prices. And the convertible notes, while creating future obligations, do not mature for several years, giving the company time to wait for a price recovery before the next refinancing deadline.

Saylor’s continued public advocacy for Bitcoin supports the argument that the thesis has not fundamentally changed. His social media activity has shifted from triumphant accumulation announcements to hints about future plans, but it has not turned bearish. The simplest explanation may be that Strategy is managing a temporary liquidity need in a responsible way: selling a small fraction of its holdings to meet an obligation, preserving the vast majority of its position, and waiting for conditions to improve before resuming accumulation.

The market will ultimately judge this question by watching the 8-K filings. If Strategy returns to net buying within the next quarter, the sales will be remembered as a speed bump rather than a structural break. If the sales continue or accelerate, the thesis revision becomes permanent and the stock’s premium to NAV will compress toward parity.

What to watch

Weekly 8-K filings. Strategy discloses Bitcoin transactions in SEC filings. A return to net buying would signal that the financial pressure has eased. Continued selling would confirm the structural shift.

MSTR premium to NAV. The stock’s premium to its per share Bitcoin value is the market’s judgment on whether the accumulation thesis is intact. A compression below 1.0x would indicate that investors no longer believe the company adds value beyond holding Bitcoin.

ETF daily flow data. If ETF inflows slow below $100 million per day while Strategy continues selling, the absorption capacity weakens and price impact increases. Watch Bloomberg and BitMEX ETF flow trackers.

Marathon Digital and Metaplanet disclosures. If other large corporate holders begin selling, the single seller narrative becomes a sector wide trend with materially different implications for Bitcoin supply dynamics.

Convertible note maturity schedule. Strategy’s convertible notes have staggered maturity dates. The next maturity creates a deadline by which the company must either refinance, convert, or repay, each of which has different implications for its Bitcoin position.

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Disclosure: This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute financial advice. Strategy (MSTR) is a publicly traded company. Investors should conduct their own due diligence before making investment decisions. Information is current as of August 11, 2026.

Goldman Sachs has agreed to acquire NEOS Investments for up to $2.25 billion, adding about $30 billion in assets and 19 options-based income ETFs to its asset management business.

Goldman Sachs sets first-quarter 2027 closing target

Goldman Sachs said in an Aug. 12 announcement that the final payment will depend on performance and service commitments included in the acquisition agreement. The transaction is scheduled to close during the first quarter of 2027, subject to regulatory clearances and customary closing conditions.

Structured as a mix of cash and equity, the deal will bring NEOS’ investment products, staff, and client relationships into Goldman Sachs Asset Management. The bank did not provide a breakdown of the cash and stock portions or identify the regulators that must approve the purchase.

Based in Westport, Connecticut, NEOS has built a range of 19 systematic options-based income ETFs since its launch in 2022. Goldman placed the firm’s assets under management at approximately $30 billion as of June 30, while Bloomberg data cited by Reuters estimated that NEOS had reached about $32 billion.

Options-based income funds generally hold securities or index exposure while selling options contracts to collect premiums. The income can soften some losses or support regular distributions, although selling calls may limit how much of a strong market rally reaches shareholders.

NEOS applies such strategies across stock indexes, bonds, and other market exposures. Its products include funds tied to the S&P 500, Nasdaq-100, high-yield bonds, and U.S. Treasury securities, giving Goldman an established set of income-focused products rather than requiring the bank to build each strategy internally.

Reuters reported that the NEOS S&P 500 High Income ETF, one of the provider’s main funds, returned about 19% over the previous year and approximately 15% on an annualized basis since its launch. Any past performance, however, does not guarantee that investors will receive comparable returns in later periods.

NEOS deal takes Goldman Sachs ETF assets above $130B

Once completed, the purchase will take Goldman Sachs Asset Management’s total ETF assets beyond $130 billion, according to the bank. Approximately $80 billion of the combined amount will be held in actively managed ETFs.

Morningstar figures included in the announcement would place Goldman as the eighth-largest active ETF provider by assets as of June 30. Unlike passive funds, which normally follow an index, active ETFs allow portfolio managers or systematic rules to adjust holdings and derivatives positions according to the strategy described in the prospectus.

The NEOS transaction follows Goldman’s acquisition of Innovator Capital Management, a provider known for defined-outcome and buffer ETFs. Goldman agreed to pay about $2 billion for Innovator, which managed $28 billion across 159 ETFs when the purchase was announced in December 2025.

Innovator’s products use options to set defined ranges for gains and losses over specified periods. NEOS concentrates more heavily on recurring income, giving Goldman funds across income, buffer, and managed-outcome categories after both businesses are integrated.

Chairman and CEO David Solomon said NEOS had developed a strong position among different types of investors and described its investment process as complementary to Goldman’s existing capabilities.

“As investor demand for active ETFs grows, NEOS’ disciplined investment approach is highly complementary to our capabilities across buffer, managed outcome and income strategies.”

Co-founders Troy Cates and Garrett Paolella will become partners at Goldman Sachs Asset Management after the purchase closes. The remaining NEOS investment, client service, and operating teams are also expected to join Goldman, according to the transaction announcement.

Options-based income ETFs have reached $180B

Demand for derivative income ETFs has accelerated as investors use exchange-traded products to seek distributions and manage market exposure. Morningstar data cited by Goldman valued the category at about $180 billion, following annualized asset growth of more than 70% since 2021.

A covered-call strategy typically sells call options against an asset or related exposure. The option premiums generate income, but the fund may give up part of its potential gain when the underlying market rises beyond the calls’ strike prices.

Put options and option spreads can also be used to set buffers or predetermined outcomes. Performance depends on contract pricing, volatility, market direction, expenses, and the portion of the portfolio covered by the derivatives strategy.

Such trade-offs have also entered the U.S. crypto ETF market. In April, crypto.news reported Goldman’s filing for a Bitcoin Premium Income ETF that would seek current income while maintaining indirect exposure to Bitcoin.

According to the preliminary prospectus, the proposed Goldman fund may place at least 80% of its net assets in instruments providing Bitcoin exposure, mainly shares of U.S.-listed spot Bitcoin exchange-traded products. It would then sell call options against part of that exposure to collect premiums.

The filing shows how NEOS’ options experience could complement product areas Goldman was already pursuing before the acquisition, though neither company has said whether NEOS personnel will work on the proposed Bitcoin fund. Any such operational role would depend on Goldman’s decisions after closing and the terms of the relevant fund documents.

US investors gain more access to managed-income ETFs

For U.S. investors, the transaction will place more exchange-listed options strategies within one large asset manager. NEOS funds already trade on U.S. exchanges and remain accessible through ordinary brokerage accounts, subject to each platform’s product availability and investor requirements.

The acquisition itself does not change the objectives, fees, distribution policies, or tax treatment of individual NEOS funds. Any material changes would generally need to appear in updated prospectuses, shareholder communications, or regulatory filings.

Tax results can vary across income ETFs because option contracts, capital gains, return-of-capital distributions, and ordinary income may receive different treatment under U.S. rules. Investors must rely on each fund’s tax documents and their own circumstances rather than treating every monthly distribution as equivalent to interest or dividend income.

Competition in the category has also extended to cryptocurrency-linked products. As covered in June, BlackRock disclosed additional operating details for its Bitcoin income ETF, including options-clearing and custody arrangements involving Goldman Sachs, Coinbase Custody, and Anchorage Digital Bank.

BlackRock later listed its iShares Bitcoin Premium Income ETF on Nasdaq under the ticker BITA. A subsequent crypto.news analysis by BITA said the product targets a 15% to 25% annual yield by selling calls against part of its Bitcoin ETF exposure, while accepting a cap on some gains during strong Bitcoin rallies.

Outside the ETF platform, Goldman’s asset and wealth management division generated $4.6 billion in second-quarter revenue, up 20% from the same period in 2025, Reuters reported. The business oversaw approximately $4.04 trillion in assets at the end of June.

Goldman Sachs Global Banking & Markets is serving as the bank’s financial adviser on the NEOS transaction. Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz and Willkie Farr & Gallagher are providing legal advice to Goldman, while Barclays is acting as NEOS’ exclusive financial adviser and Ropes & Gray is serving as its legal counsel.

GSR shifted its Core3 model toward Solana on Aug. 12, raising SOL to 43.6% of the portfolio and making it the model’s largest allocation.

Ether fell to 39.5%, while Bitcoin dropped to 16.9%, the smallest weight among the three assets.The firm said the change reflected a move in its relative alpha signals toward Solana as SOL showed stronger near term price momentum. GSR’s written commentary lists the Solana weight at 43.7%, while the accompanying allocation table shows 43.6%. This article uses the table figure.

Solana allocation jumps 7.1 points in one week

The latest allocation marks a sharp reversal from the prior week. On Aug. 5, GSR assigned 36.5% to Solana, 44.1% to Ether and 19.3% to Bitcoin. Solana therefore gained 7.1 percentage points in the model within seven days, while Ether lost 4.6 points and Bitcoin lost 2.4 points.

As crypto.news previously reported, the prior weekly allocation tilted toward Bitcoin as trading activity weakened and volatility eased. The Aug. 12 update reversed part of that move. GSR said its latest positioning reflected proprietary relative signals rather than a simple ranking of recent returns.

The distinction matters because Core3 is not presented as a live investment recommendation. GSR says the weekly publication is a model framework intended for professional investors and does not constitute advice or a recommendation to allocate to the three assets.

Solana leads weekly returns while Ether leads the month

Solana delivered the strongest seven day return in GSR’s latest table, gaining 2.98%. Bitcoin declined 1.02% over the same period, while Ether slipped 0.20%. Over 30 days, however, Ether remained ahead with a 7.88% gain, compared with 3.19% for Bitcoin and 2.44% for Solana.

The Core3 model itself returned 0.85% over one week and 5.30% over one month, ahead of the equal weight basket at 0.59% and 4.68%, respectively. Longer periods remain weaker. Core3 was down 35.58% year to date and 70.28% over one year, compared with losses of 32.22% and 63.44% for the equal weight basket.

Volatility also remained relatively subdued. GSR put 30 day volatility at 26.82% for Bitcoin, 39.75% for Ether and 35.26% for Solana. The firm said Solana trading volume had softened over both seven and 30 day periods, meaning its larger model weight did not coincide with stronger volume across those windows.

U.S. Solana access expands as GSR favors SOL

The model shift comes as U.S. investors gain more exchange traded routes to Solana exposure. Morgan Stanley Investment Management announced on July 28 that it had launched the Morgan Stanley Solana Trust, MSOL, on NYSE Arca alongside an Ether product. The release said MSOL carries a 0.14% expense ratio and seeks to track SOL while staking a portion of its holdings.

Morgan Stanley expanded its crypto ETP lineup after launching a Bitcoin product earlier in 2026. An SEC prospectus says the Solana trust may stake up to 100% of its SOL under normal market circumstances, subject to liquidity needs and legal or regulatory considerations. The filing also details risks tied to staking, custody and concentration in one digital asset.

Competition among U.S. products has also increased. A 21Shares filing dated July 27 said the issuer would waive TSOL’s 0.21% sponsor fee for one year beginning July 28. The company said the product can capture staking rewards, while warning that rewards can fluctuate and staking creates operational and liquidity risks.

Those product developments do not prove that U.S. investors share GSR’s preference for Solana. They do show that regulated U.S. exchange traded access to SOL has broadened and become more competitive while the Core3 model has shifted exposure away from Bitcoin and Ether.

What traders will watch next

GSR publishes the Core3 model weekly, making the next allocation an immediate test of whether the Solana overweight persists or reverses. Recent updates show how quickly the weights can move. Bitcoin rose from 9.2% on July 15 to 19.3% on Aug. 5 before falling back to 16.9% in the Aug. 12 model.

Volume, relative momentum and volatility will therefore remain useful measures to watch alongside the next model update. GSR has already cautioned that its opinions and estimates can change without notice as market conditions change.

The firm also warns against treating Core3 results as returns available from a live strategy. Its published figures are hypothetical, gross of transaction and management fees and exclude staking rewards. GSR further states that it may trade the assets for its own account and may hold positions that differ from the views expressed in its commentary.