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On Monday, a new Policy Exchange report added to the ever-growing pile of literature and comment about whether too many young people are going to university. It is a question that deserves serious consideration and practical answers. If graduates are struggling to find good jobs, as the recent Milburn review concluded, universities cannot dismiss those concerns. If employers say they cannot find the skills they need, we must listen.  

Before concluding that Britain needs fewer graduates, however, it is worth considering the world that today’s students are preparing to enter. We must consider seriously what a graduate is for. 

The world they will inherit is likely to need more highly skilled people than the one we inhabit now. A QS report in March identified that among the 1,436 occupations essential to the delivery of the Industrial Strategy, 80 per cent require level six skills or above. In common parlance, that’s a bachelor’s degree or higher. From healthcare and education to science, engineering and professional services, we require more high-skilled workers, not fewer. Advances in artificial intelligence are also increasing the value of capabilities that remain distinctly human: judgement, creativity, communication and the ability to work effectively with others. 

That picture feels familiar to me. UCL educates future clinicians, engineers, teachers, architects, data scientists, entrepreneurs and public servants. When I speak to employers, I rarely hear them asking for graduates who know less. More often, I hear them asking for graduates who are better able to apply what they know. They want people who can work effectively in teams, communicate clearly, manage projects and adapt when circumstances change. 

None of this means concerns about graduate outcomes should be waved away. Quite the opposite. An economy can need more graduate-level skills and still leave some graduates struggling to make the transition into good work.  

Universities are asking themselves what more they can do to close that gap. For many years, employability was often treated as something that happened alongside a degree rather than through it. Students would study their subject, then visit the careers service towards the end of their course and think about what came next. That model became outdated some time ago. 

Universities cannot become strictly vocational training providers. A university education ought to expand horizons, cultivate intellectual confidence and encourage students to think critically about the world around them. The graduates Britain needs are those who are prepared not only for the workplace as it currently stands, but also for the workplaces of the future. That is where an education from a university like UCL has a distinct value add. Students benefit from learning alongside people who are helping to shape the future of their disciplines, whether that means developing new technologies, advancing medical treatments or exploring solutions to complex social problems.  

Yet there is plenty of room to be more ambitious about helping students connect those qualities and experiences to life beyond the campus. Students should encounter more opportunities to work on real-world problems before they graduate. Increasingly, at UCL, we are experimenting with ways of doing that. For example, through our ExtendEd programme, every student is now given the opportunity to take part in industry challenges, community projects and collaborative problem-solving activities alongside their academic studies.  

I am proud that our graduates enjoy some of the strongest outcomes in the country. Yet spending time with students and employers leaves me convinced that this conversation cannot stop at employment statistics. The economy is changing too quickly for that. Many of today’s students will move between organisations, sectors and technologies that do not yet exist. Preparing them for that future involves more than helping them secure a first job after graduation. It means equipping them with the knowledge, judgement and adaptability to navigate a lifetime of change. 

Britain faces genuine skills shortages. Employers need talent. Young people need opportunities. Universities have a responsibility to work with both of these groups to be part of the solution.  

Britain’s economy will continue to need graduate-level skills in the years ahead. The task for universities is to ensure that more graduates are equipped to make use of their knowledge, contribute in meaningful ways and adapt as the world changes around them. 

Dr Michael Spence is president and provost of UCL

Philippe Marlière looks at the prospective candidates for the French presidential elections in 2027 for both the left and the right, as well as the key challenges they will have to overcome should they run.

As in 2017, the upcoming French presidential election will be a transitional one that could trigger further political upheaval. Emmanuel Macron, the incumbent President, is no longer eligible to run. His departure opens a wide range of contenders. Jordan Bardella (National Rally, RN) is leading in the polls and considered the frontrunner. But his election is far from certain. The campaign that has already unofficially begun could therefore hold a few surprises.

A disunited and historically weak left

What are the chances of the left? Very slim. It could be eliminated from the second round for the third consecutive time. It will be Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s fourth attempt since 2012. A powerful speaker, comfortable in the media, able to use the registers of radicalism and a unifying discourse, he is more than anyone else at ease in an election where personal capital and communication skills are key.

Mélenchon enters the fray with a disciplined movement. He could, as in 2017 and 2022, benefit from tactical voting from those who do not like him but desperately want the left to reach the second round. Will he succeed? It should not be ruled out in the context of a fragmented and evolving political landscape. However, his personal image is deeply tarnished. He is criticised for his ethnic factional rhetoric, authoritarianism, anti-European Union stance, conciliatory remarks towards Putin, al-Assad, and China; and numerous accusations of anti-Semitism are leveled against him. He is currently more “demonised” in the media and political class than the RN, which, for its part, has largely “de-demonised” itself. In a runoff between Mélenchon and Bardella, polls predict an emphatic victory for the RN leader.

The rest of the left claims to be organising a “unity primary”, intended to select a single left-wing candidate (outside of LFI). Negotiations between party leaders are stalled, the Socialist Party is divided on the issue, and the Communist Party refuses to participate. This primary will probably not happen, opening the door to multiple left-wing candidacies, including that of Raphaël Glucksmann, leader of the small Place Publique party, who is fiercely opposed to Mélenchon. If no non-LFI candidate gains traction in the polls by the end of 2026, the possibility of François Hollande, the former President, running as the saviour of the moderate left should not be ruled out.

Macronism rejected and the Republicans in decline

Who will embody the Macronist centre right? Two former Prime Ministers of Macron stand out: Édouard Philippe, president of the micro-party Horizons, and Gabriel Attal, president of Renaissance. A recent poll shows that the Macronist block is deeply fragmented: the “heirs” (35%) remain loyal to the centre right and will support either Philippe or Attal. Those “tempted by the right” (27%) could vote for Les Républicains (LR), or even the RN. Those “tempted by the left” (23%) are considering a return to the moderate left. Finally, the “disillusioned” (15%) appear disappointed by Macronism and politics in general and could abstain. Philippe is currently in second place in the polls behind Bardella, but he is being closely followed by Mélenchon. His stilted style is struggling to win people over, and he will find it difficult to distinguish himself from Macronism, which is now very unpopular.

The situation is hardly better within LR. Three main candidates are currently in the running: Bruno Retailleau, former Minister of the Interior and president of LR, was chosen by the party members in April 2026. David Lisnard, mayor of Cannes and a proponent of a broad right-wing coalition, is also a candidate. Xavier Bertrand, an elected Republican who opposes any alliance with the RN, could also run. None of them have the slightest chance of making it to the second round. In the event of a RN victory, will LR support the new far-right government? This is now a conceivable prospect for the (distant) heirs of Gaullism.

On the far right, there will be a new candidacy from Éric Zemmour, who has been convicted several times for racist comments and has popularised the themes of “great replacement” and “remigration” in the public debate.

Is the RN truly “de-demonised”?

We will have to wait until 7 July to find out if Marine Le Pen will be able to run, when the Paris Court of Appeal will issue a ruling concerning Le Pen’s conviction for illegal financing. If the appeal is upheld, she will be ineligible, and Bardella will be the candidate. Both are projected to win the election according to current polls, though Bardella appears slightly more popular. But Le Pen is experienced, while the young Bardella (31 years old) is not. Furthermore, she has a more “social” approach than Bardella, who has a neoliberal economic profile which could alienate part of the RN’s working-class electorate. He has already announced that the RN will backtrack on its proposal to return the retirement age to 62, a proposal which Le Pen still supports.

This is above all an historic election that could bring the far right to power in France for the first time since 1945. A RN presidency would have a significant impact on France’s domestic and foreign policy and would reinforce the nativist and nationalist camp in Europe.

The RN seems certain to qualify for the second round. Which other candidate will make it to the second round to challenge Bardella or Le Pen? A centre-left, pro-European candidate like Glucksmann or Hollande? That seems highly unlikely at present. A centre-right candidate like Édouard Philippe? It is a possibility, but he will have to overcome the widespread rejection of Macronism. A Bardella-Mélenchon showdown? That is a plausible scenario because Mélenchon excels in personalised elections and should still benefit from tactical voting on the left.

In this scenario, would we witness the return of the “Republican Front”, the alliance of all against the far right, in a great anti-fascist surge? This is indeed the great unknown of this election: has the RN definitively been “de-demonised”, like in other European countries, such as Italy? Or does a visceral aversion to it persist, leading “democrats of all stripes” to prefer, at the last minute, to support a candidate they dislike? This is Mélenchon’s hope. Is it realistic? Polls indicate that LFI is currently considered by voters to be “more dangerous for democracy than the RN”. It is therefore a slim hope.

By Philippe Marlière, Professor of French and European Politics at University College London.

Ahead of the ten year anniversary of the EU referendum on 23 June, UK in a Changing Europe experts have written a short series of blogs reflecting on some of the issues at the heart of Brexit then and now. Here, Nicola McEwen reflects on Brexit and devolution.

The UK voted to leave the European Union a decade ago while Scotland, along with Northern Ireland, voted to remain. Those divergent choices marked a shift not just in the UK’s relationship with its European partners, but in the political and institutional relationships between the constituent parts of these islands.

The implications of Brexit for Northern Ireland dominated Brexit negotiations. Accommodating its distinctive status has been a key aspect of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement. Considerably less effort went into accommodating Scotland’s distinctive preferences. Early proposals to facilitate a special relationship with the EU, including within the EU internal market, were quickly dismissed without much consideration. And over the past decade, the politics and process of leaving and living outside of the European Union have contributed to a weakening of the authority of the devolved institutions and perhaps of the Union itself.

EU law provided a regulatory architecture that supported devolution in the UK, limiting the likelihood of policy divergences producing market distortions. As a political community in which sovereignty was explicitly pooled, the EU also helped to reconcile the doctrine of Westminster parliamentary sovereignty with the principle of sharing political authority across the UK’s constituent units, while facilitating the plurality of political and territorial identities on these islands. The Brexit drive to reassert ‘national sovereignty’ and to ‘take back control’ sat uneasily alongside these shared sovereignty norms and self-government claims that underpinned devolution.

One manifestation has been a weakening of the Sewel convention. This convention held that, although its sovereignty was not affected by devolution, the UK Parliament would not normally legislate on devolved matters without the consent of the devolved legislatures. The corresponding process of securing legislative consent became a routine feature; consent was rarely withheld, and when it was, it was usually temporary pending a negotiated compromise.

That was until the Brexit referendum. When the UK government passed the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018, it did so without the Scottish Parliament’s consent, which Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, former Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, described as ‘a terrible precedent’. Breaching the convention became much more frequent as the Brexit process got underway. Then Welsh First Minister, Mark Drakeford noted: “The Sewel convention was never breached, not once, by Conservative Governments, as well as Labour Governments, for nearly 20 years… we now see… the breach of Sewel becoming almost normalised.”

Perhaps the most blatant breach was also the most controversial of the Brexit legislation introduced by the UK government. The four administrations had been working together to explore whether and how they might develop ‘common frameworks’ in some areas where EU law intersected with devolved law, to avoid unnecessary divergence after the UK left the EU. That cooperative process contrasted with UK government legislation to underpin the UK internal market.

The UK Internal Market Act (2020) was passed in the face of fierce opposition from the devolved institutions. It introduced two Market Access Principles (MAPs). The first ensures that goods and services that can be legally sold/provided in one part of the UK can be sold anywhere in the UK, without having to meet further requirements. The second protects businesses and professionals from being subject to direct or indirect discrimination that favours local goods or service providers.

The effect has been to erode the legal authority of the devolved parliaments and inhibit their ability to introduce distinctive legislation that regulates goods and services. A process was established to permit exclusions from the MAPs, but this delays law-making, creates uncertainty, masks accountability, and has, in effect, given the UK government a veto over devolved legislation that falls within the MAPs’ scope. ‘In effect’ because the UKIM Act does not explicitly curb the competence of the devolved legislatures to pass laws that regulate the market in distinctive and divergent ways, but in restricting the application of such laws to goods and services that originate in local markets, it renders them unworkable.

The most notable example of this process disrupting policy making emerged when the Scottish Government legislated for a deposit return scheme (DRS) to boost recycling. In so doing, they sought to move faster than similar schemes elsewhere in the UK and with a broader scope that included glass bottles. When the requested exclusion from the MAPs was eventually offered by the UK government, it was on a temporary basis and excluded glass, citing powerful business concerns about interoperability of DRS schemes and ‘unnecessary barriers to trade’. The Scottish Government subsequently put its scheme on hold, the company set up to administer it collapsed, and the waste firm, Biffa, sued the Scottish government – unsuccessfully – for £50 million in damages. These Brexit-related developments led to a significant deterioration in relationships between the UK government and its Scottish and Welsh counterparts.

As part of its ‘reset’ of intergovernmental relationships, Keir Starmer’s government has worked more cooperatively with the devolved governments in the implementation of the Sewel convention, despite negotiations to agree a new Memorandum of Understanding on how it should operate failing to reach agreement thus far.

The Labour government also brought forward the statutory review of the UKIM Act, softening some of its hard edges. Exclusion requests should now be considered within the cooperative common frameworks process, with evaluations of environmental protection and public health benefits to be weighed up against the economic costs of regulatory divergence.

But the government is committed to retaining the Act, despite it remaining deeply controversial and a barrier to strengthened relationships.

The Brexit referendum also had the immediate impact of reigniting the issue of Scottish independence. Its 62% Remain vote led to claims that Scotland was ‘being taken out of the EU against our will’, which then-First Minister Nicola Sturgeon said was a ‘significant and material change of the circumstances in which Scotland voted against independence in 2014’. Brexit also increased discussion among the ‘indycurious’ in Wales.

The recent election victories for Plaid Cymru and the Scottish National Party, the devastating defeats for the Labour Party, and the emergence of Reform UK as an electoral force are testament to some of the political legacies of Brexit. Though neither the Scottish nor Welsh parliaments have the constitutional competence to pursue the SNP and Plaid’s self-government ambitions, the vote to leave the European Union a decade ago continues to test the resilience of the UK Union today.

By Nicola McEwen, Professor of Public Policy and Governance, University of Glasgow Centre for Public Policy.