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Napoleon Bonaparte is said to have commented in connection with his invasion of Russia that “geography is destiny”. Take a look at a live maritime tracker to see how Napoleon’s aphorism is playing out in the Middle East today. There are presently hundreds of vessels either side of the Strait of Hormuz, idling in either the Persian Gulf or the Gulf of Oman. But nothing is passing though.
In normal times, 20% of the world’s oil flows through this waterway. But since the US and Israel began to launch attacks at the end of February, Iran has effectively closed down the Strait, both by depositing mines and by threatening to board any ships trying to pass without their permission.
The US has countered with its own blockade. And both sides have demonstrated how serious they are in recent days by threatening, boarding or forcing vessels to reroute.
That Iran would close the Strait of Hormuz should have come as no surprise to anyone. The leaders of the Islamic Republic have threatened to do so every time they have felt under threat over more than four decades. Christian Emery, an expert in US-Iran relations and Persian Gulf security at University College London, believes this is why no previous US president has chosen to launch a full-scale attack on Iran.
As we’ve already seen, the ability of Iran to hugely disrupt the global economy by shutting down the Strait was obvious: “The only person who seems not to have understood this is Donald Trump,” Emery concludes.
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So now there appears to be a deadlock. It’s an unwinnable war, write Bamo Nouri and Inderjeet Parmar, experts in international security at City St George’s, University of London. The US and Israel may enjoy massive military superiority over Iran, but this is beside the point, Nouri and Parmar believe.
While both the US president, Donald Trump, and Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, need to be able to demonstrate to their voters that they have emerged triumphant, Iran isn’t looking to win. It is looking to endure – while making sure that the cost of this conflict becomes unsustainable. And not just for the US and Israel, but for pretty much everybody else besides.
We’re already seeing that. Oil prices have surged and reserves are coming under strain. Supply chains are disrupted. And political friction is stressing relationships, not just between the US and its Nato allies, but – more ominously – with China, which typically buys between 80% and 90% of Iran’s oil exports and said this week that the Strait must be opened without delay.
Iran, our experts conclude, “does not need to win. It only needs to prevent its adversaries from achieving their aims. So far, it has done exactly that.”
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There’s a principle in classical game theory which explains why Iran’s position is so strong. It’s known as Rubinstein bargaining, writes Renaud Foucart, an economist at Lancaster University. As Foucart explains it, this holds that in a conflict the respective strength of adversaries each depends on two things: “how badly off it would be without a resolution, and how impatient it is to get things resolved”.
As we’ve heard, all the pressure is on the US, while the leverage is mainly in Iran’s hands. “The US’s position is much weaker than first thought because of a stretch of water the world can’t do without,” he concludes.
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The Strait of Hormuz shows how everything is now about leverage
On Tuesday, as we waited to see what might happen if the 14-day deadline imposed by Trump on April 8 expired without Tehran opening the Strait, it was clear that both the US and Iran, to varying degrees, were looking for an off-ramp. The blockade is financially ruinous for Iran – whether it is losing US$500 million (£370 million) a day, as Trump claims, we don’t know. But the shutting down of its oil exports is hitting an already parlous economy and this week the social security minister said 2 million people had lost their jobs since the beginning of the war.
For Trump, it’s soaring prices at the gas pumps and the prospect of rising inflation angering voters ahead of November’s midterm elections. The war is very unpopular with Americans – and, significantly, it’s beginning to fracture the Maga coalition which brought Trump to power in the 2024 election.
EPA/Jim Lo Scalzo
But there are ways both sides can find off-ramps, writes David Galbreath of the University of Bath. The key thing is to find a settlement that the leaders of both sides can sell as a “win”.
For Iran, this could be an easing of sanctions and access to some of the many billions of dollars of frozen assets held overseas. It could be a recognition of its right to enrich uranium to the level needed for medical uses – particularly given the recent assertion by the Chinese president, Xi Jinping, that such a solution would “safeguard its [Iran’s] national sovereignty”.
We know a little about what Iran is prepared to offer because a great deal of it was on the table in February when the US and Israel launched their strikes. But one of the stumbling blocks for the US president appears to be that Iran’s proposals may too closely resemble the deal struck in 2015 by his predecessor, Barack Obama.

Sipa US/Alamy Live News
But Galbreath concludes that as things stand, some combination of opening the Strait of Hormuz, acceptance of limits on uranium enrichment and agreeing to stringent inspections could be made to appear a “win” for Trump. This could be a starting point, writes Galbreath, in what is known in conflict resolution as “sequenced de‑escalation”. It could deliver an initial settlement and allow negotiators on both sides to get to work and hammer out the details. Obama’s treaty took 20 months to agree. It’s early days yet.
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One stumbling block is likely to be that there appears to be something of a power struggle raging at the top of Iranian politics. This was seen very clearly last weekend, when Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, announced that the Strait of Hormuz was completely open, only to be swiftly overruled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which said it would decide when and how the Strait would be opened.
Since then, a new figure has emerged at the head of the IRGC: a longtime guards member and hardline former commander of its elite Quds force, Ahmad Vahidi. And it seems that with Iran’s freshly minted supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, badly injured after the attack that killed his father on February 28, Vahidi is now calling the shots in Iran. Andreas Krieg, an expert in Middle East politics at King’s College London explains the power struggle that has led to Vahidi assuming control.
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