The legal dispute between Kernel Corporation and the state-owned Sense Bank is ongoing. The largest player in Ukraine’s sunflower oil market is seeking to get 1.75 billion hryvnias from the bank. The legal battle is taking place at the Kyiv Commercial Court.
I have already written about why there is a lot wrong with these proceedings. Literally everything about it is strange: how Sense Bank was drawn into the proceedings (even though it shouldn’t have been involved), how the judge was selected, and how the claim was formulated. The question of whether there are grounds for involving Sense Bank remains one of the key issues in the case. It is surprising that this $39 million has absolutely nothing to do with either Sense Bank or the state – yet they may be forced to pay it. It is also crucial to understand that the payment of 1.75 billion hryvnias will be borne by the state budget, either directly or indirectly, because it is clear that the payment of such a sum cannot fail to have a negative impact on the bank’s capital as a whole.
There is currently cause for optimism. If the court proves to be impartial, and the bank and its owner (the state, represented by the Ministry of Finance) make every reasonable effort, the likelihood of a ruling in Kernel’s favour is minimal. But this is precisely where the risks I have already written about arise.
I have reasonable doubts about the randomness of the judge’s selection, about Kernel’s motives, and even about the impartiality of Sense Bank’s senior management. Yes, this is not a ‘suspicion’ in the sense that investigators and prosecutors attach to this word, but simply my own personal assessment. However, I have a substantial body of facts that allows us to view this court case from a different angle. I have already posted some of them; I will present the rest in this text. I would suggest that representatives of the Ministry of Finance and the High Council of Justice (HCJ) pay particular attention to these facts.
A little background
The devil is in the detail, and this whole story is, quite literally, woven from details. All in all, the plot itself sounds implausible – just as a metal pole, a rope and a sheet, taken separately, cannot cross the sea. However, if you tie them together into a single raft using logs and empty plastic containers, and stretch a sheet over the pole, you’ll end up with a viable structure. In my view, that is precisely what Kernel’s lawyers did.
To understand how their case against ‘Sense’ is progressing, one needs to consider the legal intricacies, the characters’ life stories, possible signs of a conspiracy and the large sums of money involved.
I’ll start with the general framework. I have described the substance of the claim in detail, explaining why the Kernel v Sense Bank case is a matter of national importance.
If you don’t want to waste time on the details, here’s the short version. The Kyiv Commercial Court is hearing a claim brought by the Cypriot company Etrecom, which is part of the Kernel Group. The claim has been brought against another Cypriot offshore company, Greatford, which was previously linked to Sense Bank through a common shareholder. At first glance, a Ukrainian court is not required to hear a dispute between two foreign companies. However, Etrecom’s lawyers named the nationalised Sense Bank as a co-defendant and put together a tort claim that was clearly flimsy. As a result, the case fell within the jurisdiction of a Ukrainian court. However, such a claim requires careful judicial assessment as to whether it complies with the rules of jurisdiction and the appropriate remedy.
The dispute centres on a debt of $39 million. Kernel has a fairly long history of dealings with Sense Bank, dating back to when ‘Sense’ was known as ‘Alfa-Bank Ukraine’. The group was a client of the bank, took out loans, and, on the whole, the relationship had been positive. It was precisely on the basis of this positive experience that Kernel, through its company Etrecom, decided to invest its own funds in Loan Participation Notes (LPNs) issued by the Dutch independent fund E.M.I.S. Finance B.V. To this end, it purchased these bonds on the secondary market from Greatford.
Loan Participation Notes (LPNs) from E.M.I.S. were a very good instrument. The Dutch company E.M.I.S. was legally independent of Sense Bank. This ‘money bag’ in the Netherlands collected funds and then channelled them as a loan to ‘Sense’ via the bank’s parent company. The bank used this money to grant loans, and the repayments collected on those loans were eventually intended to be used to service the bonds.
Money was also collected for E.M.I.S. via ‘Sense’. Bonds issued by a Dutch company were offered for sale to clients (investors) of the Ukrainian VIP banking service of ‘Sense’, formerly known as ‘A-Club’. LPNs offered higher returns compared with foreign-currency deposits and foreign-currency government bonds, and also allowed investors to transfer substantial savings out of Ukraine without obtaining the relevant foreign-exchange licences, which was entirely legal, as investors could already receive all LPN payments into accounts held with foreign banks. That is why people were happy to buy them. The buyers included many wealthy families, represented by leading figures in Ukrainian business and senior officials.
As far as I am aware, Kernel’s relationship with Sense Bank and Etrecom’s relationship with Greatford are in no way connected. They merely demonstrate that the Kernel group of companies was closely linked, through economic ties, to the group of companies that included both Sense Bank and Greatford. This is precisely what demonstrates just how insidious such relationships can sometimes be, if one of the parties is able to draw on administrative resources.
Kernel did not register LPNs under any of its numerous companies, nor even under the publicly listed Luxembourg holding company, but under the Cypriot offshore company Etrecom. This offshore company is the financial heart of Kernel; it is through this company that the agricultural holding channels loans, dividends and other cash flows.
Nationalisation took place in July 2023. The Ukrainian government, represented by the Ministry of Finance, has become the new owner of Sense Bank. The Ministry of Finance has announced that it will not recognise the debts of the previous owners. In particular, it prohibited the bank from making payments to E.M.I.S. in respect of the LPN bonds.
However, this was of little significance to Kernel, as E.M.I.S. had undergone restructuring and promised to repay the bonds in 2029–30. All that was left to do was wait.
However, Kernel decided not to wait another three years, but to get the money back straight away. In their claim, the lawyers effectively stated that Sense Bank must pay Kernel 1.75 billion UAH – the hryvnia equivalent of $39 million at the current exchange rate.
It is interesting to note that Etrecom itself claims that there is apparently an LPN repurchase agreement, entered into between Etrecom and Greatford under English law. However, Etrecom failed to fulfil the aforementioned contract and is therefore fully aware that it has no cause of action in England. The court system in Ukraine is therefore an attempt to get round this shortcoming.
Formally, the claim has been brought against the same Cypriot offshore company Greatford, which was once affiliated with Sense Bank. However, all the funds held by this offshore company are frozen as part of criminal proceedings in Ukraine; in other words, they are inaccessible, whereas ‘Sense’ does have funds at its disposal. I think Kernel’s lawyers named the bank as a co-defendant precisely in order to get their hands on the money. Although the state-owned bank has absolutely nothing to do with this debt, it is being led to the gallows and may well be forced to pay.
And, as the icing on the cake, here’s another interesting fact. The recovery of funds from the bank is in no way linked to future LPN payments. The structure of the claims stated rightly raises the question of how the possibility of double compensation will be ruled out in the event of future payments under the LPNs. It cannot be ruled out that Etrecom is attempting to obtain funds twice: first, to recover funds from the bank through a tort claim, and then, at a later date, to receive further funds following the repayment of the LPNs by E.M.I.S.
The legal framework itself is extremely vulnerable. At the same time, it was presented as though it were entirely justified and in accordance with the law. In essence, Etrecom is seeking to use the mechanisms for the protection of infringed rights provided for under Ukrainian law to turn them against the State of Ukraine at this extremely difficult time for the country.
One would like to believe that the Ukrainian justice system will be able to establish the true legal nature of the legal relationship that arose between Etrecom and Greatford, to distinguish between artificially created torts and genuine obligations, and to prevent the financial burden of private investment from being shifted onto the shoulders of a nationalised banking institution
Next, I’ll talk about a few pitfalls in this matter.
Strange coincidences regarding the appointment of a judge
I have already mentioned that Kernel filed the same claim three times, and the case was ultimately assigned to Judge Svitlana Pogribna. It should be noted that she had previously ruled on cases involving companies within the Kernel Group. In recent years, Ms Pogribna has worked at the Commercial Court of Poltava Region, and was seconded to Kyiv for a period of one year to help optimise the court’s caseload.
Perhaps Kernel saw this secondment as a positive sign. If you follow the link, you will find several cases in which Judge Pogribna has already handed down rulings that could be interpreted as having been in the holding company’s favour.
Presumably, the holding company was so keen for her specifically to hear the case that it paid a hefty fee – around $50,000. Whenever the claim was refiled, Kernel paid the court fees. It won’t be able to get some of the money back.
Such extravagance suggests that Kernel may be expecting a much larger win. The question of why the case ultimately ended up before Judge Pogribna may be the subject of a further investigation by the High Council of Justice (HCJ).
In this very moment important to mention, that the public outcry and press attention to this process did not go unnoticed and led to certain consequences – the judge Pogribna was forced to recuse herself.
I understand Kernel’s logic perfectly. $39 million today is worth much more than $39 million in three years’ time. Receiving the money ahead of schedule will more than make up for all the costs. And if, by some miracle, they manage to hold on to the Loan Participation Notes (LPNs) and wait until 2029, they could receive their $39 million again, this time from E.M.I.S.
The very fact that Svitlana Pogribna had already ruled on legal proceedings involving Kernel should have been a ‘compelling’ reason for her recusal from hearing Kernel’s case. However, the judge is continuing to preside over the case. One explanation for this is that she herself considered the application for recusal, found nothing amiss, and ruled that the recusal was unfounded. Which, in itself, raises questions about her motives.
However, the colleague who considered the motion for her recusal supported Pogribna’s position and also rejected the motion.
From notary to judge
The career path of the judge presiding over this case is interesting in its own right. Svitlana Pogribna began her career as a private notary in Kharkiv. Her office was originally located in an industrial and residential area on Plekhanivska Street, but later she moved to the quiet historic centre, near Sumska Street, Teatralna Square and the former Peremohy Square. The area around her office on Gogol Street (later Skrypnyk Street) was home to the offices of numerous companies and a prestigious residential neighbourhood. Working as a notary in such a place was straightforward, prestigious and lucrative. In essence, it is a guarantee of a comfortable life for oneself and one’s family right through to old age.
I don’t know what prompted Ms Pogribna to give up such a golden opportunity and go into the judiciary. She made that decision in 2012, at the height of the Yanukovych era. It is clear that this appointment was not the result of backroom dealings, as she did not hear any politically significant cases. Proof: The Euromaidan took place shortly afterwards, but the lustration process did not affect Pogribna. She weathered the staff purges and integrity checks carried out by the new reformers just as smoothly, following the 2016 judicial reform.
In recent years, Ms Pogribna has worked as a judge at the Commercial Court of Poltava Oblast, even though all her assets were officially still registered in Kharkiv. It was whilst in Poltava that she upheld decisions which could be regarded as beneficial to ‘Kernel’.
An analysis of the [tax] declarations revealed nothing untoward. The judge has not managed to amass a large fortune; her property and car are extremely modest, and she also has a mortgage on the property. And yet, Pogribna’s biography is not without its flaws. In 2020, the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP) received a report alleging that she had breached anti-corruption legislation. However, the case was not heard because, by the time the report was received, the limitation period within which the judge could have been held administratively liable had already expired. It is quite possible that someone carried out a procedural step, but at a time that was extremely favourable to Pogribna, in order to minimise the risks to her.
The question remains: Could Judge Pogribna be a convenient choice for ‘Kernel’ in this particular case? If so, what might her personal motivation have been there? In this regard, I would like to draw your attention to the following two points.
Firstly, Svitlana Pogribna is 61 years old. The age limit for a judge is 65, and she is already frequently on sick leave. Pogribna is due to return to work at the Commercial Court of Poltava Oblast shortly, after which she faces a few more years of routine work before retirement. Her possessions are modest. A judge’s pension is decent by Ukrainian standards, but following yet another devaluation and several years of inflation, the purchasing power of that money will be eroded.
The second point also relates to Svitlana Pogribna’s motivation. The thing is, her son – Oleg – is going through a difficult time at the moment. It cannot be ruled out that helping him might serve as a further incentive [for her] to side with one of the parties in the Kernel v Sense Bank case.
I am not suggesting that Judge Pogribna should automatically be suspected of corruption. On the contrary, the recent sentencing of the former President of the Supreme Court, Vsevolod Kniaziev, was intended to deter judges from deliberately ruling in favour of one of the parties.
Nevertheless, circumstances relating to the judge’s family situation may give rise to heightened public interest in the hearing of this case. Given the scale of the claim and the judge’s personal circumstances, the transparency of her actions in this case should be the subject of close scrutiny by the supervisory authorities.
The case of Oleg Pogribny
The register of decisions of the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Public Prosecutors contains Decision No. 180dp-26. The Commission decided to hold him accountable under disciplinary proceedings and to impose a disciplinary sanction in the form of dismissal from his post within the public prosecution service. The Commission adopted the decision on 1 April 2026, and the order imposing the disciplinary sanction is dated 5 May, as stated in the Register of Persons Who Have Committed Corruption or Corruption-Related Offences.
Prior to this decision, the son of Judge Svitlana Pogribna had held the post of prosecutor at the Luhansk Specialised Prosecutor’s Office for Defence in the Eastern Region since July 2024. Judging by the text of the decision, complaints against him were lodged simultaneously by several former colleagues. The case was heard over several months and ended in dismissal.
The document states that his actions bore the hallmarks of a criminal offence relating to corruption. The Specialised Prosecutor’s Office for Defence in the Eastern Region has established that he:
“demonstrated a lack of integrity in the course of his official duties, breached restrictions on personal contacts and relationships that could compromise the office of a prosecutor, and engaged in conduct that could give the impression of corruption; in particular, he entered into an off-duty relationship with one of the individuals involved in criminal proceedings No. (confidential information), with whom, during private conversations via the ‘Signal’ messaging app from 1 March 2025, he discussed and planned his assistance in the unlawful removal from military registration of draft-age persons liable for military service, as well as influencing officials at the territorial recruitment and social support centres (hereinafter referred to as ‘TRSSC officials’) with the aim of obtaining an unlawful benefit in return for their entry of false data into the Unified Electronic Register of Conscripts, Persons Liable for Military Service and Reservists ‘Oberig’ (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Oberig’ register)’.
If I have understood it correctly, Prosecutor Pogribny helped someone evade conscription by exploiting his position as a prosecutor. It would appear that he wasn’t doing it for free. According to the decision of the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Public Prosecutors, Oleg Pogribny’s actions were deemed to breach the restrictions on personal ties and to give the impression of corrupt practices.
It is possible that the Office of the Prosecutor General was referring to these very incidents when it carried out a secret integrity check on Prosecutor Pogribny in 2025. “According to the findings of the aforementioned investigation, O.I. Pogribny’s integrity has not been confirmed,” states the official statement from the OPG, which I have in my possession.
Oleg Pogribny appealed against the decision to impose disciplinary sanctions at the High Council of Justice, but from the outset this appeal had little chance of success. In his declarations of integrity as a prosecutor for the periods 2023–2024, 2024–2025 and 1 January 2025–19 March 2026, he stated that he had not engaged in any corrupt practices and had not used his position as a prosecutor for his own benefit or that of third parties. However, reality has proved otherwise. The trouble came from an unexpected source. Somewhere in the Lviv Region, investigators searched a car in which they found a smartphone containing correspondence.
The decision of the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Public Prosecutors refers to the same correspondence on ‘Signal’. This is the main piece of evidence on which the decision of the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Public Prosecutors was based.
Here is just one of the quotes: “Thus, during an examination of the mobile phone seized on 9 April 2025 from a Volkswagen Passat (registration number withheld – confidential information) used by PERSON 3, correspondence dated 1 March 2025 was discovered, in which O.I. Pogribny asked PERSON 3 to cancel the summonses issued to an unidentified person registered with the Saltiv Territorial Centre of Recruitment and Social Support (TCR and SS) in the city of Kharkiv. During this conversation, PERSON 3 informed O.I. Pogribny that such actions would require a payment of between 4,000 and 5,000 US dollars and that this could be arranged through the TCR and SS located in the city of Lviv. Subsequently, PERSON 3 sent further information to O.I. Pogribny, stating that a total of between 6,000 and 7,000 US dollars would be required to have the summons cancelled, the wanted notice withdrawn and the place of registration changed (photos Nos. 1–11)”.
Because of this case, the former prosecutor has already made the headlines for all the wrong reasons. He himself claims that there was nothing at all suspicious about the correspondence, although I personally didn’t see it that way. And it’s not just me that didn’t see it that way.
Just a few days ago, on 16 July, a meeting of the HCJ took place. The High Council of Justice considered Oleg Pogribny’s appeal, as well as his application to postpone the hearing. The former prosecutor argued that he had been called up for military service and was therefore unable to attend the hearing in person. That’s certainly true. The order for his dismissal from the Public Prosecutor’s Office is dated 5 May, and the day before (4 May) he joined the National Guard.
This argument has worked twice. The HCJ adjourned the hearing of the Pogribny case on 18 June and 2 July 2026. However, on this occasion, the HCJ refused to adjourn the session or suspend the proceedings, taking the view that the matter could be considered in his absence. The Council also noted that the former prosecutor is not in a combat zone, and this does not prevent him from taking part in the hearing; in view of this, the suspension of the consideration of his appeal is unfounded. The meeting was attended by representatives of the General Inspectorate of the Office of the Prosecutor General, the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Public Prosecutors and the Specialised Prosecutor’s Office for Defence in the Eastern Region – representatives from all levels of the prosecutorial hierarchy who were involved in the decision to dismiss Pogribny.
Those present at the meeting examined the case file and upheld the decision of the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Public Prosecutors. Oleg Pogribny is still considered to have been dismissed on the grounds of “conduct that brings the office of prosecutor into disrepute and may cast doubt on his objectivity, impartiality and independence, as well as on the honesty and integrity of the prosecution service; and systematic (on two or more occasions within a single year) breaches of the rules of prosecutorial ethics”.
What’s more: As stated by Mr Pogribny’s lawyer and the prosecutors present, a criminal case has been opened in relation to the facts that have come to light, and is being investigated by the State Bureau of Investigations. For the time being, this is a case based on the facts under Part 2 of Article 369 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, concerning the exertion of influence on a public authority; the former prosecutor appears in the case as a witness. I’m no expert, but I imagine that as the case progresses, Pogribny’s status may change from that of a witness to that of a suspect. In that case, a combination of offences under the Criminal Code may apply, specifically abuse of influence (if he exerted pressure on TCR staff in the interests of third parties), receiving an unlawful benefit (if he received money in return) and aiding and abetting evasion of mobilisation.
Yes, there is a statute of limitations on prosecution under these sections, and this offers a chance to avoid punishment – just as in the case of Judge Pogribna. I suspect that the former prosecutor’s service in the National Guard may have been an attempt to drag out the proceedings in order to buy time.
So, we have a proven fact: the son of Judge Svitlana Pogribna was dismissed from the prosecution service for unacceptable behaviour that brings the office of prosecutor into disrepute. The decision withstood the appeal.
What does this mean in the context of the Kernel v Sense Bank case? There is certainly no direct link, but questions arise regarding Judge Svitlana Pogribna’s motives.
Any mother would want to help her son sort out his problems, even if he’s in the wrong. Dismissal from the Public Prosecutor’s Office means the end of one’s career and, almost certainly, the impossibility of returning to the service in the future. For its part, the criminal case looks set to have even bleaker prospects. The situation is critical, and Oleg Pogribny could do with some help to ensure that the civil case never turns into a criminal case against him. I think this situation presents a serious temptation for Judge Svitlana Pogribna to consider, at the end of her judicial career, the possibility of handing down a decision in favour of Kernel that is not in the public interest. I repeat, this is merely a reasonable assumption, but it calls for reasonable caution.
Possible collusion with the bank
I cannot overlook another important aspect.
The incredible audacity with which Kernel is taking the state to court may be explained by a traditional Ukrainian phenomenon – an agreement between the agricultural holding and the top managers of Sense Bank. I don’t usually doubt the integrity of officials at state-owned banks. However, the Mindich case has added a new dimension to the picture of the leadership of the nationalised Sense Bank, in particular that of Oleksiy Stupak, Chairman of the Management Board, and Mykola Hladyshenko, Chairman of the Supervisory Board. I wrote that a whole series of systemic irregularities had been uncovered in the bank’s operations, which can be attributed to deliberate actions on the part of management. So far, these breaches have had no consequences for the management of ‘Sense’, but this will not last forever.
I suspect there may have been an agreement between Kernel and the senior management of Sense Bank. For example, to ensure that the bank loses the case and pays 1.75 billion hryvnias to the agricultural oligarchic group.
To reiterate, this is not an accusation or a suspicion in the legal sense. This is an assumption based on my many years’ experience as a financial journalist. I have come across similar cases on more than one occasion. Usually, this is how it went. A state-owned company or agency has been locked in fierce legal battles, for example, with an oligarch’s company. But at the crucial moment, either the documents turned out not to be in order, or the representative of the state-owned company failed to appear in court, or the lawyers did not show sufficient resolve during the hearing – and the case was lost.
It was the bank’s strange stance that led me to suspect a possible conspiracy. It is reflected in two aspects.
Firstly, the bank’s lawyers are vigorously contesting Kernel’s claim and are preparing documents to support the state’s position. However, ‘Sense’ strangely ignores the fact that the case is being heard by Judge Svitlana Pogribna. It is precisely her involvement in the case that should have caused the state-owned bank the greatest concern.
To reiterate, whilst serving as a judge at the Commercial Court of Poltava Region, she repeatedly handed down rulings that could be regarded as favourable to the Kernel Group’s business interests. The claim itself, for 1.75 billion hryvnias, coincided, surprisingly, with her annual business trip to the Kyiv Commercial Court. The judicial ‘merry-go-round’ went round three times before the case ended up in Pogribna’s hands. It would seem to be highly telling, and the lawyers at ‘Sense’ should have sought the judge’s recusal on the basis of a number of circumstantial indications. But they ignored this opportunity, thereby calling the entire outcome of the case into question.
Secondly, the bank has made no public mention of the 1.75 billion hryvnia claim. But this is by no means a technical legal process.
We must be fully aware that one of Ukraine’s three largest agricultural groups is attempting to extract money from a state-owned bank in a case to which the bank has no connection. In cases such as these, public engagement is often far more important than legal action. A united stance by the state could halt such a lawsuit within an hour, and even turn the situation around in the public interest.
However, so far I am the only one writing about this process. The bank, the Ministry of Finance, the National Bank and the Office of the President have not issued any statement regarding Kernel’s lawsuit. It is possible that this silence can be explained by the bank’s management’s stance. They are obliged to sound the alarm and knock on the right doors, but they are not doing so. And this is where I believe a conspiracy is a possibility, as one of many scenarios, and the lack of an active public stance on the part of Sense Bank and the Ministry of Finance regarding this lawsuit may give rise to public debate and calls for a response from the state authorities.
It appears, therefore, that the prospects of the case being decided in Kernel’s favour are increasing sharply, whilst a victory for the agro-oligarchic group in court is highly undesirable for the state-owned bank and for Ukraine as a whole. Not only will it cost the state budget 1.75 billion hryvnias, but it will also set a precedent for all holders of LPN bonds to take legal action against Sense Bank. And this represents a potential risk amounting to many billions of hryvnias. This will have an impact on Ukraine’s budget and its commitments to the IMF and the EU (the programme focuses on risk mitigation and the privatisation, rather than the recapitalisation, of state-owned banks).
The mere fact that this claim was being discussed publicly would have spared ‘Sense’ many surprises. In fact, the claimant’s position in this case is contentious, and it is impossible to win it without outside ‘help’. Even if the court rules in its favour, Kernel stands to lose its reputation. And if the case is won at first instance, it will almost certainly go to the Supreme Court, where, following the Kniaziev case, the chances of recovering 1.75 billion hryvnias from the state are slim. But all this would only apply in the event of public disclosure, which has not yet taken place.
I apologise in advance should my hypothesis prove to be incorrect, and should the senior management of the state-owned Sense Bank be making a sincere effort to rule out the very possibility of the recovery of 1.75 billion UAH, to which it has absolutely no connection. But a single action is worth a thousand words. I hope that, in the near future, ‘Sense’ and the Ukrainian government will launch a public campaign to make the recovery of $39 million impossible.
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